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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation seeks to answer the question of whether and to what extent 
principles of natural law have figured in Supreme Court jurisprudence in the last two 
centuries. In the last quarter-century, scholars and judicial analysts have displayed a 
renewed interest in natural law reasoning and whether justices do or should take cognizance 
of natural law considerations. The issue became prominent during the 1991 confirmation 
hearings of Clarence Thomas, who had written and spoken favorably of natural law as a 
guiding principle in constitutional adjudication. 
Two cases and their progeny figure herein. In Calder v. Bull (1798), Supreme Court 
Justices Samuel Chase and James Iredell discussed whether principles of natural justice 
placed limits on legislatures beyond which they could not go, or whether judges could rely 
only on specific constitutional restraints in evaluating legislative acts. In Corfield v. 
Coryell (1823), Justice Bushrod Washington explained that the Constitution’s Privileges 
and Immunities Clause protects those rights that are “fundamental,” and many subsequent 
commentators and courts have given this statement a natural rights gloss. 
This work contributes to existing Supreme Court literature by tracing the entire 
history of Calder and Corfield, the two cases most frequently cited for potentially having 
  viii 
natural law implications. The paper considers each citation as it is relevant to the natural 
law debate; cases are excluded only because they are cited for another point. For example, 
cases that cite Calder for its holding that the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto clause only 
applies to criminal cases are not considered. 
The paper concludes that natural law considerations now figure in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence only in a mediated sense. While several Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
opinions, including Corfield itself, accept natural law principles as interpretative guides, 
natural law as a free-standing source of adjudication has faded from Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Concomitantly, the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a source of rights 
has been largely discarded in favor of a substantive due-process jurisprudence, with the 
Court adopting a gradual, common-law type of approach in determining the constitutional 
limits of government interference with Americans’ rights. 
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PRELIMINARY INTRODUCTION:  CALDER AND CORFIELD INTRODUCED 
This paper will trace the history of natural law and natural rights in Supreme Court 
history through the vehicle of two seminal cases, one of them itself a leading Supreme 
Court opinion, the other a much-cited and discussed judgment rendered by Supreme Court 
Justice Bushrod Washington in 1823.  The first case is Calder v. Bull (1798).1  The second 
is Corfield v. Coryell.2 
 A very brief discussion of those cases and their importance follows; they each will 
be addressed in much greater detail as follows:  First, I will trace the history of natural law3 
as reflected in Calder and Supreme Court cases citing Calder up to and including the 1899 
case of Atchison, T & S.F.R. v. Matthews4.  Atchison provides a sensible dividing point for 
several reasons.  First (and somewhat coincidentally), the Court handed down that opinion 
almost precisely a century after the 1798 Calder case.  Second, the case is the last of the 
Nineteenth-Century cases construing the recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment, the 
constitutional revision that fundamentally altered the American system of federalism.  
Third, and most importantly, Atchison marked the end of a certain type of “natural law” 
case, those cases emphasizing primarily contractual rights and economic issues.  When 
Calder was first cited in the Twentieth Century,5 nearly half a century after Atchison, the 
                                               
1 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).   
2 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa 1823).   
3 For brevity purposes, I will use the term “natural law” from this point in this introductory section.  It 
is to be understood that the phrase (unless the context clearly indicates otherwise) includes the related 
concepts of “natural justice” and “natural rights".   
4 Atchison, T & S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899). 
5 I am considering Calder citations only as they relate to the "natural justice" debate between Justices 
Chase and Iredell.  I am not concerned with Calder citations that invoke its ex post facto holding.  
Throughout, when I use a phrase such as "the next Calder cite," that qualification should be 
understood.   
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focus had shifted to individual liberties, both in the field of criminal law (in considering 
whether prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s silence was constitutionally permissible, 
for example) and in questions of individual autonomy (is there a constitutional “right to 
privacy”?).   
There is a substantial difference between the principles of natural law on the one 
hand, and natural rights on the other.  John Locke, a key influence on America's founders, 
would emphasize natural rights in his writings, treating rights as possessions.  The founders 
found Locke useful in emphasizing liberty and self-governance, concepts that do not 
predominate theories of classical natural law.6  This work will seek to examine both the 
natural law and the natural rights traditions.   
Second, I will then focus on Calder’s subsequent history, dating from Adamson v. 
California7 and continuing to the present day.  The Supreme Court or one of its justices 
most recently cited Calder8 in a “takings” case, Kelo v. City of New London9.  Interestingly, 
Kelo was a property case. There, the Court faced the issue of whether, under the federal 
Constitution’s “Takings Clause,”10 a municipality that seized private property, could, under 
certain circumstances, still comply with the “public use” requirement for eminent domain, 
even where the property was transferred to another private party.   
                                               
6 See infra, pp. 34 - 36.   
7 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
8  I will be tracing Calder’s history only as it is cited for the natural law debate between Justices Chase 
and Iredell.  The Court has cited it frequently for its specific holding that the constitutional prohibition 
on ex post facto laws applied only in the criminal law context.  For my purposes, anytime I use a 
phrase like “the next case to cite Calder,” it is to be understood to mean “the next case to cite Calder 
for its natural law implications.”  I am not concerned with the specific ex post facto holding.   
9 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
10 U.S. Constitution, Amendment V.  “Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”  
  
3 
One case does not make a trend however, and it certainly could not be said that 
Calder has come full circle to be applied again to property, contractual and economic 
issues.  Perhaps subsequent future appointments to the Supreme Court will determine that.  
In February 2016, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia (who will figure herein) passed 
away, and was replaced by Neil Gorsuch, an apparently like-minded jurist in the seat.  But 
the Court's ideological bent in the near future (it is now closely split) will depend, as 
always, on which seats become vacant, which president fills those seats, and the Senate’s 
willingness to confirm those presidential appointees.     
Finally, I consider Corfield, an 1823 lower court case.  Corfield is unusual in the 
degree to which it influenced subsequent legal history in the United States without having 
the status of a U.S. Supreme Court judgment.11  It is unique to this work in being the only 
decision considered not issued by the U.S. Supreme Court.12  But it remains the definitive 
(even if somewhat ambiguous) statement on the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.13   
Calder arose from a state-level probate case and a Connecticut statute altering the 
outcome of a judicial ruling in a will dispute.  The probate court for Hartford, Connecticut 
                                               
11 There are a handful of other such cases.  Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 
1928) comes to mind, for example, a decision of the highest court in New York State, known to any 
student of torts.  
12 In fact, Bushrod Washington was a Supreme Court Justice at the time he issued his opinion in 
Corfield.  But he issued the ruling while “riding circuit,” an Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
practice of Supreme Court justices, and Washington was acting in the capacity of a district court 
judge.   
13 “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states.”  U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.  The Fourteenth Amendment also includes such a 
clause: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or  immunities of 
citizens of the United States.” (emphasis supplied in both cases).   
 
  
4 
refused, in 1793, to honor a will under which the Bulls inherited from the testator.   The 
Calders inherited instead.  The time for appealing that decision lapsed, but the Connecticut 
legislature passed a law in 1795, granting a new trial and right of appeal, legal remedies 
that would have been barred by Connecticut law prior to the 1795 statute.14 
The probate court subsequently did honor the will under which the Bulls inherited, 
and the Calders took an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, which faced the issue of whether 
the 1795 Connecticut statute violated the federal Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto 
laws.15 
The Court held that the statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, ruling that 
the Clause applied only to criminal matters.  On this issue, the Court was unanimous.  
Calder has been cited frequently for this now-unremarkable (because so well-established) 
legal principle.  Calder’s more fundamental importance and relevance for this work is the 
natural law debate in which Justices Chase and Iredell engaged.16  Specifically, Justice 
Chase argued that there are certain “fundamental” principles that no legislature may 
violate, that in fact any such “act” of a legislature could not even be called a “law.”17 
Justice Iredell challenged Chase’s approach, classifying it as relying on “natural 
justice.”  A court lacks authority, Justice Iredell wrote, to base rulings on its own 
conception of such principles.18  Justice Iredell would have agreed, perhaps, that 
                                               
14 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 386 (1798). 
15 “no state…shall pass any…ex post facto law.”  U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10.   
16 There was no opinion “for the Court” as there likely would be today.  Four justices wrote separate 
seriatim opinions with a unanimous holding that there was no ex post facto violation. 
17 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (1798).  Chase’s argument that a legislative 
act violating fundamental principles was not “law” at all both reflected and presaged a fundamental 
dispute among legal theorists regarding the very nature of law.   
18 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (1798).   
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constitutional drafters should be mindful of natural law principles, but the constitutional 
commands, and those alone, were controlling insofar as courts were concerned.   
In Corfield, Justice Washington, “riding circuit” (and thus not speaking for the U.S. 
Supreme Court) confronted a New Jersey statute that prohibited anyone not an inhabitant 
of the state from gathering certain types of seafood, including clams and oysters from state 
waters upon any vessel that was not “wholly owned” by a New Jersey resident or 
inhabitant.19  Among other allegations, the petitioner claimed that New Jersey’s law 
violated the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.   
Rejecting the claim, Washington wrote that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
did not require a state to offer all the rights belonging to its citizens to non-residents as 
well.  Rather, the Clause referred to those privileges and immunities which were “in their 
nature fundamental.”20  These fundamental principles were ones that belonged, 
Washington wrote, by right to “the citizens of all free governments.”21 
Like Calder, Corfield has a lengthy subsequent history in opinions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, stretching from 187322 to 2010.23  Although Washington’s opinion in that 
case has been said to be based on a now-discarded view of natural law24 and although the 
opinion was ambiguous as to several points, including whether states were required to 
afford their citizens these fundamental rights,25 Corfield, like Calder has been a 
                                               
19 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, -- (E.D.Pa. 1823). 
20 Ibid.¸6 Fed. Case. 546, -- (E.D. Pa. 1823).   
21 Ibid., 6 Fed. Case. 546, -- (E.D. Pa. 1823). 
22 See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
23 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
24 See Upham, David, “Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of American 
Citizenship,” Texas Law Review, 83:1483, 1485 (2005). 
25 Ibid.  See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, --- (Thomas, J., concurring) (2010). 
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springboard for broad discussions at the Supreme Court for the application of natural law 
principles.  One obvious difference between the two cases is that Corfield interpreted a 
particular provision of the Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause (in addition 
to providing fodder for a later constitutional amendment), whereas the Chase-Iredell debate 
in Calder considered the appropriateness of extra-constitutional considerations (or at least 
so Iredell would have it).   
Still, the two cases read together with their extensive subsequent histories work 
quite well in tandem in analyzing the history of natural law considerations at the Supreme 
Court.  Many of the issues and judicial personalities involved will be common to both 
case’s histories. These include not only natural law issues as such but concerns like the 
scope of judicial review, the application of the law’s “spirit,” the nature of fundamental 
rights and the extent to which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
contains a “substantive” guarantee that certain governmental actions, irrespective of any 
process employed in their enactment, are, by their nature, off-limits.   
 
Natural law and the American Founding  
   One question that arose contemporaneously with the ratification of the American 
Constitution, and has continued to bedevil political historians ever since, is 
whether good government principles were somehow “natural” in origin, or whether they 
reflected the principles which early Americans were accustomed to as British 
subjects.   While law might then spring from either a natural or a positivistic source, 
the latter could be drawn from the former in an English-style constitutional republic.  Many 
positivist scholars would stress the need for a constitution to incorporate principles of 
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justice derivable from natural law as the sine qua non for that constitution to be accorded 
respect or even, in some theorists’ view, to count as “law” at all.26  Among the American 
founders, Thomas Jefferson, at least, thought that the creation of a democratic republic was 
itself a requirement of natural law.  In procuring a state of society, Jefferson wrote, 
men have a right to "regulate and control, jointly indeed with all those who have concurred 
in the procurement" of that society.27  A prominent twentieth-century analyst was to make 
this process of democratic participation the theme of his work.28  
 In Calder then, when Justice Chase wrote about the limits of legislative power, 
was he writing about “fundamental” principles in the sense that those principles are 
timeless, applying to all nations and discoverable through the use of right reason?  Or 
was he, in a much more limited sense, suggesting that American law inherited these 
principles from English law, and that those principles became part of the social contract 
obligating both the people and the government?  The answer to that question may never 
be clear; in fact, some commentators suggest that the political theorists of revolutionary 
America were themselves muddled:    
Legal historians once widely assumed that the Revolution was instigated 
and the Constitution ratified, by lawyers who were somehow motivated by 
a belief in deductive natural law.  More recently, historians have tended to 
suppose that common law tradition, or customary law tradition, or some 
mixture of the two described by the catch-phrase “rights of 
Englishmen” was the motivating force.  Both of these lines of interpretation 
attribute much more coherence and intelligibility to revolutionary era legal 
writings than those writings possess. Revolutionary era lawyers 
unreflectively conflated reason and custom – which means that, in many 
                                               
26 Jacobsohn, “Hamilton, Positivism, & the Constitution,” Polity (1981) 73. 
27 Quoted in Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic (1996), 234. 
28 Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980). 
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respects, we can never draw definitive conclusions about constitutional 
interpretation from the writings.29 
 
It seems that even the most prominent legal commentators of the era were of two 
minds.  That remains true today, with many theorists emphasizing the Constitution's (or 
the Declaration of Independence's) natural law antecedents (Michael Zuckert is a leading 
proponent of this viewpoint) while others emphasize British common law antecedents 
(John Phillip Reid for example).  But the point remains that it would be error to attribute 
too much consistency and coherency to either the pre- or post-revolutionary 
period.  Zuckert, for example, quotes the following passage from Forrest McDonald's 
work Novus Ordo Seclorum:  
When the decision for independence was made, all claims to rights that were 
based upon royal grants, the common law and the British 
constitution became theoretically irrelevant.  The Americans thus 
"unequivocally justified" themselves in the Declaration "by an appeal to the 
Laws of Nature and Nature's God.”30 
 
While this may have been accurate as far as it goes, it does not go nearly far 
enough.  For McDonald would put the emphasis on the word "theoretically".   McDonald, 
in a section not quoted by Zuckert, went on to explain the founders' influences continued 
to be many and varied:    
That opened a can of worms.  As indicated in fact, and in law, 
Americans already enjoyed a complex and interrelated variety of 
property rights, derived from the disavowed British sources, and the same 
was true of their liberties.  Yet, according to one reading of the natural-
rights theory that was most applicable to their circumstances – that 
associated with John Locke – declaring independence threw them 
                                               
29 Whitman, “Why did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and Reason?,” University of 
Chicago Law Review, 58:4 (Autumn, 1991), 1323. 
30 Quoted in Zuckert (1997), The Natural Rights Republic, 114.  
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temporarily into a state of nature wherein all previously existing law (except 
the law of nature itself) was nullified. (emphasis supplied).31  
 
McDonald went on to note that while the founders could not ignore this theory, they 
were, nonetheless, a "hard-headed, practical band of men who disdained chimerical 
theory."32  Moreover, while whether or not America's Declaration of Independence threw 
the colonies into a state of nature had practical and not just theoretical implications, early 
Americans were also divided as to that issue.33  And as other commentators have pointed 
out, the Declaration served largely as a brief, in which an advocate makes every argument 
available, including arguments based on natural law.  The language appropriate to a 
Declaration of Independence, invoking natural rights, might not be appropriate as a basis 
for governing, and in fact the American Constitution, as originally drafted, was devoid of 
reference to natural rights (although the Ninth Amendment would soon refer to rights 
retained by the people).34 
 Prior to the adoption of a written constitution in the late 1780’s, the famous dictum 
of Sir Edward Coke in the celebrated Bonham’s Case to the effect that acts of the English 
Parliament that were contrary to “right and reason” were “utterly void”35 was frequently 
cited in the writings of American courts and commentators.  References to Coke’s dictum 
largely disappeared after the adoption of the Constitution.36 That Coke's 
                                               
31 McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum (1985), 59. 
32 Ibid., 59 – 60.  
33 See Ibid., 144 – 152.   
34 Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980), 49. 
35 Quoted in McDowell, “Coke, Corwin and the Constitution,” The Review of Politics, 55:3 (Summer 
1993), 394.  As discussed in text, English common law was thought to be a manifestation of reason.  
36 McDowell, “Coke, Corwin and the Constitution,” The Review of Politics, 55:3 (Summer 
1993), passim.   
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influence remained strong, though, is evidenced by the fact that his was the only treatise 
that Justice Iredell consulted in compiling his handwritten notes on the Calder case.37 
One modern commentator makes much of James Kent’s38 failure, in 
his Commentaries, to “accord…serious consideration (to) Coke’s idea that acts of a 
legislature that contravene ‘common right and reason’ are to be held void.”39  Indeed, Kent 
specifically rejected this reasoning in light of the presence of a written constitution.  Kent 
is quoted as holding that statements that laws repugnant to “right or reason” are void 
meant only that courts should give such laws a “reasonable construction."  After all, “the 
will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land.”40  
But the legislature’s will is not necessarily the “supreme law of the land” in the 
United States, a claim that the Constitution makes for itself.  So the question returns – again 
– to the proper method for judicial interpretation of that document.  And in the very next 
section after that quoted above, when discussing the “power to declare (laws repugnant to 
the Constitution) void,” Kent cites, approvingly, a 1792 South Carolina case, Bowman vs. 
Middleton, which struck down a state law that “took away the freehold of one man, 
and vested it in another without any compensation.”41  The Court there, Kent notes (and 
without a hint of disapproval), did not rule based on “any special provision of the state 
constitution,” but rather found that the act was “against common right and the principles 
                                               
37 Justice Iredell's handwritten notes, at the Duke Library, M – 5355. 
38 James Kent was a prominent American law professor and jurist, and renowned author of the 
authoritative Commentaries on American Law.  He was, in a sense, the American Blackstone.  
39 McDowell, “Coke, Corwin and the Constitution, The Review of Politics, 53:3 (Summer 1993), 398. 
40 Ibid.   
41 Kent, Commentaries (1960 ed.), I, 475. 
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of magna charta,” and violated “those great fundamental principles which support all 
government and property.”42  
The ambiguity surrounding considerations of natural law in judicial opinions that 
is reflected in Kent's Commentaries is apparent in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
throughout the years of the Marshall Court, the first third of the 
Nineteenth Century.  Although a series of cases in this era appeared to erect a firm 
distinction between natural and constitutional law, the Court nonetheless grounded 
holdings outside the constitutional area on principles of natural justice and infused even its 
constitutional holdings with natural law principles.43  Natural law was, then "pertinent to 
constitutional cases, but not dispositive of them."44  While it has been said that natural law 
faded as a jurisprudential influence in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, except as 
it had been incorporated into positive law,45 it would still retain its influence in the 
economic sphere, and, beginning in the middle of the Twentieth Century, in the sphere of 
personal liberties.  Or at least some commentators and jurists have so maintained.  But 
whether the argument is true may depend on the definition of natural law or natural rights 
that is used.   
Natural law defined  
One issue with which any commentator on natural law must grapple is the variety 
of definitions given the term by philosophers over centuries.  That variety raises the 
                                               
42 Ibid.   
43 White, The Marshall Court (1991), 674-675. 
44 Ibid., 675. 
45 Ibid.  
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question of whether these thinkers have been talking about the same thing.  All agree that 
natural law is a higher sort of law than that which is enacted and man-made and particular 
to a jurisdiction (i.e., “positive” law).  But the unanimity stops there, as philosophers offer 
numerous other defining characteristics that are often inconsistent, and even mutually 
exclusive.  Trying to define natural law has been likened to a Rorschach Test writ 
large:  Working definitions are “suggestive of well-defined, recognizable images, yet they 
are so indeterminate that they permit us to see in them what we want to see.”46  
Perhaps natural law is that law which most accords with human nature as it is, with 
an ultimate view towards promoting peace in society.47  Commentators, beginning at least 
as far back as Burlamaqui have made this point, and continue to do so in modern 
times.48 The argument that natural law springs from mankind’s innate tendency to 
sociability is a recurring one, figuring in Grotius among others.49 Others have suggested 
that natural law is that which seeks to inculcate virtue in man in accordance with the best 
that is in him,50 or similarly, the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper 
interest.51 Thomas Aquinas famously concluded that natural law is man’s participation in 
the Eternal law.52   While most philosophers have argued that natural law is discoverable 
                                               
46 Hamburger, “Natural Rights, Natural Law and American Constitutions,” Yale Law Journal, 102 
(1993):4, 907.  
47 See, e.g., Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural and Politic Law (2006 ed.), 112. 
48 See, e.g., Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (2011), 216 – 217.   
49 Zuckert, Natural Rights (1997), 137.   Similarly, the English philosopher Roger Scruton argues that 
what distinguishes humans from animals is the “I-You” encounter, our ability to recognize that we are 
a unified subject of experience and that the “other” is as well.  The law of contract and natural law 
(predominately, the keeping of obligations) flow from this recognition.  See Scruton, The Soul of the 
World (2014), 79 – 81. 
50 See, e.g., McInerney, trans. Aquinas, Selected Writings (1998),  q. 92  
51 Locke, Second Treatise, 57. 
52 McInerney, trans. Aquinas, q, 91 
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by the use of right reason,53 they disagree over whether it is necessarily God-given law, 
which is “natural” and right precisely because God commands it. Legal philosophers have 
disagreed about whether God is even necessary to the existence of natural law:  Locke, for 
example, wrote that the fact of law necessarily implies a lawgiver,54 while Hugo Grotius 
argued that a universal law might exist irrespective of God, discerned through using right 
reason.55 Pufendorf summarized the different approaches thus:    
Some derive it (the law of nature) from the divine will, and since that is free, 
they conclude therefrom that God can change the law of nature, nay more, 
can ordain the opposite of it as is commonly the case in positive law.  But 
others assert that it is founded upon the essential holiness and justice 
of God, and since that is immutable, they conclude that the law of nature is 
also immutable.56  
 
Other scholars have noted that the essential question here is whether natural law is 
“immanent,” that is part of the “very structure of reality,” or whether it is law as will, 
imposed by a transcendent creator who might have chosen differently.57   Hobbes advanced 
the latter viewpoint, assuming one rejects the criticisms of Hobbes that he was secretly an 
atheist, and his system of society and government manifested his belief in law as will.58  
                                               
53 See, e.g., McInerney, trans., Aquinas, q. 91; Locke, s. 6; Pufendorf, Two Books (2009 ed.), 324 – 
325.  The importance of “reason” as a criterion for judicial pronouncement continues to modern 
times.  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter 
wrote that courts, in applying substantive content to the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to 
liberty in the due process clause must apply “reasoned judgement,” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 849) (Joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter), a claim that Justice Scalia 
derided as one of “philosophical abstraction” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982 ) 
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
54 One interpretation of Locke is that he viewed natural law as being dependent on God’s will, and as 
not having any ontological existence independent of God, he necessarily also concluded that our 
reason is God-given. See, Locke, 2nd Treatise (1960 ed.), s. 11. 
55 Kolakowski, Is God Happy? (2013), 246.  
56 Pufendorf (2009), Two Books, 215.   
57 Oakley, Natural Law (2005), 28 – 31.  
58 Ibid., 31.   
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Natural rights are a concept that developed apart from natural law, although the 
"rights" tradition developed within the framework of natural law.  The language of rights 
was to become central to the American Revolution.  But the term's meaning evolved over 
time.  Derived from the Latin term jus, a right, as St. Thomas explicated the term, 
referred to justice between parties; one could speak of the "arights" of a relationship in such 
a way as to make clear that a "right" was not a possession belonging to one or the other 
party.59  The turning point in the word's meaning was in the seventeenth century, when 
Suarez and Grotius made the term "right" modern.  In addition to connoting justice, 
Grotius wrote, jus referred to a "moral quality" enabling a person to "have or to do 
something justly."60  That is, a "right," became a possession.  Or, 
in other words, a "liberty," although that term was often used in early America to suggest 
a collective, rather than merely an individual right.    
 The American founders were familiar with the sometimes-conflicting writings of 
Pufendorf, Grotius, Blackstone, Locke, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Vattel, Harrington and 
Burlamaqui, among others.61 So who influenced them most?  McDonald argues for the 
primacy (aside from Locke) of Vattel and Burlamaqui, pointing out that the latter was 
frequently reprinted in America after the Revolution and into the Nineteenth Century, 
whereas Locke was not.62 Vattel's prominence may have stemmed largely from the fact 
that his writings emphasized natural law in relationships between states, and thus was 
                                               
59 Finnis, Natural Law & Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (2011) 206-209. 
60 Quoted in ibid., 207. 
61 See, e.g., McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum (1985), 60.  
62 Ibid, n.5, citing Harvey, Burlamaqui. 
 
  
15 
suited to the revolutionary arguments the American colonists were making.63  Other 
theorists have emphasized Montesquieu’s contributions from his seminal work, The Spirit 
of the Laws.  Montesquieu’s work was taught in America’s law schools, and American 
pamphleteers frequently quoted him.64  And later Supreme Court opinions which invoked 
the “spirit” of the constitution would recall Montesquieu.    
Ultimately, the question may be unanswerable.  A look at the citations of theorists 
in the published pamphlets leading to the Revolution, and in the constitutional debates 
after 1787, show that while they cited Locke most frequently, they also read and relied on 
these other thinkers often.65  Any attempt to view one thinker’s conclusions as definitive 
would be a misunderstanding of this wide mix of influences from which the founders drew 
freely. While the Declaration of Independence, authored mostly by Thomas Jefferson in 
1776, borrowed from Locke’s thought and phraseology heavily, Locke was only one 
of many natural law theorists with whom the revolutionary generation were 
familiar.66   Indeed, many commentators may have overstated the influence of Locke, at 
the expense of such theorists as Grotius, Vattel and Pufendorf, among others.67  Adding to 
the difficulty is the influence of a myriad of other thinkers from writers of the Roman 
Republic to puritan theology to commonwealth spokesmen from the English Civil 
War.68 An important point however is that debates over the relative influence of different 
                                               
63 Armitage, Civil Wars (2017) 129. 
64 Lamberti, Jean-Claude.  Montesquieu in America, “European Journal of Sociology,” 32:1, 197, 198 
(1991). 
65 See Wood, Pamphlet Debates (2015), index. 
66 Hutson, “Emergence of the Modern Concept of a Right in America,” in Shain, The Nature of Rights 
(2007). 
67 Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (1971), 99.  
68 Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (1993), 6.  
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thinkers must take a back seat to a recognition that early Americans shared a common 
approach that reflected a common vocabulary, at least at a certain level of generality.69  
Iredell’s view in Calder that “natural justice” did not give rise to judicially 
enforceable remedies appears to have been the majority view, although certainly not a 
consensus viewpoint, at least prior to the American Revolution.  Talk about both natural 
law and natural rights was often rhetorical in revolutionary America.70  Debaters frequently 
invoked natural law at the Constitutional Convention, but whether they did so as a 
rhetorical device or whether natural law was meant to have practical significance is 
disputed.71  In England the growing sentiment at the time of the American Revolution, a 
sentiment that was reflected in Locke's writings, was of parliament’s omnipotence.  The 
concept of natural law may have been a theoretical and self-enforcing restraint on 
that body, but nothing more.72  Even in the United States, at least as far as government at 
the state level was concerned, lawmakers had the power - if not necessarily the authority - 
to do most anything, something that Thomas Jefferson implicitly recognized, in his 
proposed legislation for establishing religious freedom in the Commonwealth of Virginia.  
In that document, Jefferson wrote that the then-current Virginia legislature could not bind 
                                               
69 Hamburger, “Natural Rights,” (1993) 914, FN 24.  
70 Reid, “The Authority of Rights at the American Founding,” in Shain, The Nature of Rights (2007), 
96. 
71 Pearson, "Introduction to the Transaction Edition," in Fletcher, American Interpretations of Natural 
Law, xix (2016).  Pearson takes the position that talk of natural law was only rhetorical.  But see 
Sherry, "The Founders' Unwritten Constitution," University of Chicago Law Review (1987), 1138 
(noting that post-revolutionary state courts often invoked natural law); Hittinger, The First Grace 
(2003), 119 – 123 (noting that some speakers at the Convention contemplated judicial review as the 
power to strike own positive laws that violated fundamental principles).  
72 Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 260 (1969).   In Calder, Justice Iredell made the point 
that all power is subject to abuse, and that a "salutary confidence" must be placed in a nation's leaders.  
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 400 (Opinion of Iredell, J.) (1798).  
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future legislatures with its own conceptions of natural rights.  In practice, specific 
legislation would take precedence.73    
The issue of natural law reasoning was closely connected to the concept of judicial 
review, after all, because the ultimate question that courts have confronted for centuries is 
what standards – and whether those standards are to include some concept of natural justice 
-  a reviewing party, that is, a court, will employ in considering a statute’s 
constitutionality.  The question took on special importance in the United States, where the 
courts' authority to strike down legislation as "unconstitutional" has been accepted, 
with certain well-known exceptions, since at least 1803.  As late as 1942, only the United 
States and Norway had courts with this authority.74  At least one prominent historian of the 
early American Republic has recognized that it was not the Constitution's status as 
fundamental law, nor its ratification by the American people that was the most important 
American contribution to theories of constitutional law.  It was the fact that it was 
implemented by ordinary courts – that is, the idea of judicial review.75 
However, several early post-revolutionary state court decisions unapologetically 
raised natural law considerations and were criticized most commonly not for that reason, 
but the very fact that courts were reviewing the work of legislatures at 
all.76  Although Madison v. Marbury is often heralded as the case that established judicial 
review as a constitutional principle, that idea was hardly new in 1803.  Justices in Calder 
                                               
73 See McConnell, "Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment," New York University Journal of Law 
& Liberty, 5 (2010):1, 17.  
74 Goldstein, "Constitutionalism as Judicial Review," in Kautz, et.al, ed., The Supreme Court and the 
Idea of Constitutionalism (2009), 78. 
75 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1969), 291. 
76 Sherry, “The Founders' Unwritten Constitution,” University of Chicago Law Review (1987), 1138. 
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had contemplated that very point, as noted above, and delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention openly discussed the concept.  James Wilson seemed to argue, and James 
Madison seemed to agree, that judges could refuse to give effect to, and indeed, 
to declare void, laws that were inconsistent with the Constitution.77  In fact, several 
speakers spoke to the point, and while a majority of those speakers (although, 
again, nothing approaching a consensus) seemed to agree that courts would have the 
authority to declare “unconstitutional” laws void, even they disagreed as to whether 
“unconstitutional” referred merely to inconsistency with the document they were drafting, 
or more broadly, to positive laws that violated more “fundamental” law.78  
 One reason that natural right or natural justice did not play a major role in the 
American Constitution in 1787 was that the federal government – unlike the states – was 
not designed to possess general police powers.  While state legislatures might appropriately 
pass laws relating to moral conduct, the primary question for the federal government was 
whether a particular power even existed, and only secondarily how that power might be 
exercised.79  This is an especially important point to keep in mind prior to the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The drafters of the original Constitution were constructing 
a government with very limited powers, and were addressing pragmatic and 
prudential concerns.80  After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, however, natural law 
considerations became more pronounced in Supreme Court opinions, as we will see when 
                                               
77 Ibid., 1159.  
78 Snowiss, Judicial Review (1990), 39 – 40.   
79 Hittinger, The First Grace (2003), 119 – 123.  
80 Pearson, "Introduction to the Transaction Edition," American Interpretations of Natural Law, xxii 
(2016). 
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looking at the increasing number of cases citing Calder beginning in 1870. 
  In designing a federal government of limited powers, American founders, 
especially the Federalists, believed that this was a relatively easy task in contrast to laying 
out a theory of natural law and natural rights.  The latter path would inevitably lead to the 
problem of “underspecified rights,” claimed rights that were so indeterminate in 
their meaning as to allow for arbitrary interpretation and application.81 Iredell’s concurring 
opinion in Calder alluded to this exact issue in pointing out that a “natural justice” standard 
was “no fixed” one. (Arbitrary laws were also the linchpin of tyranny as Locke argued, for 
which see discussion below.)   Moreover, Edmund Randolph, who served on the 
Committee on Detail (charged with the actual drafting of the Constitution, based on the 
decisions the members of the Constitutional Convention reached) pointed out that the 
Committee elected to forego a philosophical statement of the ends of the Constitution (in 
making this claim, Randolph overlooked the Constitution's preamble, which is 
philosophical in nature) because they were not dealing with mankind in its natural state, 
but with a mediated condition, mediated by society, and the already-existing states in the 
colonies.82 
Another limit to natural law was that the colonists believed, prior to adopting their 
own constitution, that they were a party to an “original” contract, involving mutual duties, 
obligations and benefits, between the English monarch and his subjects.83  (This original 
contract is not to be confused with the Social Contract of Hobbes and Rousseau, delineating 
                                               
81 Hittinger, The First Grace (2003), 129 – 130. 
82 Levy, Original Intent (1998), 149. 
83 Wood, The Creation of the American Republic (1969), 282 – 283. 
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why people entered society in the first instance.  While those theorists placed greater 
emphasis on the contract that the people entered into among themselves, the "original 
contract" aspect of the social contract was concerned more with the rulers' contract with 
the ruled.  Hobbes and Rousseau did not believe that rulers were bound by any 
"contract."84) Thus, the law to which they were subject was contractual in nature, and not, 
as implied in the “natural law,” a timeless set of principles applicable in any 
society.  Happily, all sides viewed it as axiomatic that the English Constitution was to 
be revered, full of “marvelous excellence,” and well able to preserve the liberties of the 
English nation.85   It was because of their reverence for certain English rights that the 
American founders placed such an emphasis on such principles as freedom of the press and 
freedom of religion.86  
Still, even such an authority as Blackstone argued specifically (and similarly to 
Iredell’s argument in Calder) against natural law, as such, as a determinative interpretive 
aid to the original contract.  To argue that the terms of the original contract were “deducible 
by reason and the rules of natural law” ignored the fact that these deductions would result 
in “understandings (that) very considerably differ.”87  Thus, it was “judged proper to 
declare these duties expressly,”88 he wrote.  The original contract was reduced to writing, 
in other words, much as the American Constitution was soon to be, in a single 
                                               
84 Gottlieb, The Dream of Enlightenment (2016), 130.  
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87 Blackstone, Commentaries, I (1983), 226.  
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document.89  The obvious point that different theorists and statesmen would draw different 
inferences from natural law, often overlooked in natural law writings, was highlighted in 
Willoughby's seminal 1896 study, The Nature of the State, a work that some have argued 
contributed to the demise of natural law theorists, at least among political scientists (if not 
the courts).90  
This disagreement as to the source of rights Americans enjoyed was described by 
the legal theorist Alexander Bickel as a dispute between “Contractarians” and “Whigs,” 
the former arguing that the American Constitution embodied certain timeless principles, 
including “natural rights” that the Constitution reflects.  Rejecting this view, the Whigs 
believed that the culture and values of a particular society determine its citizens’ 
“rights.”91  Leo Strauss would characterize this as the "historicist" view; philosophy in 
general, and political philosophy in particular, assumes a level of historical insight that 
either does not exist at all or at the least is impossible to access because our attempt to 
access it is necessarily conditioned by the paradigms of our own time and place.92  That 
"natural law" principles have appeared to alter over time is evidence, some would argue, 
that it doesn't exist at all.   Or perhaps, as others would have it, our understanding of 
natural law's timeless principles is what evolves. But if these principles are known to us or 
                                               
89 The idea that the Constitution should be interpreted as a contract or compact was to figure 
prominently in one of the Supreme Court's most notorious opinions, Dred Scott vs. Sandford.  Chief 
Justice Taney made much of the theory that the African-American race was not a party to the original 
compact forming the United States and thus not entitled to take advantage of the country's legal 
machinery.  See 60 U.S. 393, 409 – 411 (1857). 
90 Pearson, "Introduction to the Transaction Edition," in Fletcher, American Interpretations of Natural 
Law, xxiii (2016). 
91 McAffee, Constitutional Interpretation, “Brigham Young University Studies,” 27:3, 158 (1987). 
92  Strauss, Natural Right and History (1965), 23 – 33. 
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at least discoverable through reason, in the pragmatic sense that we might be able to apply 
them, what does it say about the efficacy of our reason if our conclusions regularly 
change?  Or as one scholar has recently put it, if the principles Jefferson laid out in the 
Declaration of Independence were so "self-evident," why have we argued for centuries 
about their meaning and application?93   The point is that too often, thinkers are inclined to 
conclude that long-held and cherished beliefs are "natural" or "self-evident," where they 
may instead be the product of convention.   Locke's emphasis on property, for example, 
stems from his belief that a human being "owns" his person, a belief that continental 
Europeans of the day found startling.94  And yet this property paradigm was to have long-
lasting and immense implications in both British and American jurisprudence.    
 That one of the leading theorists of the original contract, Locke, is also a leading 
natural rights theorist, and the one that most directly influenced Thomas Jefferson is 
paradoxical, a paradox further complicated by the theory that an original contract is itself 
part of natural law.  For, it is in the nature of contracts that they are governed by the intent 
of the parties.95  Parties to a contract constructing a state might or might not agree to 
incorporate natural law principles in granting the state certain substantive powers while 
denying it others.  
 No clear line of demarcation separating rights springing from natural law and those 
springing from the original contract exists though, as the very act of entering into an 
                                               
93 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (2007), 20. 
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original contract was itself something that the law of nature required.  Without those pacts, 
“human society could not be preserved at all.”96  On the other hand, Hume, anticipating the 
Utilitarian critique of natural law, suggested that the preservation of society, rather than a 
moral adherence to a timeless, God-given law, was the very point.  Principles that conduced 
to society’s long-term preservation, including the promotion of justice, had no moral 
independent standing, Hume argued.  They were not “natural,” principles, 
but conventional and pragmatic ones.97  
In fact, when American orators explicitly appealed to natural law, leading natural 
law scholars in America often repudiated such reasoning, arguing that rights sprung from 
the British common law and the British Constitution.98     The point tended frequently to 
get muddled, however.  Much of the verbiage surrounding “rights,” “liberties,” and 
“natural law” was susceptible of multiple interpretations, so that the terms got caught up in 
questions of Great Britain's sovereignty, and the colonists' duties to the mother 
country.99  The term “liberties” was usually used to denote a privilege the king conferred 
upon a colony, rather than as a quality emanating from natural law or even the British 
Constitution.100 
For Locke, Rousseau, Pufendorf, Grotius and others, the “state of nature” was 
where natural law was operative.  So did the social contract remove us from the state of 
                                               
96 Pufendorf, Two Books (2009), 210.  
97 Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (1973), 142 – 143.  
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nature, and did the original contract to which the American colonists were a party arguably 
remove abstract considerations of natural law as the primary source of rights?  Perhaps the 
leading expositor on natural rights among the colonists was James Otis (for whom Locke 
was primary) and Otis discussed this point:  
In order to form an idea of the natural rights of the colonists, I presume it 
will be granted that they are men, the common children of the same creator 
with their brethren of Great Britain.  Nature has placed all such in a state of 
equality and perfect freedom, to act within the bounds of the law of nature 
and reason without consulting the will or regarding the humor, the passions 
or whims of any other man, unless they are formed into a society or body 
politic (emphasis added).101   
 
There was, however, a further issue complicating the matter for Otis, his suspicion 
regarding whether this “state of nature” was a true historical epoch, or whether, as Hume 
had argued, it was nothing more than a paradigm (which Hume did not find very 
useful).  Locke appeared to believe that the state of nature existed once as an historical 
fact,102 an argument that Edmund Burke, among others, found ridiculous.103 Kent was 
especially harsh in his dismissal of any supposed "state of nature," writing that the 
supposition that it ever existed was "innocence and simplicity, a mere dream of the 
imagination."104 Burlamaqui, a bit less dogmatic, wrote that the existence of society and 
civil government were “almost coeval” and that discussion regarding the state of nature is 
necessarily “reduced to conjectures that have more or less probability.”105  But whether the 
state of nature ever actually existed or not seemed to make no material difference to Otis.  It 
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was at least a hypothetical contract.   As he pointed out, no one at the time he wrote was 
born into that state or even existed in that state unless it would be two people stranded on 
a desert island.106 
Like Locke, however, Otis can be read in more than one way.  Did he consider that 
citizens had surrendered their natural rights – i.e., those rights they possessed in a state of 
nature – by entering into the “original contract”?  And if so, to what extent?  Does it matter 
that (as Hume and Otis were both at pains to point out) no living individual in England or 
America (at the time he wrote) had actually voluntarily entered into a “contract”?  And 
didn’t this fact render the idea of a contract, whether social or original, a fiction, even if it 
might be a useful fiction for political theorists?    
Stirring language to the contrary notwithstanding, Otis would concede that natural 
rights had been ceded to an extent under the social contract, for by entering society, 
colonists had not renounced their natural liberties “in any greater degree than other good 
citizens.”107 (emphasis supplied.)  Hamburger argues that early Americans understood that 
they retained their natural rights only to the extent permitted by constitutional and civil 
law.108  That a right might be designated "natural" had no bearing on whether or not it was 
retained after the formation of government.109 And to what extent had they surrendered 
their rights?  To the extent that government was entitled to act for the common good: “The 
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Colonists…are not to be restrained, in the exercise of any of these rights, but for the 
evident good of the whole community.”110  In fact, in revolutionary America, the only word 
invoked more frequently than the phrase "the common good" was "liberty."111  The debate 
over the extent to which citizens surrender their pre-existing rights to government has 
continued to this day.  Some theorists contend that certain rights cannot be delegated to 
government112 while others argue that any right, including the right to life, liberty and 
property, can be infringed by government under certain circumstances, and acting for the 
common good.113 
This view that natural rights were surrendered to empower government to act on 
behalf of the common good was Lockean.  Locke’s argument that individuals united into 
society for the protection of life, liberty and property, has often been misunderstood and 
misapplied.  Leaving aside his definition of “property” which was considerably broader 
than the narrow sense in which we use the term today, Locke’s writings offered a broad 
mandate for the governmental role in securing the common, or what Locke called the 
“public” good.  This theme recurs throughout his writings too frequently to be 
doubted.  The legislature had the power, he wrote, to make whatever laws the public good 
may require, and, in fact, subjects owed their obedience to these laws.114  The legislature 
was charged with protecting the society, but protection of individuals within society was a 
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duty only so far as consistent with the public good.115 In this and other points, the influence 
of Aquinas on Locke was manifest:  Like Locke after him, Aquinas argued that natural law 
was discoverable through reason, must always be ordered to the common good, and must 
be promulgated.116 
Locke’s concern with the public or the common good is often underappreciated by 
his critics. One has argued that Locke's theory of the original contract rests upon English 
legal tradition, the "entire emphasis of which has always been the rights of the individual 
rather than on rights of the people considered in mass." (emphasis supplied).117 Typical, 
too, is Rommen’s take in his classic work, The Natural Law.  Under Locke’s reasoning, 
according to this line of thought, “(t)he state is the utilitarian product of individual self-
interest, cloaked in the solemn and venerable language of the traditional idea of the natural 
law.” 118  Moreover, this thought of Locke’s implies that “the common good is nothing 
real, that it is merely the sum of the particular goods or interest of individuals.”119  The 
suggestion is that Locke’s idea of the public good was what some commentators would 
call an “aggregative” one, difficult to distinguish from utilitarian concerns120:   Assuming 
a sufficient definition of the public good, ascertaining whether a government was serving 
that end would be little more than a matter of arithmetic, adding the utility of the several, 
discrete individuals of the society and subtracting any off-setting detriments.  Of course, 
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it has long been recognized that the phrase often substitutes for a particular 
policy preference; moreover, it is not intuitively clear what makes a good “public.”121  
So was Locke really (as Romnen implies) a pre-Bentham and pre-Mill 
utilitarian?  More importantly for our purposes, were the American founders?  To conclude 
so with respect to Locke is to ignore a wide swathe of his writings, not only those from the 
Second Treatise but from those of an earlier date. Utilitarianism, after all, disparages the 
idea that there are any "natural rights" at all, let alone inalienable ones.122 Locke 
emphasized individual rights too frequently to miss that point.  There is thus a paradox, 
but a paradox best explained by what has been called a “paradox of charity,” where Locke’s 
defense of individual right is at least partly instrumental, the most effective way to achieve 
a higher-order good, that works to the benefit of the community.123  For Locke made clear 
repeatedly that the state of mankind, the community, was paramount in his 
thought.124  “Nature,” he wrote, “willeth the preservation of all mankind, as much as is 
possible.”125  To the extent that he could be classified as a utilitarian, it was because he 
argued that, as a result of “sanctions” (which could be legal, social, theological, or even 
physical) imposed when one did not perform one’s obligations with respect to the public 
good, it was in the individual self-interest to act in such a matter.126  
In addition to his analysis of the public good, Locke focused 
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on preventing arbitrariness as a limit to governmental power.  Government was instituted 
for the preservation of life, liberty and property, Locke argued repeatedly (and given his 
other statements, this should be taken as being the equivalent of acting for the public 
good).  Governmental action that was not aimed at these ends was, by definition, 
arbitrary.   Arbitrary exercise of power was also a justification for revolution.127  
Locke's concern with "arbitrary" power later became a defining feature of American 
jurisprudence, specifically in cases applying substantive due process.  In 1884, 
for example, the Court reasoned that "broad and general maxims of liberty and justice" had 
a broader application in limiting governmental power here than those maxims did in 
England. In the United States, arbitrary legislation is prohibited by the Bill of Rights and 
those limitations did not merely guarantee particular forms of procedure, but instead, the 
"very substance" of (in a clear reference to Locke) "individual rights to life, liberty and 
property."128 As with Locke, the Court suggested that arbitrary legislation was legislation 
that was not prompted by the general will, for the general good, and was thus not consistent 
with the spirit of a government instituted for those same purposes.129  Subsequent due 
process jurisprudence found such government action to be arbitrary in more than one 
sense.130  Not only could government action infringe certain "fundamental rights," but it 
might also be so contrary to "those canons of decency and fairness which express the 
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples" so as to "shock the conscience."131 
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And how could the theory of an original contract between the government and the 
governed be justified in the absence of actual consent, aside from those rare few who were 
actually parties to voting on a new, written, single-document 
constitution?   Locke argued that, in addition to express consent (which would be only 
rarely given), citizens could be presumed to consent, that they did so tacitly when they 
enjoyed the benefits of the government’s dominion.132  Consent thus bestowed, citizens 
surrendered their natural liberty to the sovereign. In Locke’s England, this was the 
Parliament. The sovereign was to act on behalf of the public good.    
Locke's repeated references, later borrowed by Blackstone, as to the supremacy of 
parliament in England, were not taken to heart in the United States.  Congress here did not 
hold such an exalted position. Rather, America's "fundamental law" was the Constitution, 
a document the provisions of which do not admit of self-evident or self-executing 
applications.  Nor is the American Constitution, unlike acts of the English Parliament, 
easy to alter or amend.   Vigorous judicial interpretation in a manner that would not have 
been necessary in England (where the "fundamental law" could evolve by means other than 
such judicial interpretation) is thus justified. 133  
 While Locke’s concerns, discussed above, centered on why a society would 
abrogate a contract with its government, such as through repeated arbitrary 
governmental actions, Thomas Jefferson addressed how an individual could do so:   
                                               
132  Locke, Second Treatise (1960), 119. 
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maintenance.  It would shackle us to the relatively concrete original meanings or original expected 
applications of the framers and ratifiers."  Fleming, Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution (2015), 174.   
 
  
31 
(O)ur ancestors, before their emigration to America, were the free 
inhabitants of the British dominions in Europe, and possessed a right which 
nature has given to all men, of departing from the country in which chance, 
not choice, has placed them, of going in quest of new habitations, and of 
there establishing new societies, under such laws and regulations as to them 
shall seem most likely to promote public happiness.134 
  
Jefferson thus viewed an individual’s “natural right” as withdrawing his consent to 
the original contract and relocating to another jurisdiction.   This was common enough 
among early American theorists.  In his "Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies," 
Richard Bland, in addition to arguing that the original contract implied the surrender of 
one's natural rights to the sovereign, and that the English Constitution was based on the 
natural law, sought to mitigate any harshness by providing this remedy.  That is one could 
withdraw his consent, leave the country, and enter into another society.135  Burlamaqui 
argued the same, writing that “it is a right inherent in all free people that every man should 
have the liberty of removing out of the commonwealth.”136  Locke would agree that a 
citizen (or at least one who owned land) had a right to withdraw tacit consent to the original 
contract, but the right of withdrawal did not obtain where actual, that is, express consent 
was given.  In the latter instance, the subject was “perpetually and indispensably obliged 
to be and remain unalterably a subject” to that government, except where the government 
itself was dissolved.137  This issue of consent and the withdrawal of consent as affecting 
the mutual obligations between the citizen and the state would be revisited by Justice 
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Iredell in an early Supreme Court case in which Iredell (in a seriatim opinion) argued that 
there were limitations on in individual’s right to expatriate.  An individual’s private will 
alone was not dispositive,138 but the judgment of the people was, as Locke held that the 
"body of the people" was the "proper umpire."139 
 Jefferson was often viewed as paradigmatic for an emphasis on individual rights 
and liberties. Many have argued that the Declaration of Independence which he was 
primarily responsible for authoring, was a natural rights document, and ought to be 
considered part of America's constitutional order.140  While it might be easy to remember 
that Jefferson wrote about the "consent of the governed," focusing on the contractual nature 
of government, is it too often forgotten that this consent extended only to government 
exercising "just powers".141  In other words, was government constrained by natural law, 
irrespective of the specific terms of the “Contract"?  Jefferson could potentially be read 
this way.  But again, there is perhaps an attempt among analysts to impose a rigorous 
philosophical consistency on thinkers whose primary aim was rhetorical.    In his 
"Summary View of the Rights of British America," Jefferson seemed to indicate that his 
objection to oppressive British rule had nothing to do with any perceived injustice done to 
“natural rights” in an individualistic sense; America’s grievance was collective and 
jurisdictional in nature.  Jefferson again:    
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(W)e do not point out to his majesty the injustice of these acts, with intent 
to rest on that principle the cause of their nullity; but to shew that experience 
confirms the propriety of those political principles which exempt us from 
the jurisdiction of the British parliament.  The true ground on which we 
declare these acts void is, that the British parliament has no right to exercise 
authority over us.142  
  
 One of a mind to do so can easily assemble a collection of quotations from leading 
theorists suggesting that natural law principles as such, are necessary complements to 
constitutional adjudication, but a more reasonable interpretation of all the available 
evidence is that while natural law principles animated and helped develop English (and 
derivatively, American) constitutional principles, they have not had independent standing, 
at least so far as the federal Constitution was concerned.  But several Supreme Court Justice 
have relied on natural law in their opinions, at least arguably and some have accused others 
of having done so.  Beginning, of course, with Justice Iredell in Calder.   
 
CALDER V. BULL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
INTRODUCTION 
 The written Constitution of the United States dates from its drafting in 1787 and 
ratification in 1788.  For much of that 229-year history, the United States Supreme Court 
has been the ultimate arbiter of its meaning and interpretation.  While several interpretive 
approaches have developed over two centuries,143 only a select few justices have ever 
                                               
142 Peterson, ed.  Jefferson, "A Summary of the Rights of British America," Writings (1984), 110.  
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suggested that natural law or natural justice should influence the decision whether to hold 
that a legislative enactment, state or federal, is void as unconstitutional.144  Still, natural 
law’s role in judicial interpretation was discussed thoroughly as recently as 1991, when 
members of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee extensively questioned Supreme 
Court nominee Clarence Thomas about his views. This was after a prominent Harvard Law 
Professor penned a New York Times editorial suggesting that, as a justice, Thomas might 
base his opinions on natural law.145  And more recently, it has been argued that at least two 
Supreme Court justices, Thomas and Antonin Scalia146 have relied on "higher law" 
precepts in performing their judicial duties.147  On the other hand, a prominent 
commentator has recently argued, more accurately, that Justice Scalia did not recognize 
the Constitution as protecting natural rights, while expressing the hope that the newest 
addition to the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch, would correct that "misunderstanding."148 
 This section will consider natural law considerations by tracing a century of the 
cited history of a single case that was the first Supreme Court opinion to join clearly the 
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debate about the appropriateness of using natural law in judicial review – Calder v. Bull.149  
 This section is then a “biography” of Calder, and its methodology will be governed 
by that fact.  All cases to be considered in depth are selected because one or more opinions, 
whether the opinion for the Court, a concurring opinion, or a dissenting opinion, cited 
Calder specifically for the natural law debate in which Justices Chase150 and Iredell 
engaged.  These are both necessary and sufficient factors for my analysis.  Moreover, the 
cases discussed herein are also exhaustive.  Every Supreme Court case that relied on one 
of the opinions in Calder up to the dawn of the Twentieth Century for the natural law 
debate is included.  
This section seeks to contribute an important component of the answer to the 
question whether, and if so, to what extent, natural law (or, to use Justice Iredell's term, 
"natural justice") figured in Supreme Court jurisprudence in the century following Calder.  
Calder is an appropriate case to use in this analysis, since it became paradigmatic for 
natural law analysis as a result of the Chase-Iredell exchange.151  This research will thus 
contribute to the existing literature by isolating a single case's progeny.  That case, Calder, 
is the best vehicle for this approach, which has the advantage of focusing the discussion on 
a single objective variable:  whether the Court's opinion or a justice's opinion cited either 
Chase or Iredell, or both, for natural law considerations.  There is thus no subjectivity in 
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selecting cases.  For that reason, the work cannot pretend to be an exhaustive history of 
natural law:  cases that might otherwise be selected for inclusion will not be considered.152   
 Ultimately, as we will see, a case could be made that “natural law” has been a focus 
in this line of cases, but usually (with a few noteworthy exceptions) indirectly.  Natural law 
(or “rights,” a different but related concept) has been overtaken by Americans’ views as to 
the proper role of government as derivative from a sort of macro-agreement between 
citizens and governing authorities, that was, in turn, influenced by natural law 
considerations.  In other words, our republican institutions may have incorporated natural 
law or natural rights precepts, but the resulting positivistic law governs exclusively. Natural 
law and natural rights considerations have been subsumed within that positive law, to the 
extent relevant for judicial interpretation.  This is not to discount the importance of natural 
law and natural rights in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  For as "(m)ost everyone knows, or 
should know...these rights were formulated in light of natural law theories."153  Thus there 
arguably is a need, in judicial constitutional interpretation to take cognizance of natural 
law and natural right theories.154 
  One such natural right was particularly important to America's founding 
                                               
152 An obvious example is Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43 (1815).  The unanimous opinion written by 
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generation:  the right to property.155   That right was (along with the rights to life and 
liberty) "one of the great triad of inalienable natural rights."156   Thus, one sees that laws 
impairing the obligation of contract were one of the few original constitutional restrictions 
on the states,157 and a prohibition on taking private property except for a public purpose, 
and then only with just compensation was memorialized in the Bill of Rights.158    Justice 
Chase in Calder defined a "right" as the "power to do certain actions."159 Interestingly, 
Chase did not defend property rights as being "natural."    Instead, he specifically argued 
that they were the product of a compact, express or implied, and were thus conferred by 
society.160  The point is crucial, because Iredell's opinion suggested that Chase was relying 
on concepts of "natural justice."   
  Instead of invoking natural rights, based on natural law, America’s founders might 
have been invoking rights based on our history as British subjects.161   There is evidence, 
however, that natural law has occasionally had a more direct impact on Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  The Court's decision in Loan Association v. Topeka,162 for example, did not 
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rely on any specific constitutional provision and one encounters objections to legislation 
that "no judge in Christendom" would sanction a particular law.163 
A word about the analytical differences between natural law and natural rights:  
Since Thomas Aquinas wrote systematically on the subject of natural law, theorists have 
commonly asserted that natural law is that law which is discoverable by reason.164  In fact, 
the point arguably goes back as far as Aristotle.165  When Aquinas wrote about the natural 
law and used the term "right" (or the Latin jus), he was referring to the nature of 
relationships; "rights" were not meant as "possessions," an important shift that one 
commentator has attributed to Hugo Grotius,166 although others trace it to William of 
Ockham or even to earlier medieval theorists.167 Locke meant "rights" to refer to 
possessions under the natural law (in Locke's case, the right to life, liberty and property).  
Locke's interpretation was crucial for the American founders, who emphasized liberty and 
self-governance rather than the constraining norms inherent in classical natural law 
doctrine.168  A Twentieth-Century political philosopher, Jacques Maritain, noted that while 
the doctrine of natural rights springs from natural law, "the power of the State and of social 
interests cannot impose itself upon this universe (of natural rights)."169 
 After considering  the Calder opinions, I will trace the history of the Chase-Iredell 
debate regarding natural justice considerations as reflected in subsequent Supreme Court 
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opinions, where we will see a reliance on one justice’s opinion or the other has been used 
to justify a variety of judicial judgments regarding the power of Congress, the power of 
state legislatures, and the power (or authority) of the Court to regulate, especially (in the 
Nineteenth Century) in matters of economics and business. 
A careful review of Supreme Court jurisprudence as circumscribed by those cases 
that have continued the "natural law" debate begun in Calder v. Bull, will yield several 
related conclusions.  First, the Court speaking as a court, has never specifically advocated 
that natural law precepts, as such, are controlling in federal adjudication.  Some individual 
justices have come close, and some justices have (with respect to fellow justices) argued, 
along with legal commentators, that natural law has influenced judicial thinking, but those 
are different matters.  Moreover, any attempt to "filter out" natural law influences and to 
consider them in isolation just won't work.  For there is little doubt that natural law has 
often served as a mediating influence in considering even explicit constitutional provisions.   
Second, and notwithstanding the first point, natural law has had a substantial 
influence in American jurisprudence.  That influence was seen – and often specifically 
acknowledged – in state constitutions170 and in America's Declaration of Independence, 
and natural law precepts often figured in the rhetoric of America's founders, although that 
was mingled with, and often predominated by, language holding that Americans' rights and 
liberties were an inheritance from their English forebears. One often finds rhetoric that 
                                               
170 Indeed, numerous state constitutions contained some sort of explicit natural law grounding, but it 
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America's founding documents were based on timeless principles or precepts that are 
common to every republican government, but it appears that, to the extent those principles 
and precepts are operable in courts, it is only because they have been subsumed within the 
positive law. This idea that the law is, at least in part, a function of a larger construct, 
including a society's historical influences, is what Montesquieu had in mind when he 
referred to the "spirit of the laws," a phrase that Supreme Court justices frequently 
employed in early opinion-writing.  And for both the American founders and their English 
precursors, the most salient feature of natural law was reason.  It is in man's nature to be 
reasonable in the highest sense of that term, and law (especially constitutional law) was 
routinely thought to be the embodiment of right reason.  
 Third, the issue often collapses into the debate surrounding that of judicial review.  
A plausible case may be made that Americans, forming a new government and entering 
into a new "original contract," expected their leaders to respect certain natural rights and 
to be governed by a higher law, but the question of whether the judiciary had the power or 
authority to make that happen was a step removed from that.  And the extent that the 
judiciary did or did not have the power to enforce natural law precepts will figure in every 
judicial opinion contained herein. 
Fourth, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil War, fundamentally altered the nature of American Government.   
Prior to that amendment's ratification, there was scant textual basis for national review of 
individual state's actions.  The federal Constitution, by its own terms, limited federal 
governmental authority, not the authority of individual states. In addition to making the 
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United States a single unit, that is a nation (so that "the United States are" was replaced by 
"the United States is"), the Fourteenth Amendment required states (as opposed to just the 
federal government) to provide "due process of law."  The Due Process Clause has been 
interpreted as containing a "substantive" component, a guarantee that state legislatures 
cannot pass certain types of legislation, irrespective of the process employed.  Not 
surprisingly, most "natural law" debate about Supreme Court opinions in the Twentieth 
Century and beyond, has taken place in the context of "substantive due process."   
Fifth, Supreme Court opinions have tended to follow the relative values and mores 
of the age.  While judicial theorists have disputed whether or not the Supreme Court has 
functioned as a leading indicator (that is an institution molding public opinion), or a 
"Republican Schoolmaster,"171 the fact is that courts have often reflected contemporary 
beliefs.  Thus, when in American history, economic liberty and property interests, as 
reflected in the government's laissez-faire approach to the economy, predominated, courts 
were keen to invoke legal principles (whether "natural" or not is beside the instant point) 
that bolstered those interests.  When individual liberty and autonomy became a more 
pronounced value, the courts' protection of those interests was heightened.   
These issues cannot easily be separated.  The Supreme Court's common-law 
approach to constitutional adjudication and of the nature and limits of judicial review are, 
for example, closely related problems.172 Supreme Court justices of every philosophical 
                                               
171 The reference is to Lerner, "The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster," The Supreme Court 
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"circuit-riding," justices made a conscious effort to educate people in the principles of good 
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persuasion have argued for a limiting principle on judges' discretion, recognizing two 
important facts.  First, federal judges are not elected and thus the federal judiciary is 
representative only in the indirect sense that federal judges are appointed by presidents and 
confirmed by the Senate. Second, federal judges serve for life, not removable except by the 
rarely-used impeachment process. Moreover, while a judicial ruling construing statutory 
law may be reviewed and reversed by legislative bodies, where a court authoritatively 
construes the Constitution, there is no review, save for a higher court – which is to say in 
the case of the Supreme Court, no review at all. 
 Something akin to the modern American concept of judicial review existed in 
Enlightenment England, although the strict separation-of-power doctrine which pervades 
American jurisprudence (in which the final conclusion on an act's constitutionality is the 
province of the judicial branch of government, and the legislative and executive branches 
do not share in the exercise of judicial functions) was not present.173  It took one of 
England's greatest legal innovators, Lord Coke, to establish the principle that the King did 
not have the authority to judge as between subject and subject, but even Coke recognized 
an important judicial role for the English Parliament.174  It is well to remember that the 
process of judicial review developed differently in the United States where the legislative 
body did not have the same attributes of supremacy that Coke and Locke and others 
attributed to the English Parliament, and where the judicial branch was charged with 
fidelity to the Constitution. 
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Calder v. Bull:  The Facts and the Chase-Iredell Exchange 
  It is surprising that Calder v. Bull175  became constitutional law and natural law 
canon.    The facts in this case were pedestrian, involving as they did a relatively simple 
dispute over probating a will. The respondents, the Bulls, lost in probate court, attempting 
to take property under a will that the state probate court refused to record.176  Under 
Connecticut law at the time, the judgment of the probate court became final with no further 
avenue of appeal.  But two years later, in 1795, the Connecticut legislature passed a 
“resolution or law” granting a new hearing with the right of appeal.  The Bulls won the 
subsequent case and the Calders appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which faced this 
single issue:  Was the law passed by the Connecticut Legislature ex post facto, thus 
violating the constitutional prohibition against any state passing such laws?177 
 The Supreme Court found no constitutional violation.  The traditional 
understanding of the term “ex post facto,” as reflected in Blackstone’s Commentaries, the 
Federalist Papers, state constitutions and state ratifying conventions, was that the doctrine 
protected persons from state-inflicted punishment for acts that were legally 
unobjectionable when committed. The concept also prohibited the state from imposing 
more severe punishments than were available at that time.178  In other words, the 
constitutional prohibition was against not all retroactive laws, but only against those 
imposing criminal sanctions.  Justice Chase, in his seriatim opinion,179 explicitly cautioned 
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against construing the Ex Post Facto Clause to have a wider application; such an 
interpretation would, he wrote, “greatly restrict the power of the federal and state 
legislatures; and the consequences of such a restriction may not be foreseen.”180 
 Countless subsequent federal courts have relied on Calder for its relatively 
straightforward explanation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.  On this point, the Court was 
unanimous.  But the opinion has become canonical for a different reason.  Justice Chase 
and Justice Iredell, who each wrote separate opinions, disagreed as to whether extra-
constitutional considerations, something other than applicable positive law,181 could be 
considered.  Justice Iredell referred to this extra-constitutional source as “natural justice”182 
but to avoid question-begging, we will not use that terminology yet.  Justice Chase wrote 
a famous extended passage on the limits of legislative power, discussed below.  The federal 
constitutional limits on state power were very few (in addition to the federal prohibition on 
ex post facto laws, state legislatures could not make laws impairing the obligation of 
contract, an issue we will revisit below).  Still, it seems likely that Justice Chase would not 
have agreed that he was making a case for natural justice as being primary over 
constitutional law.  Justice Iredell claimed, on the contrary, that courts were limited to 
applying specific provisions of the Constitution.  The debate, although taking different 
forms and using different verbiage, continues to this day.   
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 Justice Chase’s language unquestionably was dicta, language not necessary to the 
holding.  Despite suggesting that the judicial branch would strike down legislative acts that 
worked a “manifest injustice,”183 the Court upheld this law, so Chase and the Court had no 
occasion to exercise this judicial power. (Although the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison184 
contains the first Supreme Court holding that the Court had the power to declare an act of 
the legislative branch void, that power is clearly contemplated in Calder, particularly in 
Justice Iredell’s concurring opinion that the Court would exercise this power, although only 
in a “clear and urgent case.”185) 
 As the Calder Court considered a state law, it was unconcerned with the 
enumerated powers principle that the federal government could act only pursuant to a 
specific grant of power.  Under the federal Constitution, drafted at the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787 and subsequently ratified in state conventions, “enumerated powers” 
was the interpretative rule:  a power not specifically granted by the Constitution was denied 
the federal government.  The same was not true at the state level, where governmental 
authority was plenary, unless cabined either by the state constitution,186 or by one of the 
few provisions of the federal Constitution limiting the states. 
 That there was otherwise no constitutional restraint187 on governmental power at 
the state level notwithstanding, Chase wrote that he could not “subscribe to the 
                                               
183 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (opinion of Chase, J) (1798).   
184 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
185 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (1798).   
186 McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum (1985), 269 – 270; Rakove, Original Meanings (1997); 191 – 
192; Levinson, An Argument (2015), 323 – 324. 
187 The term “constitutional” used here in the more limited American sense and not in the broad 
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omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without control; although its 
authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution or fundamental law of the 
state.”188  Chase explicitly argued for a more fundamental law restraining state action, 
certain “vital principles” of republican government that legislatures must honor.  
Government authority could not authorize “manifest injustice” or “take away that security 
for personal liberty, or private property for the protection whereof the government was 
established.”189  Any such acts, Chase wrote, could not even be dignified with the name 
“law.”190  They would be “contrary to the great first principles of the social compact.”191  
Interestingly, Chase included among his examples of actions that would violate "vital 
principles" of republican government several things that specific constitutional provisions 
prevented the states from doing, including impairing contracts, passing ex post facto 
laws,192 and taking private property without compensation.193 
 In his concurrence, Iredell took issue with Chase’s putative adjudicative method.  
State legislation that violated either the federal or state constitutions would unquestionably 
be void, he wrote.  But the Court lacked the authority to strike down a law merely because 
                                               
188 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387 – 388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (1798).  
189 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (opinion of Chase, J.) (1798).  
190 Ibid.   
191 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (Opinion of Chase, J.) (1798).   Chase's argument stemming from 
the "first great principles of the social compact" was nearly a direct quote from Madison's writing in 
the Federalist.  In Federalist 44, Madison condemned bills of attainder, ex-post-facto laws and laws 
impairing the obligation of contract.   Even though some states did not have specific constitutional 
prohibitions against such laws, all such laws violated the "spirit and scope" of those state charters. The 
Federalist, 44 (1979), 299. 
192 Both the Contracts and the Ex Post Facto Clause are found in U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 
10.  
193 The Takings Clause is found in U.S. Constitution, Amendment V.   
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that law violated its idea of “natural justice,” a concept “regulated by no fixed standard.”194  
Iredell did not go so far as to argue that a legislature could pass a law that violated natural 
justice (he left that issue open), but he did claim that the judiciary had no authority to strike 
down legislative action on that basis, citing Blackstone for that principle.   
The cited section from Blackstone's Commentaries posits that no court has the 
power to strike down a law because that law is contrary to “common reason,”195 and Iredell 
perhaps tries to make Blackstone’s argument bear too much weight.  Blackstone 
approached the relationship between law and reason differently from John Locke, who 
suggested that natural law was discoverable through reason,196   and who went so far as to 
argue that reason is the law in the state of nature.197 Blackstone took a more limited view 
of reason's efficacy.  Reason, he wrote, is corrupt, clouded, and subject to other 
limitations,198 and the true law of nature was discoverable only through divine revelation.  
Blackstone, as we'll see, also highlighted a major difficulty with natural law analysis, 
namely that its principles were not self-effecting or self-executing.  When putting 
principles into policy, disagreements inevitably would arise as to their proper application.  
This was the primary reason why English lawyers of Blackstone's time began also to 
emphasize the virtue of obedience, as conflicting views of reason's dictates led naturally to 
the question of whose views would control.199  
                                               
194 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (opinion of Iredell, J) (1798).   
195 Blackstone, Commentaries, I (1983), 91.   
196 Locke, Second Treatise (1960 ed.), 25, 56. 
197 Ibid., 6.  
198 Blackstone, Commentaries, I (1983) 42.   
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Still, the equation of law with reason, or the argument that law is dependent on 
reason (as opposed simply to will or opinion) has a long pedigree, stretching at least as far 
back as Aristotle, who concluded that law is "reason without passion."200    Aquinas, who 
openly appropriated Aristotle, argued that law is a system of commands and prohibitions 
and that reason is the rule and measure of all human acts, because it is the first principle of 
human acts.201  Hobbes argued, like Locke, that a "law of nature is a dictate of right reason," 
and for Hobbes (who also wrote that the right to defend one's life was one right not 
surrendered to the sovereign) what was "reasonable" was whatever tended to preserve one's 
life as long as possible.202  English paeans to their common law as embodying the highest 
reason, were soon to reach exalted heights.  Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century theorists 
would write that their common law was the "highest expression of human reason," the 
"absolute perfection of reason," that it consisted in "supernatural wisdom" such that its 
tenets were above the laws of parliament, and that its precepts were the "most favorable to 
civil liberty, standing the nearest to the divine law."203 
  This rhetoric equating law with reason was common enough among America's 
founders as well, although perhaps a bit more understated.   Samuel Adams, for example, 
apropos of the Stamp Act the British Parliament passed in 1765, claimed that the "leading 
principles of the British Constitution have their foundation in the Laws of Nature and 
                                               
200 See Corwin, The Higher Law (1955), 8.  Corwin relies on the Weldon translation of 1905; other 
translations use the word "intelligence" instead of reason.  See Sinclair, trans., "Aristotle:  The 
Politics" (1962) Book III, Section XVI, p. 226. 
201 McInenry, trans. Aquinas:  Selected Writings (1998), q. 90, 612 – 613. 
202 See Stewart, Nature's God (2014), 140 – 141. 
203 See Corwin, The Higher Law (1955), pp. 34 – 35, n.94 - 96.   
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universal Reason. British Rights are in great measure, unalienably, the Rights of the 
colonists and of all Men else" (irregular capitalization in original; emphasis supplied).204  
Reason, after all, is not provincial.205  
But Blackstone was correct that the conclusions reason compels are often not self-
evident.  Locke, when discussing what we know apart from divine revelation, would 
distinguish between things we know immediately, that is through sense perception (that an 
apple is red, for example) from things we know only through reason, that is mediately.  
Reason, then, provides the connection (through "sagacity" and "illation" or "inference") for 
the intermediate ideas between the extremes of sense perception and ultimate 
conclusion.206  It is too plain for argument, however that people vary widely in their 
"sagacity" and ability to draw inferences, and there is no widely-accepted definitive 
standard for concluding what reason dictates.  The operative question is, "who decides?" 
 In addition to highlighting reason's limitations, Blackstone’s argument for denying 
to the judiciary the right to declare an act of Parliament void was that to grant such a right 
would be “to set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive 
of all government.”207  To grant the judiciary the power of "judicial review" would be, in 
Blackstone's judgment, to place the judicial branch of government over the legislative; 
although he insisted on the absolute nature of English rights to liberty, it appears that he 
                                               
204 Quoted in Goetzmann, Beyond the Revolution (2009), 20 –21. 
205 The emphasis on reason continued through to the Constitution's ratification.  Madison was to write 
in the Federalist that it is the "reason alone...that ought to control and regulate the government."  
Madison, The Federalist 49 (1979), 340.  See also Mansfield, America's Constitutional Soul (1991), 
212.   
206 Rogers, "Boyle, Locke, and Freedom," Journal of the History of Ideas, 27:2 (April – June, 1966), 
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thought the legislative branch must police itself, or that it would correct errors in its 
application of natural law principles when the judiciary or others brought those errors to 
its attention.208   Blackstone, of course, believed in parliamentary supremacy, and was 
roundly criticized by many of America’s founders, including Thomas Jefferson and James 
Wilson, as being no friend of liberty.209  Different considerations might well obtain in the 
United States, where Congress was not considered supreme, and where placing the 
judiciary over the legislature, at least in matters of constitutional interpretation, might not 
be so “subversive of all government.”   Still, early American courts often assumed that 
statutes were passed to effect natural justice, that this indeed was their very purpose.210 
 An aside on Iredell’s using the term “natural justice” as opposed to “natural law”: 
Early American theorists used the former term infrequently.  In fact, Eliot’s Debates, a 
relatively comprehensive compendium of American political thought from the time of the 
American Revolution, uncovers only three instances of the exact term prior to its use by 
Iredell.211 Blackstone also used the term three times in his Commentaries, always to denote 
the duties that parties owe to each other,212 consistent with Blackstone’s apparent view that 
the concept of justice is subsumed within the natural law.213  More recent commentators 
have argued that “natural justice” was synonymous with the term “natural law” until the 
17th Century, after which the term’s limited use was meant to convey the use of natural law 
                                               
208 Sigmund, Natural Law in Political Thought (1971), 100 – 101.   
209 Lubert, "Sovereignty and Liberty," (2010) Review of Politics, 271, 272.   
210 See Helmholz, Natural Law in Court (2015), 165 and cases cited therein.   
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only in the administration of justice.214  For our purposes, we may assume that Iredell 
viewed "natural justice" as being a part of "natural law" regardless of whether he viewed 
the terms as synonymous.   
 In his Calder opinion, Iredell was answering a question with which modern 
political and legal theorists continue to grapple: “Is every ‘settled’ legal rule and legal 
solution settled by appeal exclusively to ‘positive’ sources such as statute, precedent and 
custom?  Or is the correctness of some legal decisions determinable only by appeal to some 
‘moral’ (‘extralegal’) norm?”215  Iredell’s answer was “yes,” to the former question, and 
“no” to the latter.  
Iredell’s own history on this point was checkered however.  He was not completely 
averse to natural justice considerations as a member of the North Carolina ratifying 
convention some years earlier.  Instead, he was on record as saying that, in the absence of 
an “express Constitution,” the powers of state legislatures would have been absolute, so 
long as they did not pass acts “inconsistent with natural justice.”216  While at least one 
commentator has argued that the quoted language made clear that Iredell did not consider 
the “written constitution…the sole source of fundamental law,”217  and that he “viewed a 
written constitution as supplementing natural law rather than as replacing it with a single 
instrument,”218 the language is equally susceptible of the interpretation that Iredell thought 
                                               
214 Razi, “Natural Justice by H.H. Marshall,” The American Journal of Comparative Law (1960), vol 
9, no 3. 
215 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d edition (2011), 290.   
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that whatever natural justice principles should be considered were taken into account by 
the state and federal constitutions, and that those written documents did supersede any 
other natural justice considerations.  This interpretation has the benefit of being consistent 
with his Calder opinion.219  Still, the addition of a Bill of Rights (in 1791), emphasizing as 
it does that governmental authority is to be limited, might have indicated a presupposition 
that the Constitution was to be in accord with natural law.220  Iredell himself had opposed 
a Bill of Rights in the North Carolina ratifying convention, arguing that it would 
dangerously suggest that any right not enumerated had been given up to the government, 
under the principle of construction that to express some things is to exclude others:  
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.221  
  In claiming that Chase was reasoning from a natural justice perspective, Iredell 
made the same assumption about a fellow justice’s opinion that Justice Black was later to 
make frequently in the Twentieth Century.222  But Chase, like later justices, did not use the 
term, or any of its then common synonyms, such as “natural law” or “eternal justice.”   
There were instead, “fundamental” and “vital” principles inherent in the nature of free, 
republican governments, founded by an “express compact,” he argued,223 principles which 
must serve as an interpretative aid in determining whether legislative action, at either the 
state or federal level, was a legitimate exercise of governmental power.  Famously, among 
                                               
219 See Wood, Creation of the American Republic (1969), 542.   
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Thomas Jefferson's fundamental points in the Declaration of Independence, were that 
certain rights, among them the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, were 
"unalienable"; one could not give them up even if one wanted to.224  The logical corollary 
was that citizens could not "contract" away these natural rights to a sovereign, and the 
original contract should not be interpreted as if they had.   Iredell's reasoning was that 
Chase's "fundamental" and "vital" principles were the same as "natural" ones. At a 
minimum, these principles were inherent in a free republican government and there was a 
presumption against interpreting the Constitution inconsistently with them.  
  At least one commentator argues that Chase did not have natural law in mind.   
Claims that he did are “curious, if not utterly baseless,”225 and Chase’s reference to 
principles of “law and reason” was a reference to common law,226 not natural law.227 And 
it is true that early Americans viewed the common law, in Kent’s words, as “the perfection 
of reason.”228 Common law analysis was prominent in Chase’s opinion, the commentator 
noted, citing Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in the 2000 case Carmell v. Texas.229   
The citation is problematic, however, since in Carmell, Justice Stevens (writing for the 
Court) focused on Chase’s analysis of the Ex Post Facto Clause’s meaning.  In analyzing 
that Clause, Chase did discuss common law interpretations at length, and concluded that, 
                                               
224 Barnett, Our Republican Constitution (2016), 38.  One recent commentator has argued that Chase, 
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in English common law, the phrase “ex post facto” was used to denote laws that imposed 
criminal penalties.  But that point doesn’t determine whether Chase’s separate discussion 
of “law and reason” was also based on common law.  Even if it were, this would not 
establish that Chase’s extended discussion on the limits of legislative power was limited to 
common law principles.   Using common law to determine a constitutional clause’s 
meaning is quite a different matter from arguing that constitutional interpreters were 
constrained by common law and only by common law.   
  Chase, recall, argued against the “omnipotence of a State Legislature or that it is 
absolute and without control”.230   The terms of the social contract determined the proper 
objects of legislative power, and the “nature” of legislative power in a “free Republican 
government” would limit its exercise.231  Calder was an appropriate case in which to raise 
the issue of whether a state legislature was “omnipotent” unless restrained by a specific 
constitutional command: Those fears evidently were heightened when the state legislature 
passed a law obviously intended to thwart a court’s ruling in a specific case.  Separation-
of-power concerns were at the forefront of the case, as the American system had a clear-
cut division between legislative and judicial authority.  Although the separation-of-powers 
issues were not precisely the same in England, they were similar.  Sir Edward Coke, as 
long ago as 1608, felt compelled to inform King James I that he (the king) lacked the power 
to give judgment in his realm, as that power was reserved to the courts.232 Interestingly, 
                                               
230 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 387 (opinion of Chase, J) (1798). It is an under-appreciated fact of this 
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in this case was effectively attempting to overrule the judiciary.   
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Coke later instructed the king that he could not, by proclamation, "make a thing unlawful 
which was permitted by the law before,"233 a caution that mirrors one concern mentioned 
in Calder. With the one difference that it was the Connecticut legislature attempting to 
exercise king-like powers in the administration of justice, its seems probable that Chase 
had Coke's counsel in mind in his Calder opinion.   
 A plausible reading of Chase’s argument was that it was intended to provide 
assurances that Calder did not stand for the idea that a state legislature would become all-
powerful.  In this case, what the legislature did was consistent with common law.  The 
evidence Chase adduced clearly established that "ex post facto" historically referred to 
criminal laws.  But Chase went further, claiming that legislatures are limited in their 
exercise of power by the social compact which was, in turn, informed by other "vital" 
principles.  Although Iredell was to infer that Chase was referring to "natural" principles, 
Chase was careful to make repeated references to principles inherent in "free republican 
governments."   That is, he explicitly referred to the reasons the people of the United States 
"erected their constitutions or forms of government,"234 and "fundamental principle(s) that 
flo(w) from the very nature of our free republican governments."235  Most pointedly, he 
was to write that "the obligation of a law in governments established on express compact 
and on republican principles must be determined by the nature of the power on which it is 
founded."236  Chase's language seems to suggest that there are certain principles that pertain 
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to the republican government that the American people created, as opposed to principles 
that were timeless and universal, and thus natural.  
  If Chase were claiming that the judiciary’s power to strike down acts of state 
legislative bodies was based on (in addition to inconsistency with the federal and state 
constitutions) common law, he chose a very roundabout way of saying that.  Further, on 
this reading, he was arguing that the legislative power was subordinate to common law.  
Such an argument would be startlingly inconsistent with what was established law at the 
time and ever since, namely that the legislative power is free to alter the common law.   It 
is worth re-examining the full context in which Chase used the phrase “law and reason.”  
He wrote that “it is against all reason and justice for a people to entrust a Legislature with 
such powers (to pass laws contrary to the social compact), and therefore, it cannot be 
presumed that they have done it.  The genius, the nature, and the spirit of our State 
Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation, and the general principles 
of law and reason forbid them.”237  
So, if Chase’s reference to “law and reason” here was a reference to the common 
law, he was contending that common law controls acts of the legislature.  And yet, while 
it is a legal commonplace that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly 
construed,238 it was a well-recognized legal maxim before Calder that the legislative power 
included the authority to alter the common law, rather than the other way about.  Thus, 
“where the common law and a statute differ, the common law gives place to the statute.”239 
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Moreover, as Justice Souter was to explain in a later Supreme Court opinion, early 
Americans did not believe that the common law controlled their constitutional heritage.  
Souter wrote that "it is clear that the adoption of English common law in America was not 
taken for granted, and that the exact manner and extent of the common law's reception were 
subject to careful consideration by courts."240 
If Chase was referring merely to common law principles, his extended, stirring 
passage regarding the invalidity of laws working a “manifest injustice,” would have been 
peculiarly out-of-place.241  He could have limited himself to challenging the well-accepted 
principle that statutory law supersedes common law. The argument that early American 
legal authorities did not view statutory law as superior to common law242 is unpersuasive, 
relying as it does on examples of courts (at both the federal and state levels) striking down 
statutes that happened to be, even if incidentally, inconsistent with common law. Were the 
inconsistency with common law a sufficient reason for a court to declare a statute void, 
statements such as those found in Blackstone about the legislature's authority to overrule 
common law would be flatly wrong. Surely no court would strike down a law merely 
because of its inconsistency with common law.  There must have been some additional 
reason why particular statutes were declared void (or, as in the case of Calder, brought 
into question although still upheld), and either the principles of natural law or the character 
of a particular society, the laws of which have a particular "spirit" might provide that 
                                               
240 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 132 (Souter, J., dissenting) (1995).   
241 Unless he was merely engaging in a philosophical exercise with Justice Iredell, as opposed to 
commenting on the power of judicial review.  John Hart Ely takes this position.  See Ely, Democracy 
and Distrust (1980), 209 – 211, n. 41.   
242 See Edlin, "Judicial Review Without a Constitution," Polity (2006), 356 – 358. 
 
  
58 
reason.  It is unsurprising that such laws would also be inconsistent with English or 
American common law.243 
 Chase appears to have been dealing with an argument that allowing the state 
legislature to effectively overrule a specific court ruling would be to grant the legislature 
absolute power.  He responded that the legislative act in this case did "not go that far" 
because it was consistent with common law.  In this case, the common law, frowning as it 
did on ex post facto laws only in the criminal context, provided a "check" on any claim that 
the Connecticut legislature was asserting absolute power.  But with respect to his claim 
that legislatures did not have unbridled power, Justice Iredell, at least, asserted that Chase 
was relying on natural law principles.244  
Chase’s opinion is ambiguous on the point, however.  In arguing that there were 
certain things that no legislature could do, irrespective of whether or not there was a 
specific constitutional restraint, he emphasized the binding nature of the original social 
compact.  It could not be presumed, he reasoned, that in a “free republican government” 
the people would have consented to permit the government to act in a manifestly unjust 
way.245  Does this imply that in other types of governments, acts of manifest injustice might 
                                               
243 Though one should not make the error against which Madison warned, an error having its source 
"in the changed meaning of words and phrases." See Corwin, The Higher Law (1955), 42. The term 
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referred to as the perfection of reason, here, the term often suggests legal traditions that have been 
kept despite being unmoored from their original justifications.  See Holmes, The Common Law 
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not be barred, and that such acts might deserve (unlike an act in a free republican society) 
to be called “law”?  The answer is unclear, although it is clear that in forming a just 
government, certain antecedent liberties may or may not be compromised, so that it would 
be impossible to make an all-encompassing abstract statement about what a just 
government may or may not do.246 
 A plausible reading of Chase's opinion is that he viewed the principles of natural 
law as an interpretive tool of considerable weight, but only in the sense that the 
constitutional drafters relied on natural law in forming their express contract.247  The 
argument that it "cannot be presumed" that the people in a free republic would grant a 
legislature powers to pass unreasonable and unjust laws, suggests that the "presumption" 
might be overcome, as that is the nature of presumptions.  Chase might merely have been 
responding to the peculiarity of the Connecticut law at issue,248 although an obvious 
objection to this interpretation is the categorical language he used. 
 Calder's Subsequent History          
Despite its having acquired canonical status due to Chase and Iredell's natural 
justice debate, it was over three-quarters of a century later before the Supreme Court or a 
Supreme Court justice cited Calder in a way that is relevant for our purposes.  While 
subsequent decisions frequently relied on the case for its specific ex post facto holding, the 
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Court did not again engage its “natural justice” component until 1870, in McVeigh v. 
United States.249  McVeigh, decided in the American Civil War's aftermath and the 1868 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, inaugurated a 
new era (the first of two) of relatively sustained discussion of the natural law issues the 
Chase and Iredell opinions raised in Calder.  Concomitantly, the Court frequently faced 
“substantive” due process issues under the Fourteenth Amendment, which contained a Due 
Process Clause similar to that found in the Fifth Amendment, but (unlike that of the Fifth 
Amendment) applied as against the states.250 
 An interesting trend emerges in this first collection of cases.  With the possible and 
limited exception of McVeigh, where the Court addressed fair procedures in judicial 
proceedings, all these opinions dealt with financial, economic or contractual issues.  Even 
McVeigh resulted from a law depriving a petitioner of property. No cases dealt with what 
we would now call “civil liberties,” no cases addressed personal autonomy, and no cases 
alleged that state action violated anyone’s “civil rights.”  This is consistent with early 
Twentieth-Century Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, applying the Due Process 
Clause to strike down state economic regulation.251 
This early emphasis on property and contractual rights springs from the fact that 
those considerations were paramount in early America.  Since medieval times, private 
property and contracts have been the two most fundamental legal institutions.252  Both of 
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these institutions, it was believed, flowed out of the natural law in the state of nature and 
did not owe their existence to government.253  Blackstone, whose writing was not typically 
poetical, became rhapsodical when discussing property. "There is nothing which so 
generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of 
property," he wrote.254  The right was a natural one, Blackstone claimed, echoing Locke, 
traceable back to the beginning of the world, when the Creator gave man dominion over 
the earth.255 
 Hobbes identified keeping contracts as being the linchpin of justice, while Locke 
would argue for the preservation of property as the focal point of legitimate government.256 
Other theorists emphasized the importance of holding real property in the formation of 
good political citizens.257 Those economic-related concerns figured prominently in 
America's founding.   Some historians have argued that the protection of economic interests 
was the primary motivation behind the constitutional convention of 1787.258 Philosophers 
continue to emphasize the relation of law, reason and contracts; one has argued that natural 
law, emanating from human reason, "issues precisely from our disposition to bind 
ourselves in free agreements."259 
This concern with property rights was manifest in judicial opinions throughout the 
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late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries.260  It was present also at the Constitutional 
Convention, where the primary fear regarding democracy was the damage that the masses 
might do, and had done, to those rights.261  Perhaps the 1937 cases upholding the creation 
of the National Labor Relations Board and state minimum wage laws marked the turning 
point,262 but the trend toward upholding economic legislation and breaking the tie between 
property rights and natural law, is unmistakable by the middle of the Twentieth century, at 
least as measured by Calder citations. 
 The Court’s opinion in McVeigh did not rely on the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause, or any other specific constitutional provision.263  It might be said that it was a 
straightforward application of natural law reasoning.  The petitioner, who held public office 
under the Confederate Government, fell victim to an 1862 federal law confiscating, after 
public warning and other procedural safeguards, certain real and personal property of 
persons in rebellion against the United States.264  The procedural safeguards did not include 
permitting the property’s owner to answer the “libel” filed against the property:  The 
Confiscation Act of 1862 provided that proceedings under the law should be treated as in 
rem,265 that is as against property. 
Notwithstanding the plaintiff's rebel status, the liability of being sued, the Court 
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said “carries with it the right to use all the means and appliances of defense.”266  The matter 
admitted of no doubt, the Court ruled.  It cited Calder and held that any other decision 
would be “contrary to the first principles of the social compact and of the right 
administration of justice.”267  It was this latter phrase that Iredell equated to "natural 
justice" in his Calder opinion.  
 The lower court in McVeigh had heard the case, and issued the forfeiture in 1862, 
during the Civil War.  The Supreme Court issued its ruling in 1870, five years after the 
War had ended and two years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment providing, 
inter alia, that no state could deny any person due process of law.  But the Court was faced 
with a federal law, and could simply have relied on the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause; it did not.  So it is unclear what the exact basis for its ruling was.  It was a strain to 
introduce social compact and "right administration of justice" Calder concerns after all 
those years had passed, when a straightforward due process analysis might have sufficed.    
 The point is illustrated nicely in the next series of cases to cite Calder.  The opinions 
known collectively as the “Legal Tender Cases” were among the most discussed cases of 
the second half of the Nineteenth Century.268  It was in Knox v. Lee  that Justice Chase’s 
dictum regarding “the great first principles of the social compact” was first tied to the 
“spirit” of the Constitution.269  In a double irony, the author of this dissenting opinion was 
a later Justice Chase, in this case Chief Justice Salmon Chase, who, as President Lincoln’s 
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Secretary of the Treasury was largely responsible for designing the banking system at issue 
in the case.  
 Congress, with then-Secretary Chase’s approval, had passed the Legal Tender Act 
in 1862 (“the Act”).270  The Union Government in the midst of the Civil War sought to 
raise money without raising taxes, and issued bonds payable in specie (precious metal).  
When bank reserves of specie fell precipitously, the Union Government issued demand 
notes that were not redeemable in specie, but became themselves “legal tender for all debts, 
public and private.”271 
 In dissenting from the Court’s holding that Congress had power under the 
Constitution to make legal tender of “greenbacks,” or notes not backed by precious metals 
– “specie” – Chief Justice Chase relied on the first Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder.  Since 
the Act at issue here arguably (this was Chase’s argument) transferred property from one 
individual to another, by lessening the value of debts that had been contracted prior to the 
Act, there was an impairment of contract, something that the first Justice Chase had opined 
would be “contrary to the great first principles of the social contract.”272  The states were 
constitutionally prohibited from “impairing the obligation of contract,” but there was no 
such explicit prohibition on the federal government.273   Writing in Federalist 44, Madison 
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also argued that laws impairing the obligation of contracts were “contrary to the first 
principles of the social compact” and thus also “prohibited by the spirit and scope” of the 
various state constitutions.274 
Chief Justice Chase invoked the “spirit of the Constitution,” recalling the famous 
passage from McCulloch v. Maryland, in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote upholding 
the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States.  If the end of congressional action 
was legitimate, Marshall said, the means, if not prohibited by the Constitution and 
consistent with the “letter and the spirit of the Constitution,” were also legitimate.275  The 
Court itself, speaking through Justice Strong, invoked the “spirit” of the Constitution no 
fewer than four times: 1) in framing the issue as whether the Act was “forbidden by the 
letter or spirit of the Constitution;”276 2) in rejecting the argument that the spirit of the 
Constitution was violated because the Act “indirectly impair(ed) the obligation of 
contracts;”277 3) in dismissing the claim that the Act violated the spirit of the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition on taking private property without just compensation,278 and 
finally, 4) in concluding that there were no further arguments to be made that the Act 
violated the spirit of the Constitution.279  Perhaps, as some commentators have suggested, 
these references to the “spirit” of the Constitution suggest that natural justice ought to be 
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an animating principle of constitutional interpretation,280 although Hamilton repudiated the 
idea that the Constitution granted judges the power to consider its spirit.281   
 The Knox Court explicitly overruled the 1870 decision in Hepburn v. Griswold,282 
and in holding the Act constitutional, joined fundamental debates raging since colonial-era 
America.  The proper scope and function of government and its limits – and whether it was 
limited by the vital principles that Chase had laid out in Calder, were issues the Knox Court 
met head-on.    In Hepburn, Justice Miller criticized the majority for its reliance on the 
Constitution’s spirit, arguing that such a standard was too abstract and intangible.283 
Justice Strong’s majority opinion, for example, asserted that the Constitution 
granted the federal government certain powers that were unenumerated, powers granted 
via the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause.284  The “means or instrumentalities 
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referred to in that clause and authorized, are not enumerated or defined” because that would 
have been, Justice Strong wrote, “impossible.”285  In a statement that, focusing as it did on 
the limits of the ends of government, Locke probably would have agreed to, the Court held 
that the government could use “every means, not prohibited, necessary for its preservation 
and for the fulfillment of its acknowledged duties.”286  Justice Strong also reasoned that 
the whole of the federal government’s power was greater than the sum of its parts, arguing 
that specific governmental powers, while “neither expressly specified nor deducible from 
any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone” still “grew out of the aggregate of powers 
conferred upon the government or out of the sovereignty instituted.”287  In a distinctly un-
Lockean statement, Justice Strong wrote that “property of a citizen or subject is ownership, 
subject to the lawful demands of the sovereign, so contracts must be understood as made 
in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the government.”288  This 
is one late-Nineteenth Century case in which the Court, at a cursory glance, seemed to 
denigrate property rights. Such a view would be too narrow, however. The same concerns 
that animated Chief Justice Chase when he was Secretary of the Treasury, namely those 
dealing with the entire nation's economic health, also informed the Court's decision to 
uphold this Act.   As the United States became more commercial and more of a "united" 
nation in the Civil War's aftermath, the need for an easier and more liquid method of 
finance and exchange became paramount.289 
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In addition to Chief Justice Chase, Justices Clifford and Field also wrote dissenting 
opinions in Knox, the latter opinion also relying on the first Justice Chase’s opinion in 
Calder.   Justice Field wrote that whereas Congress had the undoubted power to change 
the value of its coinage, it indisputably could not force a creditor to accept the dollars at a 
lesser value than they held at a contract's inception.  Imagine, Field argued, forcing a debtor 
to pay a far greater amount than originally agreed to, by the stratagem of re-valuing the 
currency.  This would be a “monstrous wrong” that “no judge in Christendom” would 
sanction.290  “For acts of flagrant injustice such as those mentioned there is no authority in 
any legislative body, even though not restrained by any express constitutional prohibition,” 
Field wrote.291  This was because there are certain “unchangeable principles of right and 
morality” without which “men would be but wild beasts preying upon each other,” as well 
as “fundamental principles of eternal justice...upon which...all constitutional government 
is founded.”292 
The disagreement between Strong and Chase raised the same issues that Thomas 
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton had debated in their Eighteenth-Century dispute over 
whether Congress had the authority to create a Bank of the United States. (Not 
coincidentally, Justice Strong's broad construction of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
recalled Marshall's opinion in McCulloch, the opinion upholding the constitutionality of 
the Bank.) In a paper responding to then-Secretary of State Jefferson’s attack on the bank 
as beyond Congress’s power to create, Hamilton claimed that if the Constitution vested a 
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power in Congress, any means not specifically prohibited by the Constitution were 
legitimate.293  He added one caveat however:  The means could not be “immoral” or 
“contrary to the essential ends of political society.”294  It was Hamilton’s reasoning that 
found its way into Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in McCulloch.  While 
adopting Hamilton’s argument as to Congress’s power to effect means to bring about 
constitutionally-sanctioned ends, Marshall omitted any language about whether particular 
means were “immoral” or “contrary to the essential ends of political society.”   Unless this 
is what he meant by focusing instead on the Constitution’s “spirit”.   Jefferson urged 
President Washington to veto the bill creating the Bank and disparaged the reasoning that 
Congress was free to employ means not specifically prohibited: Congress could employ 
only those means that were “proper" and "necessary" to achieve legitimate, that is 
constitutionally approved, ends.295  In other words, Jefferson emphasized the "necessary" 
half of the equation.  The Constitution, by inference, permitted means that were essential 
to effect constitutionally-sanctioned ends, a much stricter test than "not specifically 
prohibited." 
Chief Justice Chase had written the majority opinion in Hepburn, but changes in 
court personnel, as well as a congressionally-created addition of a seat to the Court296  
resulted in Chase being in dissent in Knox, a case that presented the same issue.  In 
Hepburn, the later (Chief) Justice Chase made a similar argument to the first Justice Chase's 
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about the importance of natural justice, drawn more narrowly.  In holding that the part of 
the Legal Tender Act making government-issued notes legal tender for all debts was 
unconstitutional, Chief Justice Chase wrote that, except in the “scarcely supposable” case 
where a “statute sets at naught the plainest precepts of morality and social obligation,” the 
Court is obliged to uphold any law that is not repugnant to the Constitution.297  But he went 
on to write, citing Chief Justice Marshall, that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution 
must be leavened by its “spirit,” reasoning that  
Among the great cardinal principles of that instrument no one is more 
conspicuous or more venerable than the establishment of justice.  And what 
was intended by the establishment of justice in the minds of the people who 
ordained it is, happily, not a matter of disputation, especially in its relation 
to contracts.298 
 
Chase’s odd claim that there was no dispute about the “establishment of justice” 
especially as it related to contracts was rhetorical excess.  There was heated debate at the 
Constitutional Convention (to say nothing of the various state ratifying conventions) about 
the nature of Congress’s power to impair the obligation of contracts and there was, as 
indicated above, no explicit constitutional restraint on the federal government’s power to 
do so.299  That the issues in these cases so closely touched the protection of property and 
contractual relations, and that the Court was sharply split as to such fundamental issues as 
whether there was a general power of sovereignty in the United States Government revived 
a debate about the nature of that government's power that had been dormant for nearly 
seventy years.  The Court was also facing an increasingly powerful and active federal 
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government after the Civil War, as well as Chief Justice Marshall's broad interpretation of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch.  Calder, it will be recalled, involved 
legislation at the state level.   As the federal government was designed to have limited 
powers, the natural law debate was not as vigorous at the Constitutional Convention as it 
might otherwise have been.   So the Court was engaging it now.   
Calder made its next appearance in another post-Civil War case, this one involving 
a contract that had allegedly been “impaired” by the Thirteenth Amendment, prohibiting 
involuntary servitude throughout the United States.  In Osborn v. Nicholson, the parties 
entered into a contract providing for the sale of a slave in 1861; the buyer then refused to 
pay the agreed-upon $1,300 sales price after the slave was freed by an act of the United 
States government, that is, the Thirteenth Amendment.300  In holding that the contract for 
the sale of a slave remained good even after the slave’s legally-mandated emancipation, 
the Court, Justice Swayne writing for the majority, noted that several intervening factors 
might interfere with a purchaser’s enjoyment of a contract's full benefits.  In this case, the 
slave might have, after the contract’s execution, become ill and died.  In a contract for the 
sale of real property, the state might eventually seize the property through eminent domain.  
In any such instance, the seller’s right becomes vested when the contract is entered into, 
and while the parties might address the risk of loss in the contract itself, that didn't happen 
here.  Moreover, the Court held, there was no impairment of contract in this case, because 
the slave’s emancipation affected the property itself (the slave), and not the contract.301  
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“All contracts are inherently subject to the paramount power of the sovereign and the 
exercise of such power is never understood to involve their violation,” the Court wrote.302 
The majority opinion cited Calder in holding that contractual rights, once 
completely vested, and acquired by deed, will or contract, are enforceable even if the 
statutes under which those rights vested are no longer in force.  A contrary rule, the Court 
reasoned, would not accord with principles of “universal jurisprudence” and lead to a 
“flood tide of intolerable evils.”303 
The citation to Calder seems especially ironic here.  In the earlier case, one party’s 
right to inherit under the law had vested until Connecticut's legislature retroactively 
changed the law.  Justice Chase made his famous dictum that courts ought not to uphold 
legislation that worked a “manifest injustice,” while upholding the Connecticut law at 
issue. The logical conclusion is that Chase did not understand Connecticut’s action in 
Calder to be manifestly unjust, or contrary to principles of natural justice.  But the Osborn 
Court, relying on Calder for this very point, concluded that construing the Thirteenth 
Amendment as unsettling a seller’s right to collect a debt for the sale of a slave would have 
led to a manifest injustice.  In both cases, parties had settled expectations under existing 
law.304  The conclusion in Osborn might reflect the Nineteenth-Century tendency of 
American courts to associate natural law with economic principles.   And it might also 
support Iredell’s contention point that natural law reasoning admits of no fixed principles.   
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The majority opinion in Osborn identified another possible natural law principle at 
issue in the case.  Not deterred by the patent hypocrisy, the buyer argued that the slave 
trade was against “natural justice and right” and that contracts involving the trade could be 
sustained only by positive law.   When positive law prohibited slavery, contracts for selling 
slaves shouldn't be enforced.305  The Court’s opinion acknowledged that slavery was 
“contrary to the law of nature (though) it was recognized by the law of nations.”306  Still, 
the Court held that principles of “universal jurisprudence” favored the enforcement of 
contractual rights.307  The Court did not make clear why the latter “principle of universal 
jurisprudence” trumped the former “law of nature.”    The opinion did allude briefly, 
however, to the compromises regarding slavery without which the Constitution would not 
have been ratified.308   It was thus a reminder of the uneasy relationship that document had 
with natural law principles; in fact, the argument that the United States government was 
based on natural law principles would become one of the leading claims of Nineteenth-
century abolitionists. 309  While it might be difficult to make the case that the written 
Constitution, with its compromises on the slavery question, was a natural law document, 
the case is a little easier with respect to the Declaration of Independence, dating from 1776; 
Abraham Lincoln would rely heavily on the Declaration's principles of the natural equality 
of persons310 and those principles animate our human rights philosophy to this day.311  
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Chief Justice Salmon Chase’s dissenting opinion implied that a contract contrary to 
principles of natural justice would not have been upheld absent support for the underlying 
transaction in the positive law.312  Positive law did not sanction slavery when the case was 
brought, but it did when the parties executed the agreement.  In Chase’s view, the 
inviolability of contracts did not override the principle that slavery was contrary to natural 
justice.  
The Court faced yet another “impairment of contracts” case in the post-Civil War 
era, Gunn v. Barry.313   The Court, per Justice Swayne, cited Calder here but in a surprising 
manner.  A creditor brought this case in Georgia state court, complaining that the State’s 
post-war Constitution impaired the obligation of contract and thus violated the federal 
Constitution.  Specifically, the Georgia Constitution substantially increased the amount of 
property that a debtor could exempt from execution.  Consequently, the plaintiff-creditor 
in this case, in seeking to satisfy the debt, could not seize property that could have been 
seized at the date of the contract in 1866.314  The result, Justice Swayne wrote in a 
unanimous opinion, was effectively to transfer one person’s property to another without 
any compensation, contrary to the principles of reason and justice.  Calder was cited for 
this point, but the Court went on, in the next sentence, to write, “(b)ut we must confine 
ourselves to the constitutional aspects of this case.”315  The Court then held that the 
obligation of contract was impaired by this retroactive application of the Georgia 
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Constitution, reasoning that the remedy in existence at the time the contract was entered 
into was part of its obligation.  To the extent a change in the state law regarding remedies 
impaired a substantial right, that change was “utterly void.”316 
Now this was an odd approach.  The Court favorably cited Justice Chase’s opinion 
in Calder, before essentially taking Justice Iredell’s side in the Calder dispute (“we must 
confine ourselves to the constitutional aspects”).   The favorable citation to Calder might 
have made sense if Swayne simply wanted to express his view that natural law principles 
would provide an alternative ground for striking down the Georgia law.    But in the very 
next sentence, the opinion expressly disclaims the Court’s power to act on those principles; 
the Court must be confined to what the constitution says.  Justice Swayne could 
appropriately have written that the Court didn’t need to take extra-constitutional 
considerations into account (as it struck down the law at issue anyway), but instead he 
wrote that the Court could not take such considerations into account.  He favorably cited 
Justice Chase’s Calder opinion, while rejecting its conclusion.   One possible explanation 
is that Swayne modified his opinion to keep the Court unanimous.    
The Court’s decision in Loan Association v. Topeka317 seems to have been as 
straightforward an application of natural law principles as that body ever delivered.  
Unusual in the Court’s annals, the opinion did not make even a pretense of applying a 
federal question, constitutional, statutory, or otherwise.  At least one scholar has argued 
that Loan Association was a Fourteenth Amendment case, and that the Court was implicitly 
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holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed individual liberties as against state 
action at the state level.318  It’s not clear, however, why the Court would choose to interpret 
the Fourteenth Amendment sub silentio.   
In Loan Association, the State of Kansas had authorized the city of Topeka to issue 
bonds payable to a private company, in this case, an iron-works company.  The company 
was to use the money to make internal improvements, including the building of iron 
bridges.319  The plaintiff in the case was the holder of interest coupons and brought this 
action against the City of Topeka to collect on the coupons.  The Court held that the Kansas 
statute authorizing this scheme was unconstitutional, reasoning that taxation must always 
be for the public good and that this bridge-building project was not of a public character, 
but instead for private profit and gain.320     
  The Court cited no constitutional provision for its assertion that there are “rights 
in every free government beyond the control of the state.”  A government which recognized 
no such rights was “after all but a despotism….it is a despotism of the many, of the 
majority, if you choose to call it so, but it is nonetheless a despotism,”321 the opinion read, 
but again, one searches in vain for a specific constitutional provision. Instead, this 
limitation on a state’s power grew out of “the essential nature of all free 
governments…implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact 
could not exist and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name.”322   The 
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similarity to Justice Chase’s reasoning in Calder is obvious, although the Court did not cite 
the case.  Most strikingly, Justice Miller, writing for the majority, wrote that the law at 
issue was "not legislation.  It is a decree under legislative forms."323  The language echoes 
that of Justice Chase in Calder when he wrote that certain legislative acts did not even 
deserve the name "law".324 
That the Court was adopting Justice Chase’s Calder reasoning did not escape 
dissenting Justice Clifford, however, who did cite the case, casting his lot with Justice 
Iredell.  Clifford ridiculed the notion, which he attributed to the Court, that the Court was 
a guardian of a “general latent spirit supposed to pervade or underlie the Constitution.”325  
The language recalled that of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, and subsequent cases, 
discussed above.  Clifford, too, appeared to be using the language of the “spirit” of the 
constitution as a shorthand for principles of natural law, attacking the majority for striking 
down the statute here because it violated "natural justice."   While a state constitution could 
restrict the power of the state legislature, Clifford wrote, where there was no violation of 
the federal constitution, a federal court could not.  Pointedly disagreeing with the majority 
and with Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder, Clifford argued that the power of state 
legislatures was absolute in the absence of a constitutional prohibition on its power, 
whether or not a law was in accordance with natural justice.326 
Clifford made an explicit criticism that was to resonate strongly in certain justices' 
                                               
323 Ibid., 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874).   
324 See n.190, supra, and accompanying text.   
325 Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 669 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (1874). 
326 Ibid., 87 U.S. 655, 668 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (1874). 
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writings in the twentieth century and beyond.  Ruling according to the Court's ideas of 
natural justice would, he wrote, amount to a judicial despotism; moreover, it would amount 
to making the Court sovereign over not only the Constitution, but the people themselves.327  
Although he did not make the point explicit, Clifford's reasoning seemed to rest on the 
assumption that there are no fixed standards regarding the principles of natural justice, or 
of the spirit of the Constitution.  For a Court ruling in accord with the principles of one or 
the other could not reasonably be said to be an exercise of sovereignty - as opposed to 
reasoned judgment.328    
The Court was faced with another of the “Legal Tender Cases” in 1884, called on 
to pass once again on the constitutionality of Civil War-era legislation making government 
notes legal tender for all debts.329  Holding unanimously that this case was 
indistinguishable from the earlier legal tender cases, the Court reaffirmed its prior opinions 
with Justice Field reiterating his earlier dissent.330  Field, responding to the Court’s holding 
that the federal government had an implied power as sovereign to legislate with respect to 
currency, argued that it was once thought “axiomatic” that the federal government did not 
possess the power to make legal tender of its notes.331  Citing Calder, and forecasting much 
“evil likely to follow,” Field would have held that the legislation was beyond the Congress's 
authority, and that there is “no such thing as inherent sovereignty in the government of the 
                                               
327 Ibid. 87 U.S. 665, 669 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (1874). 
328 Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (Joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and 
Souter) (courts evaluating substantive due process claims must exercise reasoned judgment) (1991). 
329 Legal Tender Cases 110 U.S. 421 (1884).  
330 Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 451 (Field, J., dissenting) (1884). 
331 Ibid., 110 U.S. 421, 455 (Field, J., dissenting) (1884).   
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United States.”332  The Court's opinion had concluded that the United States government 
had the authority to make its notes legal tender as this was a “power universally understood 
to belong to sovereignty.”333 
The majority opinion and the dissent here both framed the issue as one of 
sovereignty.  The concept had perhaps been underappreciated in Calder and previous cases 
relying on Calder.  Hobbes perceptively would have seen the very notion that a government 
of limited powers was “sovereign” as an absurd contradiction in terms, a point that Justice 
Field’s dissent seems to get.  Sovereign power is granted by consent, Hobbes argued, and 
that consent necessarily confers power and authority on the sovereign to do whatever he 
will, as the idea that anyone could limit or overrule a sovereign is a logical contradiction.334  
Moreover, to withdraw consent would be to violate one’s contractual obligations, which 
for Hobbes, was the definition of injustice. A government limited by an enumerated powers 
doctrine, whether those powers were granted pursuant to some theory of natural justice or 
not, would not be sovereign.  Hobbes specifically identified the power to coin money as 
one of the attributes of sovereignty.335  For Hobbes, though, the end of government was to 
provide for peace and justice,336 a different approach from Locke’s protection of life, 
liberty and property.  
 Field argued instead that sovereignty in the United States rested with the people, 
and that the people, through the Constitution, granted certain circumscribed powers to the 
                                               
332 Ibid., 110 U.S. 421, 467, 470 (Field, J. dissenting) (1884) 
333 Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 447 (1884).   
334 Hobbes, Leviathan (2004), 109 – 111.   
335 Ibid., 114. 
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government.  Field was attacking the majority opinion as being Hobbesian, in recognizing 
a nearly unlimited sovereignty in the federal government.    Field argued finally that the 
numerous constitutional limits on power, both at the state and the federal level, evinced an 
intention to prevent oppression and injustice, and concluded, in a manner recalling the first 
Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder, that legislation promoting either was inconsistent with 
the letter and spirit of the Constitution.337  Ironically, Field’s own opinion had Hobbesian 
aspects, especially in linking justice with the keeping of contracts.  Reiterating no fewer 
than five times his position that laws must be “just” to be consistent with the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution, he had the sanctity of contracts in mind every time.  But 
ultimately, his reasoning was drawn from Locke.  The reason contracts and the preservation 
of the obligation of contracts was so important, he wrote, was because “a large proportion 
of the property of the world exists in contracts.”338 
In fact, Justice Field’s methodology appears virtually indistinguishable from Justice 
Chase's in Calder. Since, unlike in Calder, a federal law was at issue here, Fields could 
simply have opined that no enumerated power enabled Congress to make its notes legal 
tender.  He went well beyond that in reasoning that unjust laws were beyond the authority 
of both the federal government, and the states. Moreover, while Field’s extended discussion 
on the nature of enumerated powers was standard fare in making the point that the powers 
not explicitly granted the federal government were denied to it (the whole point, after all, 
of the Tenth Amendment), it did little to take into account a half-century of jurisprudence 
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following Chief Justice Marshall’s explication of the implied power doctrine and broad 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.339  Nor did he adequately answer the 
majority’s point that a delegate at the Constitutional Convention moved to prohibit the 
federal government (and not just the states) from impairing the obligation of contract, and 
this motion failed even to receive a second,340 the implication being that the drafters of the 
Constitution intended to leave open the possibility that the federal government could 
impair contracts.   In short, he took care to argue that his dissent was based on the theory 
that American governments, at any level, could not, consistent with the spirit of the 
Constitution, pass unjust laws – laws that violate natural justice.   
The final case in the first line is Atchison, T & S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews.341  It is also 
the first case in the Calder progeny that explicitly engaged the Fourteenth Amendment.  
(Recall that it has been argued that Loan Association v. Topeka was also a Fourteenth 
Amendment case, although if this were true, the Court itself made no mention of it.) 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in 1868, was 
one of three post-Civil War Amendments adopted as a direct result of that conflict.  Among 
its key provisions were clauses making all persons born or naturalized in the United States 
citizens of the United States,342 prohibiting states from abridging the “privileges or 
immunities” of citizens of the United States,343  depriving a person of life, liberty or 
                                               
339 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).   
340 Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 444 (1884).  One possible answer that had been previously 
raised was that the power to regulate bankruptcy was delegated to the federal government, and that 
bankruptcy laws obviously impaired contractual obligations; a prohibition in the federal government 
would thus have been inappropriate.  
341 Atchison, T & S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899). 
342 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, Clause 1 
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property without due process of law,344 or denying any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.345 
The Fourteenth Amendment was unique in American legal history in its method of 
ratification.  Congress, by statute (the first Reconstruction Act), required Southern states 
who had seceded from the Union to ratify this Amendment as a condition for being re-
admitted to the Union.346  Often classified as an effort to force the states, as opposed to the 
federal government alone, to honor the civil rights of freed African-American slaves, the 
Amendment did more than this:  By forbidding states from abridging the “privileges or 
immunities” of citizens of the United States, it extended its reach far beyond racial matters, 
but to an entire panoply of rights Americans held traditionally.347   Arguably, the language 
of the Amendment was deliberately broad, allowing for Congress to protect rights, both 
those that predated and post-dated its passage.348  Importantly, the Supreme Court had held 
in Barron v. Baltimore349 that the protections of the Bill of Rights did not bind the state 
governments, and the passage by southern states of “Black Codes” denying basic rights to 
African-Americans after the Civil War prompted the Fourteenth Amendment.350 
Twentieth-Century Supreme Court cases would bring debate about whether the 
                                               
344 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, Clause 3. 
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Fourteenth Amendment “incorporated” the Bill of Rights as against the states, whether the 
broad language of the Amendment reflected a philosophy of natural law, and whether the 
result was certain “substantive due process” guarantees, a promise that governmental 
power could not be exercised for certain ends, irrespective of whether the “process” “due” 
was followed.   Early interpretations of the Amendment distorted its purpose, turning it 
into a “too(l) of laissez faire, shielding American commerce and industry from controls 
adopted by the voters’ elected representatives.”351 But some of the first applications of the 
Amendment, responsible for fundamentally transforming the way the United States 
governed itself, were more pedestrian.    
Atchison is among those cases, hardly well-remembered today.   In Atchison, the 
victim of an alleged denial of equal protection was a railroad company.  Pursuant to a 
Kansas statute, the trial court held the company strictly liable for damages caused by a fire, 
the liability incurred by the plaintiff showing merely that the company caused the fire and 
that damage resulted.  In short, the Kansas legislature statutorily amended the common law 
elements of a cause of action in tort for negligence so as to eliminate any need to find a 
breach of a duty.352  In addition to creating an unusual type of liability, the Kansas 
legislature had also provided that the companies had to pay attorney’s fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs, although there was no commensurate award of attorney’s fees for the railroad 
companies if a suit brought against them were unsuccessful.353 
The Court upheld the Kansas statute.  Lockean concerns figured in its Fourteenth-
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Amendment analysis, as the Court was faced here, it held, with a statute that served a public 
purpose and was not, moreover, purely arbitrary,354 both conditions a sine qua non for 
Locke’s legitimate legislation.  The legislation was not arbitrary, according to the Court, 
because operating railroads caused a heightened risk of damage from fire.355 Justice Harlan 
dissented.   
Harlan, the “Great Dissenter,” would have found an equal protection violation.  In 
citing Calder, though, he went well beyond straightforward equal protection analysis.  The 
law (which would have unquestionably been struck down, Harlan argued, had it awarded 
attorney’s fees to the defendant in the event of a successful defense, while denying fees to 
a successful plaintiff) led not only to an inequality, but to an “injustice.”356  This injustice 
resulted from the Kansas legislature’s awarding an advantage to one party in litigation as 
against its antagonist.  Such a law violated “the spirit” of state government, Harlan argued, 
and was, moreover, not an appropriate exercise of a state’s “police power” whereby it could 
legislate for the health, safety and morals of its citizens.357  The award, though labeled 
“attorney’s fees,” was merely an arbitrary fine placed on a corporate defendant for 
exercising its right to defend itself in court.358 Harlan would soon become an early advocate 
for the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporated” the Bill of Rights, the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution, and thus bound the states to honor those constitutional 
guarantees.359 
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After Atchison, the Supreme Court did not again cite Calder for its natural law 
implications for nearly half a century. Calder never again made an appearance in the 
Court’s jurisprudence in a business or economic context.  The Twentieth – and Twenty-
First – century applications of Calder were to arise first in the criminal law context and 
then in cases involving personal and individual liberties.  
Calder's natural law debate, if it was that, figured in the jurisprudence of several 
Supreme Court justices throughout the last quarter of the 19th Century, in seven different 
reported cases:  McVeigh (in the Court's opinion), Knox (in both Chief Justice Chase's and 
Justice Field's dissent), Osborn (in the Court's opinion), Gunn (in the Court's opinion), 
Loan Association (in Justice Clifford's dissent), the Legal Tender Cases (in Justice Field's 
dissent), and Atchison (in Justice Harlan's dissent). The citations were typically favorable 
to Chase's opinion claiming that there are "fundamental" and "vital" which no "free, 
republican" government may violate.  The one exception was Justice Clifford's dissent 
Loan Association v. Topeka, which sided with Iredell.  In that case, the Court's opinion, as 
we have seen, closely tracked Justice Chase's Calder opinion without citing the case.  
  In all these cases, justices were deliberately alluding to natural law principles, or 
at least to those principles inherent in free, republican governments, and it is noteworthy 
that, in none of majority opinions, did it seem necessary to invoke the Calder debate.  
McVeigh might have been a straightforward due process case under the Fifth Amendment.  
In Knox and the Legal Tender Cases, the dissents might have stopped at the argument that 
the federal government had no enumerated power to make legal tender of paper money.  In 
Osborn, the Court relied on the common-law principle that a contract for the sale of 
  
86 
property, once executed, bound the buyer, even where a subsequent event impaired the 
value of the buyer's purchase.  That principle alone would have decided the case. The 
citation to Calder here was especially strong evidence of the great value the late-Nineteenth 
Century Court placed on contracts, as here the sanctity of contract argument won out over 
the natural law's prohibition on slavery, a prohibition that both the majority opinion and 
Justice Harlan's dissent recognized. In Atchison, Justice Harlan relied on the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
There was only one case in which the dissent accused the majority of relying on 
natural law.  In Loan Association, Justice Clifford convincingly demonstrated that the 
Court's opinion did not rely on any specific constitutional provision, and accurately pointed 
out that Justice Miller's opinion for the Court sounded a lot like Justice Chase's opinion in 
Calder.  His citation seemed apt.  
It is no coincidence that Calder's natural law debate lay dormant until 1870.  For it 
was precisely then that the United States was becoming an industrialized nation, as opposed 
to a mostly agrarian one.360   The importance of contractual and property rights is 
heightened in a nation driven by increasing commerce and interdependence, and protecting 
economic interests was a major concern of American Government in the Civil War's 
aftermath.  The Supreme Court was not immune to those pressures.  It seems clear that 
Supreme Court justices deliberately revived the Calder debate in the last thirty years of the 
Nineteenth Century.  Chase's opinion in Calder and Locke's emphasis on property rights 
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were both readily available to the Court as aids in securing the economic and legal 
foundation for America's industrial expansion.  For of the seven cases citing Calder from 
1870 to 1899, all seven addressed economic, property and contractual issues.  This was a 
trend that would continue into the early Twentieth Century.   
 
CALDER V. BULL IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND BEYOND 
Introduction  
This section will consider the Twentieth and Twenty-first Century history of natural 
law in Supreme Court jurisprudence by looking at those Supreme Court opinions, whether 
they be Court holdings or concurring or dissenting opinions, that have cited either Justice 
Chase's or Justice Iredell’s opinion in Calder v. Bull.361  To reiterate our previous 
discussion, Calder was a late Eighteenth-Century Supreme Court case where litigants 
challenged a law that retroactively altered the outcome in a dispute over a will.  The Court 
faced the issue whether the state law's retroactive effect violated the Ex Post Facto Clause 
of the federal Constitution.362 
In holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied only to criminal law cases, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Connecticut law.  In this holding, the Court was unanimous.   
But Justices Samuel Chase and James Iredell engaged in a now-famous dispute over the 
judiciary's authority to consider what Iredell called principles of "natural justice"363 In his 
opinion, Chase argued that  
                                               
361 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) 
362 "No State shall...pass any...ex post fact Law."  U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10.   
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I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is 
absolute and without control, although its authority should not be expressly 
constrained by the constitution or fundamental law of the state...the 
purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and 
terms of the social compact...there are acts which the federal or state 
legislature cannot do without exceeding their authority.  There are certain 
vital principles in our free republican governments which will determine 
and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power.364 
To which Iredell responded that a court is not entitled to strike down legislation as 
void "merely because it is in its judgment contrary to the principles of natural justice."365  
He noted that the "ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard."366 
Calder v. Bull has become one of the most famous Supreme Court cases in 
American jurisprudence because of this exchange between Chase and Iredell.367  Although 
no Supreme Court justice cited the case for its natural law implications until 1870,368 there 
followed a series of cases that cited either Chase's or Iredell's opinion in the last quarter of 
the Nineteenth Century, invariably tying natural justice considerations to matters of 
economics, property and contracts.369  This section will consider the second wave of 
Calder's biography by looking at citations to Calder - whether Chase's opinion or Iredell's 
- for the "natural justice" debate.  Any case (from the beginning of the Twentieth Century 
to today) in which the Court itself, or one of the justices (whether in a concurring or 
dissenting opinion) cites the case for this purpose is considered herein.  Cases that cite 
Calder for its ex post facto holding are beyond the scope of this study.   
Several conclusions can be made from such an analysis.  First, it will become 
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apparent that the Calder debate was active throughout the second part of the Twentieth 
Century and until today, although in a very different context than it was in the Nineteenth 
Century.  While Nineteenth Century cases citing Calder were, without exception, 
economic, property or contractual cases, one finds no such cases beyond the Nineteenth 
Century.  Rather, beginning in the middle of the Twentieth Century,370 one finds Calder 
citations predominately in cases involving civil liberties.   
Second, the natural law debate in Twentieth and Twenty-First Century cases (as 
reflected by Calder citations) has largely been subsumed within the debate about the nature 
of substantive due process. Several opinions discussed herein either rely on or reject 
substantive due process arguments with Justice Black especially arguing that the concept 
– as well as the process of selective Fourteenth Amendment "incorporation" - lends itself 
to justices imposing their own values, based on extra-constitutional considerations.   
Third, in its substantive due process jurisprudence, the Court has adopted an 
approach akin to the common-law approach of gradual change, with precept building upon 
precept.  This sort of common-law constitutional adjudication is especially appropriate in 
light of the Constitution's once-unique status as a single document.  Whereas the English 
judiciary relied on a multitude of written guarantees, in addition to legal opinions in 
interpreting legislative acts, the American judiciary was bound, at least in theory, by that 
single written document.  As the American Constitution is difficult to amend, its meaning 
and application have been determined by judicial opinions, including the courts' authority 
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debate on natural justice) in the Nineteenth Century (Atchison, T & S.F.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 
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to strike down laws that violate the constitution, that is are "unconstitutional."  Other 
approaches to substantive due process have been proposed; for example, that it is limited 
to the specific guarantees included in the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution)371, or that it is limited to specific rights that have a deeply rooted history in 
American traditions,372 but the common law approach has dominated.373 
Adamson v. California374 was the first case in the Twentieth Century to feature a 
Calder citation. The Court in Adamson splintered four ways in applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment to state action in a criminal trial.  Specifically, there were four different 
approaches as to the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which prohibited state government action against a citizen’s privileges and immunities, and 
which also prevented state governments from denying due process of law, the same 
guarantee made effective as against the federal government by the Fifth Amendment.375  
Justice Black’s opinion, in dissent, explicitly and pointedly objected to what he presented 
as the other justices making recourse to natural law in interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no defendant in a criminal trial may be 
compelled to be a witness against himself.  Although it is now well-established law that a 
                                               
371 See Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 69 (Black, J., 
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prosecutor violates the Fifth Amendment by commenting on a defendant’s silence,376 this 
was still an open question at both the state and federal levels at the time of Adamson.377 
The State of California, unlike most other states, did permit a prosecutor to 
comment on a defendant’s silence.378  The State accused the defendant of murder, and the 
defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.  Consistent with California law, the trial 
court gave instructions, and the prosecuting attorney made comments regarding the 
defendant’s silence.  The defendant (the “appellant” in the Supreme Court case) raised two 
related Fourteenth Amendment issues:  First, he argued that the comments state actors 
made about his silence at trial violated his privileges and immunities as a United States 
citizen.379  Second, the California statute permitting comment on a defendant’s silence 
violated his right to a fair trial, a Fifth Amendment Due Process right incorporated as 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.380   
The first claim was settled by the Court’s holding in Twining v. New Jersey, 381 in 
which the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not 
incorporated as against the states, either through the Privileges and Immunities Clause or 
through the Due Process Clause.  It logically followed from this holding that the rights 
granted (or reserved) to citizens through the Bill of Rights were not necessarily also 
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378 ibid., 332 U.S. 46, 55 (1947).   
379 The Court had already ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower federal courts to 
protect a citizen’s privileges and immunities as a citizen of an individual state.  See Adamson v. 
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“privileges and immunities” of citizens of the United States, which the Fourteenth 
Amendment required each state to protect.  As there was, then, no federal protection against 
compelled self-incrimination in a state court, there was, ipso facto, no protection against a 
prosecutor’s comment on the defendant’s silence.   
The Court also dispensed with the appellant’s second argument, that prosecutorial 
comment on a criminal defendant’s silence violated his right to a fair trial, and thus due 
process.   The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate all 
the rights listed in the Bill of Rights, the Court held,382 noting that this contention was 
raised and rejected in Palko v. Connecticut.383  In Palko, the Court, in permitting a state to 
appeal a second-degree murder conviction and a life sentence, and to gain a first-degree 
murder conviction and death sentence on retrial, refused to extend the Fifth Amendment's 
prohibition of double jeopardy to the states.  In short, it refused to use the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause or Privileges and Immunities Clause to "incorporate" 
the Fifth Amendment as protection against an individual state's action. There are, the Court 
said, certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty" and it is only those that receive protection under the Fourteenth Amendment from 
state action. 
Justice Black dissented from these holdings in Adamson.  It is worth considering 
his dissent in some depth, because it would presage a long career (Black remained on the 
Court until 1971) of discussion about natural law and incorporation.  In fact, Justice Black 
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would later refer to his dissent in Adamson as his “most important opinion.”384 
The Court (as reflected in the majority opinion in this 5 to 3 decision) was using, 
Justice Black complained, a natural law approach that was an “incongruous excrescence 
on our Constitution.”385  Black included a lengthy appendix to his dissent, the upshot of 
which was that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment had in mind that the entirety of 
the Bill of Rights would be incorporated as against the states.  Black would have 
straightforwardly overruled Twining.  That case, Black wrote with great rhetorical flourish, 
entailed that the “Court is endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under 
‘natural law’ periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the 
Court’s conception of what, at a particular time, constitutes ‘civilized decency’ and 
‘fundamental liberty and justice.’”386  In a manner recalling Justice Iredell’s concurring 
opinion in Calder, Black (like Iredell, a thoroughgoing and unapologetic positivist) 
contended that the constraints and dictates of natural law are not determinate, and that 
reliance on natural law theory would cede to “this Court a broad power which we are not 
authorized by the Constitution to exercise.”387  
Black did not cite (for he could not) any portion of the majority opinion that invoked 
natural rights or natural law, but instead relied on a claimed similarity between the Court’s 
arguments in Adamson and natural rights/natural law arguments that the Court rejected in 
the Slaughterhouse cases.388  The Court in Slaughterhouse was faced with a Fourteenth 
                                               
384 Newman, Hugo Black, 352 (1994). 
385 Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 75 (Black, J, dissenting) (1947).   
386 Ibid., 322 U.S. 46, 69 (Black J., dissenting) (1947). 
387 Ibid., 322 U.S. 46, 70 (Black, J., dissenting) (1947).   
388 ibid., 322 U.S. 46, 76 (Black, J., dissenting) (1947).  Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1871). 
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Amendment claim that a Louisiana statute requiring that all slaughtering of animals in New 
Orleans take place in one central location, and granting an exclusive franchise to one 
business to provide the services, violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause.389  The 
plaintiffs in Slaughterhouse did not cite any particular provision of the Bill of Rights, but 
instead argued that a person had a “natural right” to “do business and engage in his trade 
or vocation.”390  These natural law arguments in Adamson were much like those that the 
Court “flatly rejected” in Slaughterhouse, Black contended.  The Court in Adamson was 
adopting, in Black’s view, the same sort of natural justice criteria -  including notions of 
“civilized standards,” “canons of decency,” and “fundamental justice” – in determining 
which provisions of the Bill of Rights were enforceable against the states and which were 
not.391 
For Black – although not for the majority, and not for Justice Murphy in his own 
dissenting opinion – the issue was easy.  The Fourteenth Amendment extended the 
protections of the first eight amendments to the Constitution (the relevant provisions of the 
Bill of Rights) to citizens against state infringement of those rights.  Such a methodology 
would constrain judges from roaming far afield, attempting to define the ill-defined 
principles and applications of natural law in giving content to "liberty" in the Due Process 
Clause or determining what the privileges or immunities are.  Citing Calder, and 
specifically Justice Iredell’s concurring opinion, Black wrote that “to pass upon the 
constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards enumerated in the Bill of 
                                               
389 Urofsky, Dissent and the Supreme Court, 84 – 85. 
390 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 77 (Black, J., dissenting) (1947). 
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Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one thing; to invalidate statutes because of 
application of ‘natural law,’ deemed to be above and undefined by the Constitution, is 
another.”392  Black feared also that a court unconstrained by the Bill of Rights’ specific 
guarantees would, using a natural law formula, both fail to prevent state violations of civil 
liberties and “roam at large in the broad expanses of policy and morals and to trespass, all 
too freely, on the legislative domain of the States as well as the Federal Government.”393   
He attached a lengthy appendix to his opinion, outlining in detail the legislative history of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, including statements by one of the Amendment's principal 
authors, Ohio Congressman John Bingham, indicating that Bingham, at least, intended to 
make the Bill of Rights apply to the states.394 Justice Black was joined in dissent by Justice 
Douglas, whose own writings would later figure prominently in the natural law debate.   
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, said that Twining was “one of the 
outstanding opinions in the history of the Court.”395  Arguing that it would be reasonable 
for a jury to draw negative inferences from a defendant's failure to testify, Frankfurter wrote 
that "the notion that to allow jurors to do that which sensible and right-minded men do 
every day violates the 'immutable principles of justice' as conceived by a civilized society 
is to trivialize the importance of 'due process.'"396  Perhaps more importantly, Frankfurter 
blasted Black's incorporation theory of the Fourteenth Amendment, relying on the 
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393 Ibid., 332 U.S. 46, 90 (Black, J., dissenting) (1947). 
394 Ibid., 332 U.S. 46, 92 (Black, J., dissenting) (1947).   
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arguments of his former student,397 Charles Fairman, who would, two years later, publish 
a famous article arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not make the Bill of Rights 
binding on the states.  Fairman focused on the historical practices of the states at the time 
of the Amendment's ratification, rather than on statements by Congressman Bingham.398   
In addition to Black, Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, also dissented, 
agreeing with most of Justice Black’s own dissent, agreeing that the Fourteenth 
Amendment fully incorporated the Bill of Rights, but disagreeing with Black’s conclusion 
that the Due Process Clause of the Amendment was limited in application to the specific 
protections of the Bill of Rights.  “Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far 
short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional 
condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of a specific provision 
in the Bill of Rights,” Murphy wrote.399  Since his reference was explicitly directed to 
“standards of procedure” (as opposed to substance), it is unclear whether Justice Black’s 
criticism that the majority was employing natural law considerations would also apply to 
Murphy’s statement.  As Murphy’s opinion differed from Black’s only in arguing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s application to the states might be broader than the specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights (an approach Black disdained) and since Justice Douglas 
was to employ precisely this reasoning in later cases, it is not obvious why Douglas should 
                                               
397 Frankfurter was a Harvard Law Professor before joining the Court.  For the relationship between 
Fairman and Frankfurter, and an unflattering review of Frankfurter's Adamson concurrence, see 
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have joined Black’s opinion rather than Murphy’s.  Perhaps there simply was an evolution 
in his own thinking. 
  Adamson was the first, and as of this writing, remains the only Supreme Court 
criminal law case to cite Calder for its natural law debate.400  While the economic and 
contractual concerns which often dominated political discourse in the second half of the 
Nineteenth Century and the first half of the Twentieth as well as the personal liberty and 
individual autonomy issues that figured prominently from the latter part of the Twentieth 
Century, both had their share of Calder citations, the mid-Twentieth Century line of cases, 
strengthening many protections for criminal defendants, did not.   
The Court would revisit the Fourteenth Amendment and fundamental principles in 
the next cases citing Calder which are similar enough to treat as a kind.  In fact, they 
involved the same Connecticut state statutes.  But the Court reached differing conclusions 
in its opinions.  The cases were Poe v. Ullman401 and Griswold v. Connecticut.402  But 
before considering those cases from the 1960's, we must briefly examine a 1952 case.  
Although none of the opinions in Rochin v. California403 rely on any of the Calder 
opinions, the case is too central a link in the natural law/incorporation debate of the mid-
Twentieth Century to omit.   
The facts are straightforward.  California state police, having "some information" 
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that a person was selling narcotics, forced their way into the bedroom he was sharing with 
his wife.  The suspect swallowed two capsules that were on his nightstand, which later 
proved to contain morphine.  The police found this out, however, only after they directed 
a doctor to forcibly insert a tube into the suspect's stomach, causing him to vomit.404  
The Court, faced with these facts, ruled that California violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because its officers' conduct "shocked the 
conscience."405  Although later Court opinions and commentators would suggest that 
Justice Frankfurter had proposed "conscience-shocking" as a constitutional test, this is not 
a fair summary of what he wrote.  Mindful of Justice Black's Adamson dissent (and Black's 
concurrence in this case), Frankfurter disputed the idea that the search for substantive due 
process was merely a revival of natural law.  Instead, he proposed a constitutional common 
law approach that is similar to what Justices Harlan and Souter would later develop.  Noting 
that the Due Process Clause was the "least specific and most comprehensive protection of 
liberties,"406 Frankfurter stressed the need for "disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of 
science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated" as necessary to accommodate 
both continuity and change in a "progressive society."407  It was surprising that Frankfurter 
wrote in terms of "science," since he contemplated a moral inquiry, such as whether 
stomach-pumping "shocks the conscience." 
Judges, Frankfurter wrote, were not free under such a methodology to roam at large.  
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Nor were they free simply to apply their own notions of natural law; although due process 
considerations could not simply be frozen at some "fixed state of time or thought," (a 
method that would permit "inanimate machines" to judge), due process judgments still 
must be anchored to "the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples" and "deeply 
rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession."408  This case was 
easy for Frankfurter, because the police action - including an illegal entry, a struggle to 
keep the suspect from swallowing capsules, and an invasive procedure designed to extract 
the contents of his stomach - were "shocking," leaving no doubt that the notions of justice 
of English-speaking peoples were violated.    
Justices Black and Douglas both wrote concurring opinions, agreeing with the 
Court’s judgment but not its reasoning.  Both Black409 and Douglas410 would have relied 
on the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination.411  Both, 
obviously, thought that the Fourteenth Amendment had incorporated the Fifth 
Amendment's protections as against the states. Black, reasonably enough, questioned why, 
if the Court was to search for "fundamental" and "immutable" principles of justice, it should 
limit itself to seeking those of the English-speaking peoples.412 The answer, of course, was 
that it was English traditions that American courts had taken cognizance of since the time 
of America's founding, and that there was much to be said for the argument that it was 
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English common law on which American courts could legitimately search for and apply 
principles of justice.  Put another way, Black assumed that his colleagues were reasoning 
from natural law, which relies on immutable principles, and cannot be limited to a 
particular time or country.   
The Court in Rochin was condemning, too, "arbitrary" governmental action, but in 
a broader sense than that the state action was merely "irrational".  Here, it was brutal and 
despotic, and some commentators have argued that the case established a fundamental 
liberty interest, the liberty against despotic state action.413  In other words, this particular 
arbitrariness test should not be confused with the "rationality" test that any state action 
must pass.   
 To return to Poe and Griswold.  The Connecticut laws at issue applied to both 
individuals using contraception-preventing devices and to those, including medical 
practitioners, seeking to “assist, abet, counsel, cause, hire or command” others in using 
contraception.414   The laws, passed in 1879, had gone unenforced, and there appeared to 
be little or no threat that anyone would be prosecuted under them,415 although that point 
was disputed.416 
 Calder was cited in both cases, and in multiple opinions.  In the earlier case, Poe, 
Justice Harlan (the second Justice Harlan, the grandson of the first) dissented after the 
Court dismissed the appeal as not justiciable, as it did not involve a live case or controversy; 
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the State of Connecticut had deliberately allowed the law to go unenforced.417  Justice 
Black would have decided the case on the merits.  One may conclude based on his previous 
and subsequent writings that Black would have upheld the law. 
  However, it is Justice Harlan’s and Justice Douglas's dissents that concern us here. 
Douglas's dissent did not cite Calder, and while it would thus otherwise be outside the 
scope of this paper, his was one the one opinion in Poe that might most persuasively be 
pegged as relying on natural law.   Douglas wrote philosophically, citing Immanuel Kant 
and John Stuart Mill, among others.418   He argued that the Constitution, through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteed certain liberty interests beyond those that were listed 
in the Bill of Rights, pointedly disagreeing with the Black position that the Bill of Rights 
limited the liberties the Fourteenth Amendment protected.419  Among those was the right 
to privacy, which was "implied" in a free society, Douglas argued.  Although not made an 
explicit constitutional guarantee as such, the right "emanated" from the totality of the 
"constitutional scheme under which we live."420 
  Harlan would have had held that the laws were inconsistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment as an “intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of the 
most intimate concerns of an individual’s personal life.”421 Justice Brandeis’ dissenting 
opinion in Olmstead v. United States422 foreshadowed this suggestion that the federal 
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Constitution contained a right to privacy and it would later provide the basis for the Court’s 
holding in Griswold.  Finding such a right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, Harlan recalled Locke in arguing that the clause offered not merely procedural 
guarantees, but that it also guarded against arbitrary legislation by the state.423  Harlan 
cited Chase's opinion in Calder, for the principle that a Court must enforce those rights, 
the security of which men entered society in the first instance.  In brief, Harlan’s position 
was that the Fourteenth Amendment ensured, against infringement from the several states, 
certain fundamental rights inherent in free republican governments. 
Justice Harlan gave perhaps the most comprehensive and influential defense to that 
date of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.424  Rejecting Justice 
Black's argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is limited in 
application to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, he noted the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment (binding the federal government) would have been mere 
surplusage if interpreted the same way:   
The fact that an identical provision limiting federal action is found among 
the first eight Amendments, applying to the Federal Government, suggests 
that due process is a discrete concept which subsists as an independent 
guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than 
the specific prohibitions.425 
 
 As if addressing Justice Iredell’s Calder opinion, as well as Justice Black’s 
methodology laid out in a series of cases, Justice Harlan rejected the claim that a search for 
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a substantive due process was indeterminate, of no fixed standard, and allowed judges to 
roam freely in applying their own philosophical predilections.  His opinion is worth quoting 
at some length:   
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be 
determined by reference to any code.  The best that can be said is that, 
through the course of this Court’s decisions, it has represented the balance 
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the 
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized 
society.  If the supplying of content to this constitutional concept has of 
necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges 
have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them.  The 
balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard 
to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as 
the traditions from which it broke.  That tradition is a living thing.  A 
decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, 
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.  
No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and 
restraint.426 
 
Harlan made the case that a substantive due process jurisprudence that 
encompassed more than the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights could be based on 
something other than the Court’s own notion of “fundamental” law, whether that 
fundamental law has its roots in natural law or not.  His argument recalls those early 
Americans who believed that the United States’ fundamental law was that which the new 
country derived from its English antecedents.427  It also serves as a counterpoint to Justice 
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passim.  This claim is unpersuasive as it ignores Justice Harlan’s own language explaining 
 
  
104 
Clifford's dissenting opinion in Loan Association v. Topeka.428 In that case, dissenting 
Justice Clifford had argued that permitting judges to base rulings on "natural justice" would 
be to make the judiciary sovereign.  Harlan here was making an argument from substantive 
due process, a fact that distinguishes this case from Loan Association, but his response is 
still apt.  A decision of the Court that radically departed from established tradition could 
not long survive, he wrote. His point was that judges were not free to simply incorporate 
their own philosophical predilections into constitutional law.  Instead, judgements must 
take into account American traditions.  
 If he was correct about this, Justice Clifford's claim about judicial sovereignty was 
not apt.  For a sovereign might, per Locke, be bound under threat of revolution to honor 
the ends of government.   And it might, per Hobbes, not be bound by its subjects at all.  But 
surely it could not be bound or limited by its country's traditions.  That would be to lack 
sovereignty altogether. Clifford's point was that a court, when, going beyond specific 
constitutional text, would be exercising will as opposed to judgment.429  Harlan disputed 
this, suggesting that courts must necessarily be constrained by the people's tradition, and 
that discerning that was an act of judgment, not will.    
          Substantive due process was not new to the Court’s jurisprudence.  Some scholars 
trace it as far back as Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the Court in Dred Scott v. 
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429 cf. Hamilton, The Federalist 78 (1979) (The judicial branch has "neither force nor will, but merely 
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Sandford,430 where Taney condemned the Missouri Compromise by saying that the specific 
law at issue – one that deprived a citizen of his “property” (in that case, slaves, of course) 
because of the simple expedient of his having moved that property to another state - could 
not be dignified with the adjective “due.”431  While in the immediate aftermath of the Civil 
War (and thus also in the immediate aftermath of the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment), the courts tended to reject substantive due process claims in upholding state 
regulation on business, the idea that the state's police powers might be limited in regulating 
business affairs gained traction in the late 1870’s and the decade of the 1880’s.432  The 
Court in these cases was borrowing from the idea of vested rights, as laid out by Justice 
Chase in Calder, and giving it a specific constitutional mooring that it had previously 
lacked.433   
Later, the Court would strike down state laws under a Fourteenth Amendment 
theory of liberty of contract.  These cases that do not cite Calder are outside the scope of 
this paper, but bear mentioning (though not an extended treatment) as part of a complete 
understanding of the historical progression of the arguments that played out in Calder and 
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the cases subsequently citing it.  A brief digression is in order here, before proceeding to 
Griswold.   
 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
The substantive due process cases that identified the concept of due process with 
"vested rights" in the Court's jurisprudence in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century were 
of two kinds. First, in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, those cases were concerned 
primarily with the system of federalism, the intricacies of the relationship between and the 
respective powers of the federal and state governments.  Second, beginning in about 1890 
(with the death of Justice Miller, the author of the opinion upholding state regulation in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases) the primary concern became economic laissez-faire, the protection 
of property rights, specifically in the context of big business.434 
This era of substantive due process marks a fundamental shift in jurisprudence that 
arguably leant a textual basis for the sort of jurisprudence that the first Justice Chase had 
advocated in Calder.  Up to that point  
A majority of the Court was drawing the doctrine of vested rights from the 
"essential nature of all free governments," as it had done years before in 
Calder v. Bull. Should it ever decide, however, that due process of law itself 
constituted a limitation upon the police power of the state, then the doctrine 
of vested rights would be tremendously strengthened.  For the immunity of 
vested rights from legislative interference would then be supported by the 
authority of a specific clause in the Constitution of the United States, rather 
than by some vague conception of the nature of compact government.  All 
that was necessary, in other words, was to tie the doctrine of vested rights 
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Were that done, 
the police power of the states would be seriously impaired.435 
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The problem remained that the Due Process Clause is abstract, and must itself be infused 
with substantive content.  That task would involve a different methodology than the task 
of searching for natural law principles, but is just as susceptible to differing interpretations.   
The Slaughterhouse Cases436 and Munn v. Illinois437 illustrated the Court's concern 
with the federal government's power vis-a-vis the several states.  In the former case, as 
discussed above, the Court refused to hold that the state regulations of slaughterhouses 
which, inter alia, awarded an exclusive to one favored private business, violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.  In Munn, the Court upheld, as against a 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenge, Illinois's act of setting limits that a private 
company could charge for the storage of grain.  Noting that the grain storage units at issue 
served a public interest, the Court held that where private property is devoted to a public 
use, it is subject to regulation.438   
As he had in Slaughterhouse, Justice Field penned a dissent in Munn, and would 
have held that the private company here had been deprived of its property without due 
process of law.   "The same liberal construction which is required for the protection of life 
and liberty," Field wrote, "should be applied to the protection of private property."439  Field 
was not suggesting that this (as he saw it) impairment of private property rights was 
unconstitutional merely because the state did not provide the process that was "due," but 
that the state lacked the power, under any circumstances, to pass this sort of legislation.  In 
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other words, the Due Process Clause was not merely "procedural"; instead it prohibited 
government from passing certain types of laws - those denying fundamental rights - 
regardless of the process used.  
 
GRISWOLD AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
To return now to those cases explicitly citing Calder, after Poe v. Ullman, we are 
faced again, in Griswold v. Connecticut440 with the same Connecticut statute regulating the 
use of contraceptives.  That statute prohibited the use of contraceptives, even among 
married couples, and also prohibited any person, including medical practitioners, from 
assisting or counseling with respect to contraceptive use.441 Griswold was a case of such 
importance that six of the justices wrote opinions; in addition to Justice Douglas's opinion 
for the Court, Justices Goldberg, Harlan and White wrote separate concurrences, and 
Justices Black and Stewart wrote dissents.  
 Even most casual students of constitutional law will be familiar with Justice 
Douglas's famous, often-mocked line from the majority opinion:  "(s)pecific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance."442  Justice Douglas pre-emptively dealt with any suggestion 
that he was inventing substantive due process rights a la Lochner v. New York.443  He 
                                               
440 Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
441 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).   
442 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (citing Poe vs. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-522 (dissenting opinion).  
443 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) was the Supreme Court case that famously held that New 
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disclaimed any intention on the part of the Court to act as a "super-legislature," charged 
with determining the wisdom or propriety of legislation.  This case though directly affected 
the "intimate relation of husband and wife," and was different from Lochner for that 
reason.444  In fact, Justice Douglas relied, in his first draft of the opinion, on the First 
Amendment's (implied) right of association, but Justice William Brennan dissuaded him 
from that course.445 
Partly as a result of Brennan's intervention, but building on his earlier dissent in 
Poe, Douglas grounded his opinion, and the Court's finding of a Fourteenth Amendment 
violation, on the right to privacy.  The right to privacy was "older than the Bill of Rights," 
Douglas wrote, speaking for the Court.446  Later critiques of the Griswold opinion 
notwithstanding, the "right to privacy" was not invented ex nihilo in that case.  The "right 
to be left alone" was recognized (albeit in a criminal case) at least as far back as Justice 
Brandeis's opinion in Olmstead and had been proposed in 1890 in a Harvard Law Review 
article by none other than Brandeis himself.447 But was this privacy right "fundamental"?   
In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg seemed to suggest so,448 although the Court 
itself, through Justice Douglas, did not quite go that far.449 
Douglas's opinion was subject to the criticism that it was incoherent.  On the one 
hand, with his language about "penumbras, formed by emanations," it could be, and has 
                                               
444 Griswold vs. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 
445 See Ball and Cooper, Of Power and Right (1991), 287; Stern and Wermiel, Justice Brennan (2010), 
285. 
446 Griswold vs. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  
447 Stern and Wermiel, Justice Brennan (2010), 281. 
448 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (1965).  
449 See Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty (2013), 250.   
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been, argued that he was basing his reasoning on rights that were merely instrumental, that 
is to say a means to secure other rights specifically enumerated.450  On the other hand, his 
language about the "right to be let alone," and its status as predating the Bill of Rights 
would call this reasoning into question.  Surely, Douglas suggested that the right of privacy 
had a standing independent of any specific enumeration in the Bill of Rights – 
notwithstanding that one commentator called his opinion in Griswold a "possibl(e) 
exception" to substantive due process holdings where the authors claimed to be merely 
recognizing preexisting (although not enumerated) rights.451 
Justice Black, in his dissent, argued that the Court's decision was based on natural 
law, because there was no specific constitutional text that prohibited the state law.452  In 
this sense, Black's dissent was rhetorically identical to Iredell's opinion in Calder.  In his 
Calder opinion, Chase did not mention "natural justice," just as the majority opinion in 
Griswold did not mention "natural law."  But Iredell and Black attributed this to Chase (in 
Calder) and to Douglas, Harlan and Goldberg (in Griswold) in order rhetorically to 
condemn what they were doing. One straightforward interpretation is that Douglas was 
referring to the long-established rights that Americans had inherited from their English 
forebears.  This debate about the nature and source of American's rights was as old as the 
Republic itself.  Strikingly, the best evidence that Douglas may have had natural rights in 
                                               
450 In fact, at least one Supreme Court justice has argued that Justice Douglas's language suggesting 
reliance on specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights (even if through penumbras and emanations) 
means that Griswold was not a substantive due process case at all.  See Lawrence vs. Texas 539 U.S. 
558, 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (2003). 
451 Ross, "A Natural Rights Basis for Substantive Due Process," Universal Human Rights, 2:2 (April – 
June, 1980) 61, 67).   
452 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381. U.S. 479, 510 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965).   
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mind comes not from the language of the opinion, but from Douglas's memoir.  There, he 
wrote that the "penumbra of the Bill of Rights reflects human rights which, though not 
explicit, are implied from the very nature of man as a child of God."453 And Justice Black, 
in his dissent, cited a Georgia Supreme Court case for the proposition that the right to 
privacy is derived from natural law.454 
Justice Harlan developed his common-law theory of constitutional adjudication at 
some length in his Griswold concurrence.455  Although he concurred in the judgment of the 
Court, he refused to join the Court's opinion, arguing that it displayed the same flaw as 
Justice Black's and Justice Stewart's dissents.  Both the majority and dissenting opinions, 
he wrote, relied on the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was 
bottomed on the Bill of Rights; just as Black could not find any "right to privacy," in the 
first eight amendments to the Constitution, so the majority opinion felt the need to justify 
its holding based on "some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights."456  
Justice Harlan would instead have held that the statute prohibiting contraceptive use 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it violated the basic 
values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," the standard laid out in Palko v. 
Connecticut.457  A law might be so repugnant to American traditions, or so inappropriate 
to free, republican governments, Harlan argued, that the Due Process Clause, standing 
                                               
453 Quoted in Ball and Cooper, Of Power and Right, 286.  Recall also Douglas's dissenting opinion in 
Poe v. Ullman.    
454 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527, n. 6 (Black, J. dissenting) (1965). 
455 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (1965). 
456 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 499 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (1965).  
457 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (1965) 
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325).  
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alone (not tied to another, more specific constitutional text) was offended.  Or to put it 
another way, the Due Process Clause "stands on its own bottom," as Harlan famously put 
it.458   
Justice Black's dissent must be discussed at considerable length, for there is much 
that is relevant to this discussion, and it is this opinion that contains the most detailed 
criticism in Supreme Court history of supposed natural law jurisprudence.   No opinion in 
Griswold claimed to rely on natural law or natural justice, but Black did make this claim, 
repeatedly, not only about the opinions in that case, but regarding the opinions in a host of 
other cases.  His opinion provides an excellent opportunity to consider the history of the 
issue in some depth.   It was a dissent that he was to call his "most difficult," because he 
found the law at issue "abhorrent, just viciously evil, but not unconstitutional."459 
Black's insistence that his brethren, both in Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court 
and in the several concurring opinions, were invoking natural law, was emphatic and 
repeated to the point of dogmatism. His tone was sharp, and he was frequently sarcastic.  
The concurring justices "did not bother" to cite Lochner, Black wrote acidly, although 
Black thought that the substantive due process methodology used here could not be 
distinguished from that discredited opinion.460 No fewer than eleven times he wrote that 
one opinion or the other relied on the justice's own application of "natural law" or "natural 
justice" principles.461  This included citing at some length Justice Iredell's opinion in 
                                               
458 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (1965).  
459 Newman, Hugo Black (1994), 597.   
460 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965). 
461 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 511, 515, 516, 521, 523, 524, 525, 527 (n. 3, n. 4) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(1965).   
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Calder, for it was the Iredell approach that Black adopted.462  Black objected to standards 
such as finding that laws might violate "fundamental principles of liberty and justice" or 
are contrary to the "traditions and conscience of our people."463  
  Thus, for example, in responding to Harlan's and Byron White's concurring 
opinions, he wrote that those justices would vest the Court with power to void any state 
law it considered "arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or oppressive," or laws that were not 
rational or were "offensive to a 'sense of fairness and justice'".464  These formulas were 
based on "natural justice," Black argued, although neither Harlan nor White made that 
claim.465 Natural law principles were "mysterious and uncertain,"466 and subject to no 
limiting principle except that which might be self-imposed.467 
Black's own limiting principle was the same that he laid down in Adamson, namely 
that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected those rights secured to 
Americans by the Bill of Rights.  The specific guarantees of that document were all 
included against infringement by any state; on the other hand, no other unenumerated rights 
were.  "(T)o pass upon the constitutionality of statutes by looking to the particular standards 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution is one thing," Black 
wrote, but "to invalidate statutes because of application of 'natural law' deemed to be above 
                                               
462 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 524 – 525 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965). 
463 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479 519 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965).  Black's argument here foreshadows that 
made by Justice Scalia in Planned Parenthood, in which he argued that the Court's "undue burden" 
test was a "verbal shall game" to "conceal raw judicial policy choices."  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 987 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (1992).   
464 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965).   
465 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 511 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965).   
466 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 521 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965). 
467 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 524 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965). 
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and undefined by the Constitution is another."468 
One difficulty with the Black position was laid out by Justice Goldberg in his 
concurring opinion, which focused on the Constitution's Ninth Amendment.  The Ninth 
Amendment provides, in full, that "the enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."469  Although 
Justice Douglas referred to the Ninth Amendment in his opinion for the Court, Justice 
Goldberg would have relied on it explicitly, not as an independent basis for striking down 
the legislation, but as an interpretive tool, indicating that the Constitution's drafters 
believed that there are fundamental rights entitled to constitutional protection although not 
specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights.  To say that a state may infringe on the 
marriage relationship because that relationship is not protected by specific constitutional 
guarantees, was to make a nullity of the Ninth Amendment.470 Numerous commentators 
have agreed with this.471 
Black's position, at its base, was that the Court and concurring justices were simply 
applying natural law value judgments dressed up with stirring phraseology.   The due 
process and Ninth Amendment arguments were just claims that the Court had the power to 
strike down laws which it found irrational, unreasonable or offensive.472  Similar language, 
which various justices cobbled together from a long line of substantive due process cases 
– language condemning laws that violate "fundamental principles of liberty and justice" or 
                                               
468 Ibid., 381 U.S. 479, 525 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965).   
469 U.S. Constitution, Amendment IX.  
470 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (1965).   
471 See, for example, Fleming, Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution (2015), 80.   
472 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965). 
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are contrary to the "traditions and conscience of our people"473- were also simply 
alternative ways to describe individual notions of natural law and natural justice, according 
to Black.  
Justice Black's contribution to the natural law debate in the context of the 
Fourteenth Amendment made its final appearance in In re Winship,474 a case involving the 
well-known "beyond a reasonable doubt standard."  The Court here grappled with a New 
York statute that replaced that standard with a "preponderance of the evidence" standard 
(one more commonly associated with civil cases) in juvenile proceedings.  Specifically, 
before a juvenile could be adjudicated for an act that would have been the criminal offense 
of larceny had it been committed by an adult, New York state required only a finding under 
the lesser standard.   
The Court, with Justice Brennan writing for the majority, held two things.  First the 
Constitution's Due Process Clause mandated the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused was charged.475   
Second, where a state delinquency proceeding threatened, as in this case, a juvenile with 
confinement for six years, the same heightened standard was also required.476 
Justice Harlan joined the Court's opinion and wrote a concurring one of his own, 
emphasizing that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard embodied a "fundamental value 
determination of our society" that it is better to let a guilty defendant go free than to convict 
                                               
473 Ibid, 381 U.S. 479, 519 (Black, J., dissenting) (1965).   
474  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
475 Ibid., 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).   
476 Ibid., 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) 
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an innocent one.477  He also expressed, again, his exasperation with Justice Black's 
Fourteenth Amendment approach.  He criticized Black's claim that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not embody a requirement for "fundamental fairness" in judicial 
proceedings, but protects only those specific procedural guarantees listed in the Bill of 
Rights.478  Black's opinion was contrary to "an unbroken line of opinions" as well as 
"uncontroverted scholarly research" showing that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process protections were not so limited, Harlan wrote.479  
In dissent, Justice Black, predictably, resorted to his position that the Constitution's 
specific text controlled.  To his mind, "due process of law" meant simply that courts must 
comply with the "law of the land," that is, the existing promulgated law.480  He rejected as 
overly broad the suggestion found in a previous Court opinion that, in interpreting due 
process, courts must be guided by "those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing 
in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors,"481 and 
he also rejected the Court's opinion in Twining v. New Jersey that "no change in ancient 
procedure can be made which disregards...fundamental principles."482  It was for this latter 
point that Justice Black cited Calder in a footnote, but it was Justice Iredell's and not Justice 
Chase's opinion that he relied on. This reasoning (found in Twining) contained "the kernel 
of the 'natural law due process' notion by which this Court frees itself from the limits of a 
                                               
477 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
478Ibid., 397 U.S. 358, 375, n. 5 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
479 Ibid., 397 U.S. 358, 375, n. 2 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1970).   
480 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 379 (Black, J., dissenting) (1970).   
481 Ibid., 397 U.S. 358, 380 (Black, J. dissenting) (1970), (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land 
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276) (1856). 
482 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381 (Black, J., dissenting) (1970) (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 
211 U.S. 78, 101) (1908).   
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written Constitution," Black wrote.483  And yet it was Justice Chase, and not Iredell that 
arguably relied on natural law in Calder.  Black's citation to the Iredell opinion, arguing 
for the controlling nature of the written constitution was preceded by the signifier "cf.," 
from the Latin "confer," and evidently Black meant to suggest that Justice Iredell's 
reasoning should be compared favorably to the reasoning the Court employed in more 
recent cases, including Twining.   
Black's discussion of the nature of a written Constitution was crucial to his opinion 
in this case and in considering his reasoning generally.  He conceded that his limited view 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's reach might seem a bit cramped.  But to view it this way 
was to misunderstand the revolutionary nature of the American form of government, where 
the powers of that government were spelled out in a single written document that formed 
our "constitution."484  The fundamental law of our nation was thus consolidated in a 
comprehensive sense in a single location, keeping constitutional expositors from having to 
search for our governing principles.  In other words, and to reiterate, to the extent that 
natural law obtained in the United States, it was incorporated into existing law, including 
the single-document Constitution, and did not provide a separate, free-standing, source of 
law, permitting the judiciary a wide expanse for interpretation.  Or so felt Justice Black.   
That the specific rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights provided the only substantive 
limitations on state legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment was an argument that 
Black made with such force and frequency over more than a quarter-century, that Justice 
                                               
483 Ibid. 397 U.S. 358, 381 (Black, J., dissenting) (1970). 
484 Ibid., 397 U.S. 358, 383 (Black, J., dissenting) (1970).   
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Potter Stewart was later to label it "Pavlovian."485 Black made a mark over the same several 
decades arguing that fellow justices applied natural law in their judicial opinions as a means 
of augmenting their authority.  Winship proved to be his last such case.  Whether the right 
claimed in the case was one of substantive, as opposed to procedural, due process is not 
clear.486 
 Calder took a completely different trajectory when it next made an appearance.  It 
was a quarter of a century later, and the case did not involve economic regulation, as most 
Calder cases in the Nineteenth century had, neither did it focus on civil liberties or criminal 
procedure, as the mid Twentieth century cases had.  Instead, issues of sovereignty appeared 
again, this time under the auspices of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. 
 Seminole Tribe    
The Case was Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida487 and arose under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act ("the Act").  The framers of the Constitution had granted Congress 
the power to "regulate commerce...with the Indian Tribes."488  Pursuant to this authority, 
Congress had passed the Act, which provided, inter alia, that states have a duty to negotiate 
with Indian tribes "in good faith" toward the formation of a compact allowing for the 
conduct of certain gaming activities.489  The Seminole Tribe of Florida, using that part of 
the Act permitting it to sue to enforce its provisions, claimed that the State of Florida ("the 
State") had violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. Specifically, the state had refused 
                                               
485 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 144 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
486 See Rubin, "Square Pegs and Round Holes," Columbia Law Review, 103:4 (May 2003), 833, 848.   
487 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).   
488 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.   
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to enter into any negotiation at all regarding some proposed gaming activities.490  The State 
pleaded sovereign immunity, the principle that the state (here, I use the term in the broader 
sense of "the government") may not be sued by its own citizens.  The majority opinion 
(authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist) and the primary dissenting opinion (authored by 
Justice Souter) used the occasion to debate the nature of the common law and its effect on 
constitutional adjudication. Calder was cited (in Justice Souter's dissent), although whether 
it was natural law that had any effect on the Court's opinion that the Constitution did not 
authorize Congress to do away with the State's sovereign immunity in this case, or whether 
the Court's extra-constitutional source was common law, is subject to debate.  This was the 
same debate scholars held in evaluating Justice Chase's opinion in Calder.   
Was the principle of sovereign immunity incorporated in the Constitution, and if it 
was, did the Constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate Indian Commerce 
abrogate that immunity?  As Justice Souter recognized in dissent, the issue was 
complicated by the nature of sovereignty in the United States, where, contra Hobbes, 
sovereignty was spread among different levels of government. 491  Certainly the states were 
not sovereign with respect to the powers that the founders had specifically granted to the 
federal government.   
In the Eighteenth-Century case Chisholm v. Georgia,492 the Supreme Court ruled 
that states enjoyed no immunity against suits in federal court. Those suits might arise in 
one of two ways: 1) from a federal question, or 2) under diversity jurisdiction, the power 
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of a federal court to hear cases between citizens of different states or between a state and 
another state's citizen.493  In response, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was 
swiftly ratified, providing that the judicial power of the United States would not be 
construed as applying to suits filed against one of the United States by citizens of another 
state.494 
Subsequently, in Han v. Louisiana,495 the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment 
also barred a state's citizen from suing his state in federal court under federal question 
jurisdiction.  The Court reasoned that it would have created an anomaly if the federal courts 
could entertain suits by a citizen against his own sovereign, but not by non-citizens of a 
state suing that state.  The Eleventh Amendment, in other words, addressed the precise 
issue raised in Chisholm, whether a non-citizen of a state could sue that state in federal 
court; a state's sovereign immunity as against its own citizens was assumed.496  Or at least 
the Han Court so ruled.   
Perhaps, as Justice Souter argued in his Seminole Tribe dissent, the more plausible 
reading of the Eleventh Amendment was that its drafters intended only to strip federal 
courts of diversity jurisdiction and not of federal question jurisdiction.497  Also left 
unanswered in Hans was the question of the extent to which specific constitutional grants 
of power to the federal government deprived the states of sovereign immunity in those 
                                               
493 The Constitution provided for federal jurisdiction in suits between a state and a citizen of another 
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494 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XI.   
495 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) 
496 Ibid., 134 U.S. 1, 4 (1890).   
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121 
instances.  In a plurality opinion, four of nine justices signing onto the reasoning had stated 
that the Interstate Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity with respect to interstate commerce,498 but the Seminole Tribe Court overruled 
that case, and held also that the Indian Commerce Clause did not give Congress the power 
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
Justice Souter in dissent provided the citation to Calder, and it was perhaps the 
most stinging rebuke of Chase's opinion that appeared in a Supreme Court opinion.  Souter 
accused the Court's majority in Seminole Tribe of constitutionalizing a common law rule, 
namely that a sovereign could not be hauled into court against its will by one of its subjects, 
and giving it priority over an explicit constitutional command, namely Congress's plenary 
power to regulate Indian Commerce.499  "I know of only one other occasion on which the 
Court has spoken of extending its reach so far as to declare that the plain text of the 
Constitution is subordinate to judicially discoverable principles untethered to any written 
provision," Souter wrote.500  He was referring, of course, to Justice Chase's opinion.  That 
opinion, Souter stated flatly, was inconsistent with American constitutional principles, as 
much in 1798 as it is today.  Justice Iredell recognized this well, and his view has been 
vindicated, according to Justice Souter, who seems to have been in little or no doubt about 
the matter.  
Other justices, including Souter himself, have cited Chase's opinion more favorably 
and would do so again after Seminole Tribe.  And Souter's claim may have been a bit 
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overbroad.  First, Chase did not vote to strike down the Connecticut law in Calder.  So 
whatever the extent of Chase's hypothetical musings in that case, they were, at any rate, 
dicta, although Chase did cite the Ex Post Facto Clause as reflecting one of the "vital" 
principles to which he referred.  Second, he was not referring to the possibility of a 
constitutional provision being inconsistent with natural justice (or "the great first principles 
of the social compact"), but rather to a legislative act being contrary to those principles.  
Chase was arguing that the "plain text of the Constitution is subordinate to judicially 
discoverable principles" only in the very broad sense that, by "the "plain text" Souter was 
referring to the interpretative principle that state legislatures possess plenary power except 
where a specific power was excluded.  It seems a bit much to refer to this as "the plain text 
of the Constitution."   Third, Chase's argument was that it could not be presumed that the 
people had granted government the power to pass unjust laws; any constitutional provision 
explicitly authorizing an unjust law - which would seem to be required to sustain a claim 
that it was in the Constitution's "plain text" - would not involve any "presumptions," and 
thus would not have been subject to Chase's rule.     
Seminole Tribe was a one-of-a-kind case in the Calder biography.  It was neither a 
business/economic/contractual case, as we saw frequently in the latter part of the 19th 
Century, neither was it a personal liberty or individual autonomy case that we've seen more 
often in recent years.  But Justice Souter gave Justice Chase his due by not characterizing 
Chase's opinion as relying on natural law, but instead on common law, an argument that, 
as we have seen, other commentators had made.  
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From Right-to-Die to Eminent Domain 
Justice Souter would reference Chase's Calder opinion again in a case that has been 
popularly, if not precisely, referred to as rejecting a constitutional "right-to-die."   The case 
is Washington v. Glucksberg,501 and arose from a State of Washington law prohibiting 
anyone from "promoting" a suicide attempt.  The law was challenged by terminally ill 
patients who sought the assistance of physicians in "dying with dignity." The remaining 
respondents502 were physicians who (in order to establish their standing to bring this action) 
claimed that they would have assisted terminally ill patients in ending their lives, but for 
the Washington law.503  The trial court had ruled that the law violated both respondents' 
due process and equal protection rights, although the 9th Circuit appellate court rested its 
decision only on substantive due process.504 
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by four other 
justices,505  laid out what it characterized as established substantive due process reasoning. 
Two considerations obtained in substantive due process methodology:  First, an analysis 
of whether an asserted right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"506; 
second, a careful and precise description of the asserted right's nature.  These requirements 
                                               
501 Washington v. Glucksberg, 51 U.S. 702 (1997).  Souter references Calder in support of his and 
Harlan's general approach to interpreting the Due Process Clause, not his view of the right to die in 
particular.   
502 The "respondents" in this case were the plaintiffs at the trial court, as the patients and doctors 
challenging the law had won in an en banc decision from the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
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503 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 708 (1997). 
504 Ibid., 521 U.S. 702, 708(1997). 
505 The holding in this case was unanimous, but four justices refused to sign onto the Court's 
reasoning, each of them filing a separate opinion concurring only in the judgment.   
506 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
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would ensure that justices were not merely reading personal and subjective preferences 
into constitutional law.  The Court left unexamined the extent to which substantive rights 
might be expanded (as a matter of constitutional law) as society progresses, an issue that 
prior opinions had raised.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,507 for example, the controlling joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and 
Souter had rejected the notion that substantive due process "protects only those practices, 
defined at the most specific level that were protected against government interference by 
other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified."508  Justice Scalia chafed 
at the claim that this represented his position, writing that he had argued only that, in 
defining liberty, the Court was not free to disregard an established tradition either 
recognizing or denying the asserted right, defined at its most specific level.509 
Rehnquist, expounding further on substantive due process methodology in 
Glucksberg, wrote that the only time the Court would apply a standard of review more 
stringent than "rational basis" was when the asserted liberty was "fundamental."  In the 
event that a fundamental liberty was implicated, then the Court would apply a "strict 
scrutiny" standard – in other words, the state must have a compelling interest to justify its 
interference with the liberty interest and the challenged law must be narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.510  Justice Scalia in a later dissent, was to reiterate that this was the 
                                               
507 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).   
508 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania vs. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847(Joint opinion of 
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standard methodology in substantive due process cases.511 This methodology was 
questioned not only by Justice Souter in his opinion concurring in the judgment, but by 
commentators arguing that it is inaccurate as a historical description of the Court's 
reasoning, in the due process cases protecting rights.512  In fact, on only one occasion when 
applying substantive due process to protect a right – in Roe v. Wade513 - had the Court 
recognized a fundamental right and applied a test of strict scrutiny.  And even that case was 
modified, in pertinent part, in Casey, in which the dispositive joint opinion refused to 
classify the abortion right as "fundamental" and, instead of "strict scrutiny" applied a less 
stringent "undue burden" test.514 
The respondents in Glucksberg, relying on recent precedent, defined the right they 
were asserting as being one of "self-sovereignty" and "personal autonomy."515  The Court 
denied that it had gone so far as to previously recognize a right to "personal autonomy," 
pointing out that in previous "right-to-die" cases, it had held only that there was a liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, a recognition that was entirely consistent 
with the Nation's history and constitutional traditions.516  Accordingly, the Court held that 
there was no "fundamental right" to assisted suicide.  Thus, the State had to advance only 
rational reasons for its ban, not compelling ones.517  The Court did not need to seek far to 
                                               
511 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (2003).   
512 Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty (2013), 239.   
513 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
514 Fleming and McCain, Ordered Liberty (2013) 238 – 239; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter) (1992).   
515 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724(1997).  For this proposition, respondents cited, in 
addition to Planned Parenthood, Cruzan v. Missouri Director, Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 
(1990). 
516 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997).   
517 Ibid., 521 U.S. 702, 728-733 (1997). 
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find rational reasons for the Washington law, including protection of vulnerable and ill 
individuals, and the protection of the integrity of the medical profession, among others.  
No justice disagreed with the outcome in this case; there were no dissenting 
opinions.  The specific holding that the Washington statute prohibiting assisted suicide was 
not invalid on its face (without considering how the statute might be applied in an 
unconstitutional manner) was unanimous.  However, four justices refused to sign onto the 
Court's opinion, and reached their conclusions based on different reasoning.  One of the 
opinions concurring in the judgment was Justice Souter's.   
Justice Souter laid out a fairly exhaustive review of the history of substantive due 
process, and placed Chase's opinion in Calder within that history.  This is not to say that 
post-Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims must necessarily rely on 
principles of natural law or natural justice, but if those considerations have figured (and do 
figure) in constitutional jurisprudence, the vehicle by which they would most suitably be 
introduced would be substantive due process.  It would not be necessary to rely on non-
textual or extra-textual considerations where a specific constitutional protection obtains. 
The Court itself made that clear in Graham vs. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  There, the 
Court held that substantive due process analysis does not apply where a specific 
constitutional protection does, although that approach has been criticized as undermining 
the very rationale of substantive due process.518   
                                               
518 See Massaro, “Reviving Hugo Black?” N.Y.U. Law Review, 73:4, 1086, 1099 – 1102 (1999).  The 
other constitutional provision which is an obvious candidate for federal constitutional protection of 
unenumerated rights is the Ninth Amendment, providing that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."  the Court 
noted that the district court had relied on the Ninth Amendment in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
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In an unusual and interesting, but reasonable take, Souter characterized Chase's 
Calder opinion as one that "presage(d)...the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment," in 
suggesting that the Court had the power to void legislation that was contrary to "important 
but unenumerated principles of American government."519 This favorable citation to 
Justice Chase's opinion seems to conflict with Souter's earlier criticism of that same 
opinion.520  For while Souter had just one year previously declared that Chase's approach 
was "in conflict with American constitutionalism," he here portrayed that same opinion in 
a positive light, as emblematic of a train of thought recognizing that certain general 
principles necessarily inform free institutions, even where those principles are not 
specifically enumerated.  These seemingly contradictory approaches might support an 
interpretation that judges make indiscriminate use of their sources in order to support a 
desired result. 
In addition to discussing the pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases, Justice Souter 
recounted the early days of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence, 
where the doctrine was used mostly to enshrine the idea of "liberty" as being primarily 
economic and property-based.  Cases here include Allgeyer v. Louisiana521  and, most 
                                               
and Justice Goldberg made it the focal point of his concurrence in Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) 
although not as an in independent basis on which to strike down a legislature's act.  Justice Stewart's 
response, noting the irony of using an amendment meant to restrain the federal government as a 
vehicle by which to overturn a state statute, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) certainly had some force, and 
might partially explain why the Ninth Amendment has taken a back seat to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which explicitly binds the states.   
519 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 758 (1997). 
520 See n. 499 -500, supra, and accompanying text.   
521 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (striking down a Louisiana statute voiding a contract and 
suggesting that the Due Process Clause was not limited to procedure) (1897).   
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famously, Lochner.522  Finally, were those cases turning to an analysis of individual 
liberties as being protected against arbitrary governmental sanctions, commencing with 
Meyer v. Nebraska,523 a case holding that a state statute prohibiting schools from teaching 
the German language violated the Due Process Clause.524 
Souter argued that Justice Harlan, in his Poe dissent, laid out the proper 
methodology by which to evaluate substantive due process claims.525  Justice Harlan's 
dissent in Poe made, according to Souter, three important points.  First, was to recognize 
the importance of substantive due process and the Court's role in implementing it.  Second, 
courts, in addressing substantive due process claims, are not dealing with "extratextual 
absolutes," but instead resolving competing constitutional principles, each worthy of 
respect.  Courts are thus called on to accord relative weight to these competing principles, 
not to make deductions from a first premise.  Third, explicit attention to detail must be paid 
in recognizing, precisely specifying, and building on, substantive due process 
guarantees.526 
If one is to reconcile Souter's criticism of Chase's Calder opinion (in Seminole 
Tribe) with his favorable citation to it in Glucksberg, his argument regarding Harlan's 
second point in Poe would seem to be a promising place to start.   That is, Souter seems to 
suggest that Chase was entertaining the possibility of relying on "extratextual absolutes" 
in his Calder dicta, inveighing against absolute legislative power, whether of natural law 
                                               
522 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (striking down a New York law limiting bakery employees' 
hours as violating the Due Process Clause) (1905). 
523 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
524 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997).  
525 See footnotes 424 - 427, supra, and accompanying text.   
526 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 763 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (1997).   
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or English common law.   To the extent that Chase's opinion was suggesting that a specific 
constitutional command might be subordinated to other considerations, that opinion was 
worthy of Souter's condemnation.  To the extent that two constitutional commands 
(specific or implied, enumerated or unenumerated) were in tension with each other, the 
courts were entitled to weigh competing interests in reaching a constitutionally supportable 
result.  Here, Chase's Calder opinion was consistent with the remaining substantive due 
process cases that Souter discusses (although the concept of "substantive" due process as 
such was not a factor in Chase's opinion, of course).    
The linchpin of Souter's opinion – relying, as he thought, on Harlan's dissent in Poe 
– was the Court's duty to weigh competing interests where state infringement on individual 
liberties is said to be arbitrary.  The Court's discretion is limited by the fact that the asserted 
liberty must be consistent with and rooted in the nation's tradition, and also by its 
recognition of its judicial role.  Thus, courts are not free, when reviewing legislation, 
simply to impose an alternative reasonable reading of the resolution of competing interests.  
Instead, it is only where the "legislation's justifying principle, critically valued, is so far 
from being commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly 
applied," that a court is justified in striking it down as violating substantive due process.527  
Put another way, Souter was proposing a different methodology whereby the Court would 
evaluate claimed "liberty" interests under the Fourteenth Amendment; instead of being 
bound merely by tradition, the Court would be called on to consider whether a law was 
arbitrary, when weighed against the individual interest.  
                                               
527 Ibid., 521 U.S. 702, 783 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Ultimately, Souter agreed that the plaintiffs in this case had failed to establish a due 
process violation, although he reached his conclusion by a different route than the majority.  
Conceding that there was a long tradition in western law against suicide (a fact that was 
dispositive of the case for the Court), Souter instead weighed the plaintiff's asserted interest 
– the traditional right to medical care and counsel – against the state's asserted interest.  
Evaluating those interests, Souter was persuaded by the State's claim that its law protected 
terminally ill patients from involuntary suicide and voluntary or involuntary euthanasia.528 
Souter's use- and the Court's, in substantive due process jurisprudence -  of the 
concept of "arbitrariness," is not markedly different from Locke's in one respect, and the 
American condemnation of arbitrary lawmaking had its genesis in Locke's theories.  
According to Locke, arbitrary government is that which is not aimed at the preservation of 
the life, liberty and property of its subjects.529  The sorts of "morals" legislation that have 
often been the subject of substantive due process attacks, including prohibiting 
contraceptive use by married couples, for example, appear to have scant relationship to 
protection of life, liberty and property.  Hence the Court's insistence on a weighing of the 
asserted state interest, whether it might be said to be a "compelling" one or at least a rational 
one, against the asserted liberty interest of the individual, whether it was enumerated or not 
and whether it was "fundamental" or not.  But Locke applied his precept also in a collective 
and not merely an individualistic sense, as he stressed repeatedly that the end of 
government was the good of "mankind," and not merely the protection of individual 
                                               
528 Ibid., 501 U.S. 702, 782 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (1997).   
529 Locke, Second Treatise (1960), 171 – 172; 221- 223.   
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rights.530  The difficulty, of course, is in a precise description of the state interest involved, 
and its relative weight as opposed to the asserted liberty interest.   
Souter squarely located his methodology within American practice and tradition (a 
method his colleague Justice Scalia also advocated, although with often drastically 
different results), and considered it to be conservative in the same way the development of 
the common law is conservative.  Common law adjudication is suspicious, Souter argued, 
of broad and sweeping new claims, rejecting "all or nothing" analysis, and advocating 
instead attention to detail.  Thus the importance of exact and precise characterization of the 
rights being claimed.531  By contrast, Scalia viewed common law constitutional 
interpretation as a practice of illegitimate "living constitutionalism".532 
Still, the Glucksberg majority did not view Souter's (and by extension, Harlan's) 
methodology as placing sufficient limitations on judges' discretion.  The Court's historic 
approach of recognizing as "fundamental" only those liberty interests that were "deeply 
rooted in this nation's tradition and history" so that "neither liberty nor justice would exist 
if they were sacrificed"533 - as opposed to Souter's emphasis on "arbitrariness" or 
"purposeless restraints" - carefully refined those rights by "concrete examples," the Court 
said.534  The justices here were again debating the standards by which asserted rights would 
be identified, just as Chase and Iredell did in Calder.  And here, it appears that Justice 
                                               
530 Ibid., 229.   
531 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 772 (Souter, J., Concurring in the judgment) (1997).   
532 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1998), passim.   
533 As to whether the Court's majority accurately described the Court's historic methodology in 
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Souter, notwithstanding his earlier harsh criticism of Chase's Calder opinion, was closer to 
Chase's position, insofar as Souter saw his role as resolving constitutional principles in 
tension with each other, whereas he had criticized Chase for relying on, or at least 
indicating a willingness to rely on, purely extra-constitutional considerations.  But Iredell's 
Calder criticism that the principles of natural justice admit of no fixed standard could aptly 
be made of Souter's "arbitrary" and "purposeless" standard.535 
The nub of the dispute between the majority and Justice Souter was the manner in 
which courts would (or would not) recognize "rights" that were not previously afforded 
judicial protection as against legislative action.  And it is difficult to see that any application 
of natural law would figure prominently in such an analysis.  In its essence, natural law 
embodies principles that are timeless and not culturally bound.  The idea that natural law 
might evolve over time seems inherently contradictory.   
But some scholars have suggested that our capacity to reason our way to seeing 
natural law's principles more clearly has expanded.  In fact, James Wilson, one of America's 
intellectual founders, argued that God gives a "moral sense" to individuals enabling them 
to grasp the first principles of morality.   That people and nations disagree about the 
requirements of morality does not indicate that morality's principles are not universal or 
                                               
535 One analytical difficulty beyond the scope of this paper is the idea that legislative bodies would 
pass laws that are "purposeless" or not "rational."  Unless these standards are meant to suggest that the 
legislation was passed in a corrupt manner (which is something that Locke did suggest, as when laws 
were not promulgated for the public good), presumably a great number of individual legislators found 
the law at issue to have reason and a purpose.  On the other hand, one renowned constitutional scholar 
has argued that "it does not take a lunatic legislature to enact measures that are irrational.  It only takes 
a legislature more than normally whipped up, very intent on the expedient purpose of the moment, 
acting under severe pressure, rushed, tired, lazy, mistaken, or forsooth, ignorant."  Bickel, The Least 
Dangerous Branch, (1962), 39. 
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timeless; it merely indicates that the moral sense has become corrupted.  As Wilson put the 
point, "the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will be progressive in its 
operation and effects."536    
The idea that America's fundamental principles (as opposed to our perception of 
timeless principles) do change over time is more plausible and straightforward, though.  
Thomas Jefferson, perhaps one of the greatest "natural rights" theorists among the 
founders, argued explicitly that each generation must work out for itself its defining 
parameters.  "No society can make a perpetual constitution or even a perpetual law," he 
wrote, laying this down as a "fundamental principle," in the immediate aftermath of the 
Constitution's ratification.537  Jefferson was not questioning the existence of an eternal or 
"perpetual" law, but rather making the point that each generation must decide for itself 
which law they are to be bound by.  Moreover, he was making a point that others, like 
Blackstone before him and Iredell after him, were also to make.  The principles of natural 
law, just as the principles of a constitution, are not self-effecting; they require interpretation 
and implementation in specific circumstances.  Whether he was questioning the existence 
of an eternal law or not, Alasdair MacIntyre, in his groundbreaking work, After Virtue, was 
to argue that the Enlightenment attempt to arrive at timeless principles through reason had 
failed, and that it had failed because our philosophical traditions and precepts have a 
specific historical context that often gets overlooked.538 
                                               
536 Hall, Justice, Law and the Creation of the American Republic (2009), 6.    For the same argument, 
see Maritain, Natural Law:  Reflections on Theory & Practice (2001), 20.   
537 Smith, ed. The Republic of Letters, vol. 2, (1995) 631 – 632.  
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But if Iredell and Blackstone were correct (and surely they were) in pointing out 
that the principles of natural law and natural justice provide no fixed standards, that they 
would lead to different conclusions, inferences and implementations among different 
minds, the same criticism could be made to the common-law constitutional approach that 
Harlan and Souter favored.  Justice Scalia has famously criticized the search for judicially 
defined and constitutionally-protected rights, where those rights arguably do not reflect 
even a contemporary standard, let alone rights that are deeply rooted in the nation's 
traditions and history.  Thus did he object to Supreme Court cases finding that the Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits the execution of persons who were under the age of 
eighteen at the time of their crimes, even where numerous states permitted such 
executions,539 and to similar holdings that it is "cruel and unusual" for a state to execute 
even a mildly retarded murder defendant.540  In the area of substantive due process, Scalia 
would condemn the Court's conclusion, in 2003, that there was an emerging national 
consensus that adults had a liberty interest, entitled to "substantial" protection, in 
conducting their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.541   That debate was to continue 
as recently as 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, 542 where the Court, with Justice Kennedy 
writing for a 5-member majority, held that the right to marry was a fundamental liberty 
protected by both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and that states could not 
therefore deny marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  Justice Scalia, in dissent, called the 
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decision a "threat to American democracy," dealt by an "unelected committee of nine" 
which robbed the people of the "freedom to govern themselves."543 
One final note on Justice Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg: it is implicit in his 
gradualist, common-law type approach to substantive due process, an approach that he 
shared with the second Justice Harlan, that the sort of formulaic reasoning that would 
reduce substantive due process analysis to the binary classifications of "fundamental" 
liberty interest or not and "compelling" as against "rational" justification of state action is 
not tenable.  He envisioned, instead a continuum of liberty interests as well as a continuum 
of state responses, and, in practice, the Court's cases have not employed the sort of 
dichotomous analysis that some justices have suggested.544   
The most recent Supreme Court case, as of this writing, that cites Calder is a takings 
case under the Fifth Amendment.  The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the taking of private property for public use 
without just compensation.545  That the City of New London Connecticut did take private 
property and did provide just compensation was undisputed in Kelo v. City of New 
London.546  The issue confronted in the case was whether the taking was for a "public 
purpose," and both the majority opinion and the principal dissent cited Calder.   
The private property seized was taken by a government body and then turned over 
to a private party.  The Connecticut Legislature found that the City of New London was a 
                                               
543 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. -- (Scalia, J., dissenting) (2015).   
544 See Fleming and McClain, Ordered Liberty (2013), 242 – 243.   
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"distressed municipality" after decades of economic decline.   A private development 
corporation formed by the city submitted a comprehensive redevelopment plan, the 
cornerstone of which was a huge, private pharmaceutical research company. The City 
relied on the development corporation's detailed plans, a large planned community in 
addition to the research company, to include hotels, restaurants, museums and new private 
homes.  The petitioners in this case found their home subject to eminent domain after they 
refused to sell their property to the private development corporation.  There was no 
allegation that the homes in this action were blighted or in disrepair; on the contrary, the 
parties agreed that the homes were well-maintained and structurally sound.547  
Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion upholding the taking, while Justice 
O'Connor spoke for the four dissenters in the principal dissent (Justice Thomas, while 
joining O'Connor's opinion, also filed a separate dissent).  The Court's opinion reasoned 
that courts, in interpreting the Takings Clause, had traditionally afforded legislatures wide 
discretion in defining what constituted a "public purpose."  Accordingly, it would not 
second-guess the city's judgment regarding the efficacy of its redevelopment plan, nor the 
city's judgment about what properties it needed to claim under its eminent domain power.  
The City's plan was carefully thought-out, comprehensive and systematic, and was enacted 
pursuant to a state statute permitting the exercise of eminent domain for economic 
development – unquestionably a public purpose.548 Had it taken the property for a private 
purpose, the action would have been void, the Court said, citing Calder for this 
                                               
547 Ibid., 545 U.S. 469(2005). 
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unremarkable point.549  The citation to Calder was plainly unnecessary here, and perhaps 
was a nod to the dissent's citation to the same case in its opening paragraph.  For the only 
citation necessary to that point would have been to the Constitution itself, which provides 
explicitly that the state may exercise its eminent domain power only for a public purpose.   
The Court's second citation to Calder was far more interesting, and was to Justice 
Iredell's, not Justice Chase's opinion.  No previous Supreme Court opinion had ever cited 
this part of Calder.  In rejecting the argument that the prohibition on ex post facto laws 
extended to civil cases, Iredell analogized those types of cases to eminent domain (or 
"takings") cases.  The comparison is obvious, because one fundamental complaint in the 
Calder case was that the legislature's action in granting a new trial to one litigant was to 
deprive the other of a property interest.  Iredell noted that sometimes "private rights must 
yield to public exigencies" and cited the example (without using the term) of eminent 
domain.  Clearly, the power might be abused, but that is the very nature of power, Iredell 
wrote. That the power might be abused is not a warrant for judicial second-guessing.  Power 
cannot always be limited, and where it cannot, we must be content to "repose a salutary 
confidence," Iredell said.550 
Justice O'Connor began her dissent with a citation to Chase's Calder opinion.  This 
was apt in one sense.  Chase had offered a state action in taking the property of one private 
citizen and giving it to another as an example of a law that would be manifestly unjust, and 
thus void.  On the other hand, the same criticism made above of Steven's citation to Chase's 
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opinion could be made of O'Connor's.  That is, it seemed unnecessary, as O'Connor (and 
the three justices joining her) plainly thought that the Court had failed to apply the Takings 
Clause properly.  In fact, O'Connor wrote that Chase's dictum (that a law transferring 
property in that manner would be void) was a "long-held, basic limitation on government 
power."551  It is not clear what she meant by that.  Chase appeared to be arguing that certain 
laws might be void even in the absence of a specific Constitutional guarantee (although 
paradoxically, some of the examples he offered were the subject of constitutional 
guarantees, the taking of property among them).  With respect to state legislation (at issue 
in Calder) this is a truism of federal constitutional law in the aftermath of the incorporation 
process after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification.  It was not a truism at the time of 
Calder.  Now, there are basic limitations on government power, even at the state level, but 
they arise from the Constitution, and not the sort of extra-constitutional sources that Chase 
appeared to contemplate.552  
O'Connor's citation makes sense only under one of two circumstances.  First, if she 
was intending to suggest that there was an alternative rationale – over and above the 
Takings Clause – for striking down the exercise of eminent domain in this case, she would 
have been following Chase's dictum in its most straightforward sense.  In other words, even 
in the absence of a Takings Clause in the federal Constitution, the action might have been 
void.  But more probably, and consistently with what some have argued is the best 
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interpretation of Calder, she might have been arguing that the Takings Clause should be 
interpreted in light of natural justice principles animating the Constitution (or as other 
justices have put it the Constitution ought to be interpreted according to its "spirit.").  The 
whole point of having a Takings Clause, or any other specific limitation on governmental 
power in the Bill of Rights, would be to implement the natural law ends that the framers 
(arguably) had in mind.   
But the two-centuries’ trajectory of Calder vividly illustrates the limitations to 
“natural law” reasoning in judicial opinions.  Perhaps it illustrates also a difficulty with the 
very concept of natural law.  For if natural law embodies timeless principles, one of its 
defining characteristics in the view of all important thinkers who have written about the 
topic, one might expect that similar issues would recur in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  
That is not the case.  Instead, the late 19th and early 20th Century focus on property rights 
and economic issues has diminished dramatically from jurisprudential natural-law 
discourse in the last century.   One exception, the Kelo case, focused on a specific 
constitutional provision (the “Takings” Clause), and the appropriateness of Calder 
citations, in both the majority opinion and (especially) the dissent, was questionable. 
  It would be too much to conclude, relying on Calder citations alone, that the trend 
in natural law jurisprudence (if it is that) has turned to issues of personal autonomy.  The 
sample size of cases is simply not nearly large enough to warrant any such conclusion.  But 
the Poe, Griswold, and Glucksberg cases are all suggestive, and the idea of the 
constitutional importance of personal autonomy has certainly been engaged (if not always 
upheld, as in the case of Glucksberg) in numerous Supreme Court cases that have not cited 
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Calder.  Examples include, but are by no means limited to Roe v. Wade553 (recognizing a 
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy), Lawrence v. Texas,554 (striking down a state 
law prohibiting same-sex intercourse), and Obergefell v. Hodges555 (holding that states may 
not limit marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples). 
Whether one approves of this trend or not seems to have little to do with natural 
law considerations.  The late emphasis on individual rights and personal autonomy is 
generally disparaged by some commentators,556 applauded by others,557 treated 
ambivalently by some,558 and paradigmatically redefined by others.559  What is indisputable 
however, is that American jurisprudence now engages those issues as affecting 
fundamental rights to a much greater degree than it did a century ago.  At the same time, 
the stirring rhetoric about free enterprise and the liberty of contract that once permeated 
opinions is now largely absent.   
The issues surrounding discussions of a “fundamental law” that is not made explicit 
in the Constitution remain with us today.  These include the nature of judicial review and 
the power of courts, and a legislative body’s authority to impinge on fundamental rights, 
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however those might be defined, even in the absence of specific constitutional protections 
(or in the presence of abstract constitutional provisions).  All would agree that America’s 
historical traditions are an important consideration.   And those traditions include 
governments of limited powers, not authorized to act arbitrarily.  Whether those traditions 
sprung directly from the requirements of natural law was obviously a matter of some 
dispute.  But the evolving focus of Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes one thing 
conclusively:  If natural law does inform Supreme Court jurisprudence, either natural law 
has changed (a problematic conclusion) or our understanding of it has.  Thomas Jefferson 
recognized the inability of his founding generation to bind future generations with its 
understanding of what law was and should be; modern jurists (most notably Justices Harlan 
and Souter) have implicitly argued for each generation’s need to build gradually on what 
has gone before.  Ultimately, that may be the only reasonable – and workable – conclusion.   
 
CORFIELD AND PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES  
Introduction 
 This final section will trace the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of 
the Constitution560 by considering the cited history of Corfield v. Coryell. 561   In previous 
sections, I considered the history of Calder v. Bull,562 in which two Supreme Court justices, 
Chase and Iredell, debated the nature of constitutional interpretation and whether principles 
of “natural justice” should inform that process.  In this final section, after a brief discussion 
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of the term “privileges and immunities,” as it was understood at the time of the 1787 
Constitutional Convention, I will take the subsequent history of Corfield and consider the 
specific Constitutional provision of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  If there is an 
original (thus excluding the Bill of Rights and subsequent constitutional amendments) 
clause in the Constitution that might be said to express natural law principles, this is it.  The 
privileges and immunities of Article IV, whatever they might be, are not enumerated, at 
least not in the Constitutional text.  
A note on one key difference between my methodology here contrasted with my 
methodology in tracing the history of Calder: That case could not be tied to a specific 
constitutional clause.  Justice Iredell's whole point was that Justice Chase was arguing for 
the relevance of extra-constitutional considerations.  Justice Washington's opinion in 
Corfield, by contrast, explicitly construed the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The cases 
considered herein will necessarily also deal with that Clause. Also, an analysis of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause will focus on natural rights specifically, as opposed to 
natural law generally.  
 It would not be surprising to find some intimation that the Federal Constitution 
drafted in 1787 (replacing the existing Articles of Confederation) protected Americans’ 
“natural rights” from federal intrusion.  It has been argued that the “overwhelming majority 
of Americans” at the time believed in natural rights doctrine, and that it was “the unspoken 
assumption that no state could ever justifiably deny to its own citizens their natural 
rights.”563  On the other hand, it was also explicitly understood that the federal government 
                                               
563 Antieu, “Paul’s Perverted Privileges,” William & Mary Law Review, 9:1, 1, 5 (1967).   
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was one of limited and enumerated powers.  It did not have the “police” powers that the 
states retained to regulate health and morals. That fact provided one reason to exclude a 
Bill of Rights from the original Constitution (why provide that Congress had no power to 
restrain speech when Article I, Section 8 never gave them any such power in the first 
place?).564 The Ninth Amendment, providing protection for unenumerated rights, along 
with the rest of the Bill of Rights, was proposed by the first Congress and ratified shortly 
thereafter.   
 The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that “the Citizens of each State shall 
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”565  Like other 
constitutional clauses, this one is ambiguous on its face. It is not immediately clear, for 
instance, whether the Clause is meant to constrain states or the federal government or both.  
The wording is unusual, and unlike that of other constitutional clauses explicitly providing 
whose power is limited.  The Constitution provides, for example, that “no state shall...pass 
any law...impairing the obligation of contracts.” (emphasis supplied)566  The First 
Amendment dictates that “Congress shall pass no law...abridging the freedom of speech.” 
(emphasis supplied)567   By contrast, the Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that 
citizens of each state are “entitled” to the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the 
several states, without answering the question “entitled as against whom?”   Does the 
Clause merely bind the states, or does it give the federal government power to protect 
                                               
564 Hamilton, The Federalist, 84 (1979), 576. 
565 U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 
566 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1  
567 U.S. Constitution, Amendment I.   
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certain rights (or “privileges and immunities”) against denial by particular states? 
 A further interpretive question is the meaning of the Clause’s final four words, “in 
the several States.”  The phrase might mean one of two things:  One is that a citizen of a 
state is entitled to certain unspecified “privileges and immunities” no matter where she 
might go.  In other words, the sense of the Clause could be “A citizen, regardless of which 
of the several states she may find herself in, is entitled to the privileges and immunities of 
United States Citizens.”  But the Clause might just as easily mean something like “A citizen 
of a state, while in a sister state, is entitled to the same privileges and immunities that the 
sister state affords its own citizens.”   In this case, the Clause would be an anti-
discriminatory provision; states would be prohibited from favoring their own citizens over 
the citizens of other states.  Commentators and courts have disagreed over which of these 
is the proper interpretation.568 
 The difference is fundamental.  For if the Privileges and Immunities Clause merely 
limits a state’s authority to favor its own citizens, that is, if it only prohibits state-based 
discrimination, there would be no need to infuse the phrase with any substantive content.  
The phrase would be given meaning by the substantive laws of the state in which a citizen 
found himself.  On the other hand, if there are certain rights that no state may abridge 
because they are fundamental, whether because they are entailed by natural law or because 
they are implicit in a country with free, republican institutions, then the Clause’s 
substantive content becomes a matter of interpretation.  That interpretation must 
                                               
568 See, e.g., David R. Upham, “Corfield v. Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of American 
Citizenship,” Texas Law Review, 83 (2005):1483,1498 - 1507. 
  
145 
necessarily be guided by certain mediating principles, and one obvious possibility is the 
principles of natural law or the related but narrower concept of natural rights, a concept 
with which the Constitution’s drafters were intimately familiar.569  As one commentator 
has noted, “any discernment of those rights that belonged to citizens by right...would, in 
the absence of any clear legislative pronouncement, require an inquiry outside of strictly 
positive law - i.e., a theoretical inquiry into principles prior to or transcendent of such 
law.”570 
 The relatively few commentators who have written on the topic have differed 
widely over the proper interpretation of Article IV. (The Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
it has been noted in a classic understatement, “is not among the more definitively glossed 
provisions of the Constitution.571) One has traced the history of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause to the give-and-take over its wording before the Second Continental 
Congress included it in the Articles of Confederation.  The protection of privileges and 
immunities had two aspects in the Articles, under this line of thought - one assuring “basic, 
fundamental, natural rights of men - not only citizens, but all inhabitants.”572  The second 
guarantee was one of interstate comity or equality.  The Articles of Confederation version 
                                               
569 See, e.g., Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law (1962, 2016), 79 - 82; Stoner, Common 
Law & Liberal Theory (1992), 189 - 194; McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum (1985), 57 - 63; Zuckert, 
Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (1994), 152- 155; Rakove, Original Meanings (1997), 290 
- 291.   
570 Upham, “Corfield v. Coryell,” Texas Law Review, 83:  1483, 1497 (2005).   
571 Currie and Schreter, “Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:  Privileges and 
Immunities,” The Yale Law Journal, 69:8 (1960), 1323, 1335-133.  See also Upham, “Corfield v. 
Coryell,” Texas Law Review, 83: 1483, n.6 (“the Founders generally refrained from providing any 
detailed exposition of this provision, even during the framing and ratification of the Constitution.”) 
(2005). 
572 Antieau, “Paul’s Perverted Privileges,” William & Mary Law Review, 9:1; (1967) 1, 3. 
 
  
146 
read:   
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of 
each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice 
excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens 
in the several states; and the people of each state shall have free ingress and 
regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges 
of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and 
restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively.573 
 
The Clause reading "the free inhabitants of each of these states...shall be entitled to 
all privileges and immunities" - the “natural rights” one - was the one that appeared in the 
1787 Constitution.  Antieau argues that “the draftsmen of the Constitution, then, were not 
primarily concerned with protecting peddlers in the interstate peregrinations.  They were 
concerned with protecting human dignity and the basic rights of free men everywhere in 
the nation.”574  The few passages of the Federalist Papers addressing the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause do not, however, support this natural rights reading.  Hamilton seemed 
to place great importance on these “peddlers” with their “interstate peregrinations.”575  And 
subsequent courts have sensibly assumed that the Constitutional clause was a streamlined 
version of that found in the Articles, and that no substantive change was intended.576  
Moreover, unlike the Articles of Confederation, a document deliberately drafted to provide 
for a weak central government, the Constitution provided the central government with the 
                                               
573 Articles of Confederation, Article IV.  
574 Ibid., 1, 6 (1967).   
575 See Hamilton, The Federalist 80 (1979), 535.   
576 See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975) (“the provision was carried over into the 
comity article of the Constitution in briefer form but with no change of substance or intent.”).  See 
also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 79 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (1982).   
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authority to regulate interstate commerce;577 the second half of Article IV of the Articles 
of Confederation may be subsumed within that Constitutional power.   
 At the other end of this spectrum are those who view the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause as merely promoting comity - that is, as prohibiting states from discriminating as 
between their own residents and non-residents.  In accord with Hamilton’s later defense of 
the Clause in the Federalist, its purpose, under this reading, was to promote interstate 
comity by limiting states’ authority to discriminate against non-residents.578  This 
interpretation has the benefit of consistency with the prefatory clause of the version found 
in the Articles of Confederation.  That clause indicated that the goal was to “secure and 
perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse” among the people of the several states.  It 
also accords with some of the concerns that Charles Pinckney, said to be the principal 
author of the ultimate Constitutional provision, expressed with respect to the weaknesses 
of the Articles of Confederation and their tendency to disunion.579  Finally, as the Supreme 
Court has noted, the Clause appears in Article IV, the Constitution’s State Relations 
Article, the same article containing the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Extradition 
Clause, among other clauses clearly meant to promote interstate comity.580 
The underpinnings of natural law are more fully developed in other writings, 
including in my own papers discussing Calder. Suffice it to say they are typically defined 
in terms that distinguish natural law from positive law.  If positive law is (by definition) 
                                               
577 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.   
578 See Simpson, “Discrimination against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 128:2 (1979), 379, 383 - 384.   
579 Beeman, Richard, Plain, Honest Men:  The Making of the American Constitution (2009), 94 - 97. 
580 See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978).   
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man-made, promulgated law, natural law arises from principles that transcend positive law, 
principles that are universal.  All definitions of natural law agree on that much, although 
they may disagree as to other issues, including whether natural law is necessarily God-
given, and whether a positive law that is inconsistent with natural law is a law at all.  Those 
discussions are treated in greater detail elsewhere and need not be reexamined here.  For 
our purposes, a relevant question is whether the U.S. Constitution incorporates principles 
of natural law.  This is one plausible interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.   
Specifically, it has been suggested that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is the 
"natural rights" provision in the Constitution.  While theorists and philosophers have 
agreed that natural law embodies timeless principles more fundamental than those found 
in positive, or man-made law, "natural rights" is one part only of natural law theory.  Since 
at least the Seventeenth Century, natural rights have been viewed as possessions held by 
individuals, possessions that governments are not free to infringe.581 Thus, while "the 
philosophical foundation of the Rights of man is natural law,"582 "the power of the State 
and of social interests cannot impose itself"583 on the universe of natural rights.   
 Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington (nephew of George) provided the most 
famous and oft-cited explication of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause in 
Corfield. Washington’s writing was not a Supreme Court opinion, as he delivered it in his 
capacity as a Circuit Court judge.  In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Supreme 
Court justices engaged in the practice of “riding circuit,” that is in hearing cases as federal 
                                               
581 See Finins, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (2011), 206 – 209.  
582 Maritain, Natural Law:  Reflections on Theory & Practice (2001), 53.   
583 Ibid., (2001), 75.   
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trial court judges in their respective areas of jurisdiction (although Supreme Court justices 
are still assigned particular circuits, they no longer hear cases as trial court judges).   It was 
as a trial court judge that Justice Washington issued his opinion in Corfield.  Corfield was 
the first reported federal case construing the Privileges and Immunities Clause.584 
 The facts of the case are not complicated, and may be stated briefly. The New Jersey 
legislature passed a law prohibiting non-residents from dredging oysters in the State’s 
waters. The plaintiff alleged that the law violated Article IV, Section 2, of the Federal 
Constitution - the Privileges and Immunities Clause.585 
 In rejecting that contention, Justice Washington expressed “no hesitation” in 
limiting the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to those privileges and 
immunities which were “in their nature fundamental.”586  He then proceeded to list some 
of those “fundamental” privileges, but stressed that the list was not exhaustive. Somewhat 
cryptically (especially given the disagreement that subsequent commentators and courts 
have had in construing his meaning), Washington wrote that it would not be “difficult” to 
enumerate those privileges, but that it would be “tedious.”587  At a minimum, Washington 
wrote, he would have “no hesitation” in limiting the Clause’s application to those rights 
that were “fundamental”.   Those “fundamental” rights could be placed under the following 
heads: “Protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind and to pursue and obtain happiness and security; 
                                               
584 Meyers, W. J., “The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States,” Michigan Law 
Review, 1:4 (1903), 286, 290. 
585 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Case. 546, 553 (E.D.Pa. 1823). 
586 Ibid., 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-552 (E.D.Pa. 1823). 
587 Ibid., 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-552 (E.D.Pa. 1823). 
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subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the 
general good of the whole.”588 
Several scholars and Supreme Court justices have suggested that Washington was 
employing natural law reasoning.589   In other words, there were, in Washington’s view, 
certain fundamental rights retained by the American people that no state was entitled to 
restrict.  But Washington’s opinion left open several questions that will be explored over 
the course of this paper.  
 The paper’s methodology is straightforward.  After a brief discussion of the 
antecedents of the Privileges and Immunities Clause (the source material here is quite 
limited), I will consider those cases in which the Supreme Court, either as a court or through 
one or more individual justices (in a concurring or dissenting opinion), has cited Corfield 
for Washington’s discussion of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.   
 The United States Supreme Court (or an individual justice writing a concurring or 
dissenting opinion) has cited Corfield a total of thirty-six times as of this writing.  Space 
limitations prevent me from discussing all thirty-six cases in any detail.  Thus, though I 
have included an appendix with a list of citations to all thirty-six cases, in text, I will, with 
limited exceptions, not discuss those cases in which only issues of state discrimination are 
                                               
588 Ibid., 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551-552 (E.D.Pa. 1823).  
589 See, e.g., Upham, “Corfield vs. Coryell,” Texas Law Review 1483, 1485 (2005); “The Equal 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution,” Columbia Law Review, 28:3 (1928), 
347.  Most emphatically, Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe wrote that “Corfield can be 
understood as an attempt to import the natural rights doctrine into the Constitution by way of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.” Quoted in Levin, “Reading the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 35: 569, 579, n. 59 (2015).  
See also Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288. n. 10 (1985).   
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presented.590  As will become clear (and although different gradations have been proposed), 
Corfield Privileges and Immunities cases fall into two basic categories.  First are those 
cases that do not involve any type of state discrimination against out-of-state residents.  An 
example is Mugler v. Kansas.591  In that case, the Court addressed whether a state law that 
prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors within the state violated the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.  The statute there made no distinction between in-state 
and out-of-state residents.  Thus the Court (as in all of these types of cases) necessarily had 
to reach the issue of whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause was limited to a non-
discrimination reading.   If all that Clause meant was that each state must provide the same 
privileges and immunities to non-residents as it did to its own citizens, the Court would 
have to so conclude and refuse to read any substantive content into the Clause.  
 If, on the other hand, a case involved state discrimination against non-residents, 
different considerations obtained.  In such cases, a non-discriminatory treatment of 
Corfield would suffice, and the only analysis necessary (assuming the Court was citing 
Corfield favorably) would be whether the discrimination implicated a “fundamental” right.   
 One further note about Corfield citations:  many of them are what I refer to as 
“vicarious,” a Court opinion citing Corfield merely because the author is summarizing or 
quoting from either a speech or a previous opinion that itself cited Corfield.  This occurs 
frequently especially with respect to the Slaughterhouse cases.  Slaughterhouse (despite its 
                                               
590 The exceptions are Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898), of interest because of Justice Harlan's 
extended discussion of "fundamental rights," and Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 
436 U.S. 371 (1975), or interest because of the majority opinions discussion of what Washington 
meant by using the word "fundamental" and because of the dissent's proposal for a new test to replace 
Washington's "fundamental rights" test.  
591 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
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much-criticized methodology) remained the definitive interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause for decades, and many of the cases citing 
Corfield were really just relying on Slaughterhouse’s narrow interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s scope, which will be more fully discussed below.  
 The ultimate goal of the paper is to evaluate the extent to which the Supreme Court 
(or individual justices) has, or has not, employed natural law or natural rights 
considerations in the past two centuries, as measured by its construction of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV or the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.   Such an analysis will not constitute a complete history of natural 
law or natural rights in Supreme Court jurisprudence, but it will provide one piece of the 
puzzle.  The issue of natural law considerations in Supreme Court deliberations received 
extensive attention at least as recently as 1991, when it was raised at some length at the 
Senate confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas.592  At least one writer has argued that 
Justices Thomas and the late Antonin Scalia (a puzzling argument given that Scalia was an 
avowed positivist) relied on natural law in rendering their opinions.593 
 Moreover, whether or not the Court (or individual justices) has relied on natural 
law precepts has been an issue the justices themselves have often debated.  In Calder, the 
subject of the first two papers in this series, Justice Iredell charged that Justice Chase relied 
on precepts of “natural justice.”  And in Corfield, Justice Washington gave the most famous 
                                               
592 Tribe, “Clarence Thomas and ‘Natural Law,’” The New York Times, July 15, 1991.  
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explication of the constitutional clause that might be said to express natural right principles.   
Privileges and Immunities in 1787 
 The Privileges and Immunities Clause was made part of the American 
constitutional order in 1787, although a similar clause had appeared in the Articles of 
Confederation.  The Articles, a “League of Friendship” governing the United States prior 
to the ratification of the Constitution, entitled the “free inhabitants” of each state to the 
privileges and immunities of the “free citizens” of the several states.594   
 The terms “privileges” and “immunities” were not frequently used in either English 
or American law prior to the Constitutional Convention. Justice Thomas was to argue in 
2010 that, Blackstone apparently considered the terms to be synonymous with “rights,”595 
although his cited evidence for that was very scant, limited to a single instance of 
Blackstone's describing "rights and liberties" as "private immunities" and "civil privileges." 
Madison’s Notes on the Federal Constitution makes no mention of any debate on the 
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.  Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have 
seemed to equate the term “privilege” with “liberty.”596 
The Article's drafters appeared to be focused on uniting the states by prohibiting 
discriminatory laws (especially with respect to trade and commerce) and requiring states 
to permit free ingress and egress.  Alexander Hamilton made this point in Federalist 80, 
when he cast the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a guard against laws that would 
                                               
594 Articles of Confederation, Article IV, Section 1.  Library of Congress: “Primary Documents in 
American History.”  https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=127.  Accessed May 25, 2017.   
595 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, -- (Thomas, J., dissenting) (2010).   
596 See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 433 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-592  
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“disturb the harmony between the States,” in arguing for federal judicial jurisdiction in 
prohibiting state abridgements of privileges and immunities; he argued that the Clause 
would serve as the “very basis of union.”597 His hopes, obviously, were frustrated.  The 
Clause’s “rather cryptic brevity would prove a source of frustrating ambiguity.”598 
Similarly, James Madison seemed to have in mind state laws that discriminated 
against others.  He wrote in Federalist 42 (while also criticizing the confusing verbiage in 
the Articles of Confederation, which referred, alternately to “free inhabitants,” “free 
citizens,” and, simply, “people”) that under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Articles, more lenient citizenship laws in a sister state might permit a non-citizen resident 
to obtain citizenship in the sister state and thus elude the stricter requirements in his own 
state, as his own state would then be required to honor his “privileges and immunities.”   
To guard against this scenario, the new Constitution had wisely provided Congress the 
power to establish a uniform law of naturalization, but Madison clearly interpreted 
privileges and immunities as applying to discriminatory laws.599 
Corfield's Subsequent History 
As of this writing, Washington’s explanation of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause has been cited in a United States Supreme Court opinion (whether an opinion for 
the Court, or a concurring or dissenting opinion) a total of thirty-six times, but it would be 
fifty years before the first such citation.  This came in 1873, when Corfield was cited both 
by Justice Miller, writing for the majority, and Justice Field, writing in dissent, in the 
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Slaughterhouse Cases.600   The Slaughterhouse Cases were the first to construe the 
Fourteenth Amendment, one of three post-Civil War amendments, ratified in 1865 (the 
Thirteenth), 1868 (the Fourteenth) and 1870 (the Fifteenth).  The Fourteenth Amendment 
was perhaps the most crucial in making the American nation a united one in the Civil War’s 
aftermath.  It provided, inter alia, that no state could abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States.601  The Court had occasion to consider the implications of 
that clause in Slaughterhouse.  
The State of Louisiana provided that the slaughtering of animals in New Orleans 
could take place only in a specified area, and it granted, for an extended period of time, an 
exclusive franchise to a single corporation to carry out that function.602  The plaintiffs in 
this case argued that the legislation deprived them of property without due process of law.  
The plaintiffs included New Orleans butchers who argued that they were being denied the 
right to practice their trade, by the granting of an exclusive franchise to a single company 
to slaughter animals within the city.  The Court quickly dismissed that argument, focusing 
instead on the claim that the legislation abridged the plaintiff’s privileges and immunities 
as citizens of the United States, by depriving them of the right to practice their trade.   
Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the Court said, there were certain 
privileges and immunities that citizens enjoyed, both as citizens of the United States and 
as citizens of particular states.  However, with the limited exception of those specific 
Constitutional prohibitions against certain state actions - e.g., the Impairment of Contracts 
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Clause - protection of any rights that citizens enjoyed as citizens of the several states was 
to be provided by the states and not by federal courts.603  To hold otherwise would be to 
transfer a general “police power” to the federal government which was beyond the intent 
of the drafters of the Amendment.604  The right asserted in this case, to be free of state 
regulation in the slaughtering of animals, was not a privilege belonging to a citizen of the 
United States.  
Justice Miller, writing the opinion for the Court, cited Corfield for the point that the 
“privileges and immunities” of citizens of the United States were limited to those rights 
that were “fundamental” in nature.  He did not elaborate further.605  The Court’s 
methodology in Slaughterhouse has been vigorously criticized, although it was perhaps no 
more harshly attacked than by Justice Field’s dissent.  Justice Miller argued that “the 
framers of the Civil War amendments had never meant to disturb the relations of the states 
to the national government, when in fact that is exactly what they intended to do.”606  
Justice Field also cited Corfield in his dissent, while reaching a very different 
conclusion. Field’s concern mirrored that of Justice Chase in Calder; he feared that, even 
after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, under the Court’s reasoning a state 
legislature’s power would be without restraint. “If exclusive privileges of this character,” 
he wrote, “can be granted to a corporation of seventeen persons, they may, in the discretion 
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of the legislature, be equally granted to a single individual.  If they may be granted for 
twenty-five years, they may be equally granted for a century and for perpetuity.”607 
Field’s criticism of the Court’s opinion was forceful:  If the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of privileges and immunities did not give federal enforcement 
rights against state action, but referred only to “such privileges and immunities as were 
before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as 
belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which 
accomplished nothing.”608  However, “if the amendment refers to the natural and 
inalienable rights which belong to all citizens, the inhibition has a profound significance 
and consequence.”609 
Field’s dissent is one of the most straightforward statements to be found in the 
annals of Supreme Court opinions respecting natural rights.  While he did not make the 
argument that natural law or natural rights had any standing independent of the 
Constitution, he did maintain that the principle of natural rights had been incorporated into 
the Constitution, first through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, and then 
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The issue of 
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state residents did not present itself.   
Corfield was next cited in Supreme Court jurisprudence ten years on, and the 
citation was the first Justice Harlan’s in the Civil Rights Cases.610  In the Civil Rights Cases 
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the Court faced legislation passed by Congress that protected all citizens in their enjoyment 
of, inter alia, inns, public conveyances and theaters.611  Under the congressional enactment, 
it was a civil right violation to deny any citizen the full enjoyment of those conveniences 
“except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color.” In other words, 
the law sought to prohibit discrimination even by those acting in a private capacity. 
Congress passed the legislation, known as the Civil Rights Act of 1876, under the authority 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
  As discussed above, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited any state from 
denying citizens due process of law or the “privileges or immunities” of citizens of the 
United States.612   Its crucial importance was that it bound states, in a way that the federal 
Constitution previously had not.613   The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was largely patterned upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV; the Amendment’s primary author, Ohio Congressman John Bingham, evidently had an 
expansive view of both Constitutional provisions, and thought that the Article IV Clause 
had served to incorporate the Bill of Rights (which it antedated) as against the states, long 
before the “incorporation” debate was joined in the U.S. Supreme Court.614 
The Court struck down the Civil Rights Act, holding that neither the Thirteenth 
                                               
611 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883).  
612 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV.   
613 While there were some provisions of the Constitution as it was drafted in 1787 binding the states - 
the Contract Clause, for example - as a general rule, the original Federal Constitution defined and 
limited the powers of the Federal Government, and not the individual states.   
614 Aynes, Richard, “On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,” Yale Law 
Journal, 103:1 (1993), 57, 84.  See also Justice Black’s dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 
68 (Black, J., dissenting) (1947). 
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Amendment (abolishing “involuntary servitude” in the United States)615 nor the 
Fourteenth, authorized Congress to “legislate upon subjects which are within the domain 
of State legislation.”616  While the Fourteenth Amendment did, in Section Five, give 
Congress the power to pass “appropriate legislation” to enforce its provisions,617 this 
power, the Court held, was a check upon state legislation, and did not endow Congress 
with a general “police power” that had hitherto been the sole province of the states. Here, 
dispositively, there was no state action of any kind.618 
Crucially for our purposes, the Court explicitly declined to answer the question 
whether a state could abridge a “right” to enjoy equal accommodations in inns and public 
conveyances.  The Court did not express an opinion on whether or not this was one of the 
“essential rights of citizenship,”619 and thus a “privilege” or “immunity” that the states were 
bound to protect.620 In the Court’s view, it was unnecessary to do so in the absence of state 
action. 
Justice Harlan dissented.  He considered it axiomatic that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of a citizen’s privileges and immunities was at least coextensive 
with the guarantees of Article IV.621  Harlan read that Clause the same way Washington 
                                               
615 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIII.    
616 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).   
617 U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 5.  
618 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).   
619 Ibid., 109 U.S. 3, 19 (1883). 
620 While Article IV refers to “privileges and immunities,” the Fourteenth Amendment refers to 
“privileges or immunities.”  The difference reflects merely the fact that Article IV is phrased in terms 
of what citizens enjoy (both privileges and immunities) while the Fourteenth Amendment is phrased 
in terms of what the state may not abridge (neither privileges or immunities).  The phraseology is thus 
consistent. 
621 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 47 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (1883).   
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did.  He viewed it as guaranteeing rights that are “fundamental in citizenship in a free 
republican government.”622  He cited Corfield for the point that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause was intended to bind the states together into a single union (the same 
argument that Hamilton had made in Federalist 80).  Going beyond Hamilton’s argument, 
he interpreted the Clause as a federal guarantee that certain rights could not be abridged by 
a state, regardless of whether out-of-state citizens suffered discrimination or not.  
Harlan viewed the requirements of Article IV (as well as the Fourteenth 
Amendment) as guaranteeing certain fundamental rights irrespective of whether state 
discrimination of non-residents was involved.  Recognizing that a state might merely claim 
that it afforded privileges and immunities to only certain of its own citizens (and that, by 
extension, the Privileges and Immunities Clause required merely that it treat out-of-state 
citizens in the same manner), he emphatically would have held that the Article IV 
Privileges or Immunities Clause afforded African-Americans and freed slaves within a 
state’s jurisdiction every privilege and immunity that such state afforded its white 
citizens.623  In other words, Harlan would have given a substantive meaning to the Clause 
beyond requiring merely that states not discriminate between their own citizens and 
citizens of other states.   
  Harlan specifically argued for a broad interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and was consistent in this view; thirteen years later, he was in dissent in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, which case held that Louisiana’s system of segregating races in railway 
                                               
622 Ibid., (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1883).   
623 Ibid., 109 U.S. 3, 47 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1883). 
 
  
161 
cars did not violate that Amendment.)624 and concluded that the majority’s holding violated 
the “spirit” of the post-Civil War amendment.  But Harlan’s view, like Field’s before him, 
was in the “natural law” tradition that Washington may be said to have endorsed in 
Corfield; that is, his argument was that there are certain fundamental rights that no 
government may abridge.  He read the Privileges and Immunities Clause to be much more 
than a simple anti-discriminatory provision.  Harlan perhaps labored over his dissent in this 
case more than he did in any other in a lengthy career; although he announced his 
disagreement with Justice Bradley’s opinion for the Court from the bench at the time the 
ruling was released, it was only some months later that Harlan released his written dissent, 
an opinion that has been called “among his most eloquent and forceful...and tightly 
reasoned.”625 
The Court was later to reach a similar conclusion to its holding in The Civil Rights 
Cases in Hodges v. United States.626  Handed down about a quarter-century after the Civil 
Rights Cases, the Hodges opinion again struck down federal legislation making it a crime 
to “injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate” citizens in the exercise or enjoyment of their 
rights or privileges.627  The Court’s citation to Corfield was twice removed - it relied on 
that portion of the Slaughterhouse Cases which contained a citation to Corfield.  The 
holding with respect to the Privileges or Immunities Clause was simple, as the Court merely 
concluded that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could only counter state (and 
                                               
624 Plessy v. Ferguson, 153 U.S. 537, 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1896). 
625 Yarbrough, Judicial Enigma, 149 (1995). 
626 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). 
627 Ibid., 203 U.S. 1, 13 (1906).  
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not private) action.  Harlan was again in dissent.628 
Corfield next made its appearance in Mugler v. Kansas.629 As mentioned above, 
there the Court reviewed a Kansas statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of 
intoxicating liquors within the state.  As in the Slaughterhouse Cases and the Civil Rights 
Cases, again, no state law discriminating against out-of-state residents (the fact pattern in 
Corfield) presented itself.  Still, the plaintiffs, who owned and operated a brewery prior to 
the law’s passage, contended that the law abridged their privileges and immunities.   The 
Court, Justice Harlan writing for the majority, rejected the argument, although it did not 
reject natural law reasoning.  In fact, Harlan’s opinion for the Court appeared to embrace 
the possibility of natural law as a limiting factor on state legislative action.  There are, he 
wrote “of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go.”630  “If, therefore, 
a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or 
the public safety has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable 
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge 
and thereby give effect to the Constitution.”631  The reference to the Constitution 
notwithstanding, Harlan here appears to contemplate a higher law when he refers to the 
“fundamental law.”  For if a state law (especially after the Fourteenth Amendment) violated 
a specific constitutional provision, it would not matter if it had a “real or substantial 
relation” to the public health - it would still be unconstitutional.  Nevertheless, in this case, 
                                               
628 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1906). 
629 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
630 Ibid., 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) 
631 Ibid., 123 U.S. 661 (1887). (emphasis supplied.)   
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the Court concluded that the right to manufacture intoxicating liquors does not “inhere in 
citizenship.”632  Put another way, it was not “fundamental.”  Still, at this date, the Court 
was contemplating the Privileges and Immunities Clause as providing certain substantive 
liberty guarantees.   
In Blake v. McClung,633 we are concerned again with an opinion written by Justice 
Harlan, again an opinion speaking for the Court (Harlan’s most famous opinions, including 
those in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy, are dissents).  Blake is one in a long line of cases 
in which the Court applies the Privileges and Immunities Clause in only its non-
discriminatory aspect. The plaintiffs here claimed a violation of both the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Court framed the issue as whether a state may, consistent with the 
Constitution, exclude citizens of other states from collecting on the assets of an insolvent 
corporation until the claims of citizens of its own state were satisfied.634 
In answering “no” to that question, the Court considered Corfield at some length.  
As Harlan noted in his opinion, Justice Washington’s enumeration of specific rights that 
could not be abridged included the right to sue and be sued and to take hold of and possess 
property.  While courts were careful not to specifically delineate the exact parameters of 
privileges and immunities (a procedure that must take place on a case-by-case basis), the 
right to institute actions was one specifically mentioned both in Corfield and by Justice 
                                               
632 Ibid., 123 U.S. 662 (1887).  
633 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898). 
634 Ibid., 172 U.S. 239, 248 (1898). 
 
  
164 
Story in his Commentaries.635  This right, was therefore, fundamental.   
Interestingly, Justice Harlan here employed the strictly non-discriminatory reading 
of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.  There was little or no “natural law” or 
“natural rights” language in this opinion.  He quoted Slaughterhouse for the proposition 
that the “sole purpose” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 
was a non-discriminatory one, to declare to the states that “as you grant or establish (rights) 
to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise the 
same, neither more nor less shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other states 
within your jurisdiction.”636  Harlan, of course, would have disagreed with that, although 
he quoted it approvingly here, noting that “these principles have not been modified by any 
subsequent decision of this Court.”637   
In Maxwell v. Dow,638 Justice Harlan was in dissent again.  The majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Peckham, upheld a Utah law allowing a defendant accused of robbery 
to be charged via an information instead of an indictment, and permitting him also to be 
tried by a jury of eight instead of twelve.  Conceding that these procedures would have 
violated the Sixth Amendment, had they been used in federal court, the Court here 
nonetheless upheld the Utah law.639  This case also involved the issue of “incorporation,” 
that is the question of whether the provisions of the Bill of Rights, either substantially or 
entirely, were made applicable as against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  
                                               
635 Ibid., 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898). 
636 Ibid., 172 U.S. 239, 252 (quoting Slaughterhouse 83 U.S. 77) (1898). 
637 Ibid., 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898). 
638 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). 
639 Ibid., 176 U.S. 581, 586 - 587 (1900).   
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Put another way, were the first eight amendments to the Constitution part of the “privileges 
and immunities” of citizens of the United States?  The Court cited Corfield without 
comment, and relied on Slaughterhouse to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
fundamentally alter the American system of federalism, and that the primary responsibility 
for protection of rights remained with the states.  The right to a trial by jury, the Court 
concluded, although protected in federal court by the Sixth Amendment, does not “arise 
out of the nature or essential character of the National Government.”640 
Justice Harlan’s dissent traced the history of the right to trial by jury since the time 
of King Henry VII of England.641  He did not here, as he had in the Civil Rights Cases, rely 
on any intimations of natural law; instead he made the sort of incorporation argument that 
Justice Black, decades later, was to become famous for making:  That the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights, in its entirety, against the states.  The Court’s 
opinion, he wrote, was “very far-reaching in its consequences….(t)o say of any people that 
they do not enjoy those privileges and immunities (found in the Bill of Rights) is to say 
that they do not enjoy real freedom.”642 
In Twining v. New Jersey,643 a criminal defendant accused of bank fraud in state 
court declined to take the stand, and the trial court judge instructed the jury that they were 
entitled to draw a negative inference from his failure to testify.  The Court, with Justice 
Moody writing for the majority, declined to reach the question of whether the trial court’s 
                                               
640 Ibid., 176 U.S. 581, 594 (1900). 
641 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1900).  
642 Ibid., 176 U.S. 581, 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1900).   
643 Twining v. State, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
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instructions violated the Fifth Amendment’s right against compulsory self-incrimination.  
Instead, the Court dispositively held that the Fifth Amendment right was not binding on 
the states, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not “incorporate” the Fifth.   
The Court specifically addressed the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and found (recalling and relying on the holding in 
Slaughterhouse) that the right against self-incrimination, almost universally established in 
the States prior to the adoption of the Constitution, was thus not a privilege or immunity 
of United States citizenship (as opposed to state citizenship).644  Again, the Corfield cite 
was vicarious, coming as it did from an extended quoted passage in Slaughterhouse.  
Slaughterhouse’s neat and firm distinction between the privileges of United States 
citizenship and state citizenship remained good law and limited the reach of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.  The irony of the approach taken here - finding that a “privilege” 
was not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment precisely because it was ancient enough 
to predate the Constitution -  was pointed out over a hundred years later in Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago.645 
The Slaughterhouse standard for federal enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause was altered (or at least disingenuously 
applied), it has been argued, by the Court in Colgate v. Harvey.646  A Vermont statute in 
that case applied a discriminatory tax on loans made to non-citizens of the state, even where 
(as here) the loan was made by an in-state corporation.  Specifically, a tax of four percent 
                                               
644 Ibid., 211 U.S. 78, 95 (1908). 
645 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, -- (Thomas, J., Concurring) (2010). 
646 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).  Overruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). 
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of the interest earned from loans did not apply to loans made to Vermont residents as long 
as the interest charged on the loan was less than five percent.647  The case presents an 
unusual fact pattern in that the discrimination at issue was against an in-state corporation, 
and not a non-state citizen.   
In considering the plaintiffs’ Privileges or Immunities claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Slaughterhouse’s holding that the federal court could only enforce those 
privileges arising under the national government was binding precedent, of course.  The 
Court, Justice Sutherland writing for the majority, said that “the simple inquiry is whether 
the privilege claimed is one which arises in virtue of national citizenship.”648  The Court 
went on to note that the privileges of United States citizens had never been 
comprehensively enumerated, pointing out Justice Washington’s reluctance to do so while 
construing Article IV in Corfield.649  In striking down the discriminatory tax, the Court 
explicitly held that the right “to make a lawful loan of money in any state” was a privilege 
of national citizenship, and thus protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.650 
The holding was scathingly attacked by then-Justice Stone (he would later become 
Chief Justice) in dissent.  Pointing out that Slaughterhouse had limited the application of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s (“almost forgotten”) Privileges or Immunities Clause to those 
growing out of the relationship between a citizen and the national government, he ridiculed 
                                               
647 Colgate v. Harvey., 296 U.S. 404, 418 - 419 (1935). 
648 Ibid., 296 U.S. 404, 429 (1935). 
649 Ibid., 296 U.S. 404, 429, FN 5 (1935). 
650 Ibid., 296 U.S. 404, 430 (1935). 
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the notion that the discriminatory taxation here fell under that category, when the Court 
had held that not even the protections enumerated in the first eight amendments to the 
Constitution did.651   
By one count, the Court was presented, from the time of Slaughterhouse in 1873 to 
Colgate in 1935 (a period of sixty-two years) with forty-five claims that state action had 
violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rejecting the 
claim in every instance.652  Until Colgate, that is.  Small wonder that Justice Stone referred 
to the Clause as “almost forgotten.”  Whether the Court in Colgate “deliberately repudiated 
the limitations placed upon the privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughter-House 
Cases”653 is debatable, but it seems a stretch to argue that it was reviving the “fundamental 
rights” doctrine.654  One would be hard pressed to find any examples of political thinkers 
or philosophers arguing that non-discriminatory taxation is a fundamental right protected 
by natural law or any similar precept.   And Colgate was short-lived, as the Court explicitly 
overruled the case a mere five years later.655 
More than one opinion discussed Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion in Hague 
v Committee for Industrial Organization.656  The case is significant for at least two reasons.  
First, one opinion explicitly referred to Washington’s opinion as resting on his concept of 
“natural rights.”657  Second, another justice condemned Washington’s understanding of the 
                                               
651 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 444 (Stone, J. dissenting) (1935). 
652 Pendleton, “The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 87:3 (1939), 262.  See cases assembled at 270 - 272.   
653 Ibid., 273 (1939). 
654 Ibid., 273 (1939). 
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657 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (Opinion of Roberts, J.) 
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Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause as “mistaken.”658  The case is worth 
considering in some depth.   
In Hague, the municipality of Jersey City, New Jersey placed restrictions on the 
respondent labor unions’ ability to meet and disseminate ideas and information.  The 
complaint alleged that labor unions were, inter alia, prohibited from holding lawful 
meetings on the grounds that they were communist organizations, and stopped from 
distributing leaflets and pamphlets while other organizations were permitted to distribute 
similar printed matter.659  The complainants in this case (the “respondents” at the Supreme 
Court) consisted of both individuals and organizations.   
In the leading opinion,660 Justice Roberts rejected Justice Washington’s specific 
reasoning in Corfield.  He characterized that earlier opinion as recognizing a group of 
“natural rights” and as holding that the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause was 
meant to “create rights of citizens of the United States guaranteeing the citizens of every 
State the recognition of this group of rights by every other State.”661  That view, Roberts 
held, had been superseded, in favor of a non-discriminatory reading of the Clause: “in any 
State, every citizen of any other State is to have the same privileges and immunities which 
                                               
(1939). 
658 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 532 (Opinion of Stone, J.) (1939). 
659 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 501 (Opinion of Roberts, J) (1939). 
660 There was no opinion for the very fractured Court.  Two justices did not participate in the case.  Of 
the remaining seven justices, no more than two joined any single opinion.  The specific holding that 
the municipality’s actions violated the 14th Amendment was concurred in by a 5 to 2 vote.  There was 
disagreement, however as to whether the holding should rest on Privileges and Immunities grounds or 
on due process grounds.  Compare 307 U.S. 496, 511 (Opinion of Roberts, J.) (relying on Privileges 
and Immunities) with 307 U.S. 496, 524-525 (opinion of Stone, J) (relying on Due Process).  This 
disagreement foreshadows a similar one in McDonald.  
661 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (Opinion of Roberts, J.) 
(Citing Corfield) (1939).   
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the citizens of that State enjoy.  The section, in effect, prevents a State from discriminating 
against citizens of other States in favor of its own.”662 
The question then became whether the right to freely disseminate information is a 
privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.663   The Court held that it 
was.  The right to discuss topics of national concern and to communicate regarding those 
topics was, the opinion said, “inherent in citizenship of the United States” and thus 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.664  The Court’s holding was limited to natural 
persons, so only the individual respondents prevailed.  Interestingly, Justice Roberts’ 
opinion made no effort to reconcile his claim that the right to assemble and distribute 
information was tied to national citizenship with cases holding that other, similar rights 
(e.g., the right to avoid compelled self-incrimination as discussed in Twining) were not.   
Justice Stone agreed with the result in the case.  But he disagreed that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause should be applied.  It had never been held, he noted, that freedom of 
speech and assembly are “privilege(s) or immunit(ies) peculiar to citizenship of the United 
States, to which alone the privileges and immunities clause refers.”665  He cited (of course) 
Slaughterhouse for this proposition; and he was right that Roberts’ opinion seemed to 
ignore those cautions of Slaughterhouse, which was still “good law” in 1939.  Stone noted 
that the record did not indicate that the issue of whether these rights were privileges and 
immunities specifically tied to citizenship of the United States had been fully argued and 
                                               
662 Ibid., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (opinion of Roberts, J.) (1939).   
663 If the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause were limited to a non-
discriminatory meaning, it would simply repeat the Article IV provision.  Logically, the Fourteenth 
Amendment must provide additional protection that Article IV does not.     
664 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 512 (opinion of Roberts, J.) (1939).  
665 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 519 (opinion of Stone, J.) (1939). 
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decided in the courts below.  Instead, he would have relied on a straightforward due process 
analysis.   
Wondering why Roberts and Black did not do the same, one commentator 
suggested that they wanted to limit the scope of the Due Process Clause to procedural 
guarantees.  In other words, under this reading, Roberts’ opinion in Hague was an attempt 
to get the Privileges and Immunities Clause to do the work that has subsequently been done 
by substantive due process.666  Justice Stone, by contrast, was not interested in modifying 
the reasoning in Slaughterhouse, and reasoned that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provided a greater range of protection, applying, as it did, to 
“persons” and not just “citizens.”667 
In Edwards v. People of State of California,668 the Court considered a California 
statute making it a crime to assist bringing an indigent, non-resident person into the State.  
The petitioner, a resident of California, traveled to Texas to bring his unemployed brother-
in-law back to California, and was convicted of this offense.  In striking down the 
California Statute, the Court ruled that it violated Congress’s right to regulate interstate 
commerce under Article I, Section 8.669  It was well-settled, the Court said, that the 
transportation of persons across state lines was “commerce” for purposes of that clause.   
Unwilling to rely on the Commerce Clause, Justice Douglas filed a concurring 
opinion relying instead on the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  Douglas would have held 
                                               
666 Seaman, “Constitutional Law:  Fourteenth Amendment:  Privileges and Immunities Clause:  Civil 
Liberties:  The Hague Case,” Michigan Law Review, 38:1 (1939) 57, 63.   
667 Ibid., 57, 62 (1939).   
668 Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
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that the right to travel across state lines is a right protected by “national citizenship.”670  
That point had been settled beyond dispute at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratification in 1868, Douglas wrote.  He conceded that one might find language in several 
cases indicating that the right of free movement is incident to state citizenship, but relied 
on Justice Miller’s failure, in Slaughterhouse, to characterize the right as one of state 
citizenship.671  Note here that Justice Douglas, as late as 1941 is still at least purporting to 
honor the distinction between national and state citizenship that Justice Miller laid out in 
Slaughterhouse.   
By the time of Poe v. Ullman,672 a 1961 case involving a Connecticut law banning, 
inter alia, medical practitioners from giving even married couples advice on contraceptive 
use, the second Justice Harlan was developing a substantive due process jurisprudence that 
involved a gradualist approached based on tradition, rather than any concept of natural law.  
In dissenting from the Court’s holding that the case did not present a “case or controversy” 
and thus was not justiciable, Harlan cited Corfield, just as he cited Calder as discussed in 
my paper analyzing that case,673 but only for the proposition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects rights that are fundamental.674  The 
Connecticut law at issue would be ruled unconstitutional, based on substantive due process, 
                                               
670 Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis in 
original) (1941).   
671 Ibid., 314 U.S. 160, 180 (Douglas, J., concurring) (1941). 
672 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
673 See my unpublished dissertation, The Supreme Court and Natural Law:  Calder v. Bull in the 20th 
Century and Beyond (2017), 14 – 17.   
674 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1961).  He nowhere mentioned, let alone 
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just four years later.675  
The Corfield citation in Duncan v. Louisiana676 was in Justice Black's concurring 
opinion and was contained in a speech by Senator Howard, who introduced the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the Senate.677  Here, Justice Black, a longtime proponent of the view that 
the Fourteenth Amendment fully "incorporated" the Bill of Rights as against the states, 
cited Senator Howard's speech (and reference to Corfield) for that point.   Justice Black 
and Justice Harlan here continued a debate that Black had previously had with Justice 
Frankfurter in Adamson v. California.678  In fact, Justice Harlan, concurring in Duncan, 
relied on the same scholar that Justice Frankfurter had earlier relied on, in finding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended679 to fully incorporate the Bill of Rights as 
against the states.680 
In Duncan, the State of Louisiana sentenced a defendant to sixty days in prison and 
a $300 fine for simple battery.  The Court refused to grant the defendant a jury trial.681  The 
Court traced the lineage of the right to a jury trial through both English and American law, 
                                               
675 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
676 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
677 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (Black, J., concurring) (1968).   
678 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and 332 U.S. 46, 90 
(Black, J., dissenting) (1947).  
679 I am not suggesting that "intent" should be controlling.  Such a position raises several issues 
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680 That scholar was a former student of Frankfurter's named Charles Fairman who was, two years 
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Rights," Stanford Law Review, 2 (1949) 5.  Harlan, in his Duncan dissent relied on Fairman's point 
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681 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146.  
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noting that the First Continental Congress had listed the right to trial by jury as among "the 
most essential rights and liberties of the colonists."682   It ultimately agreed with the 
petitioner (the "defendant" at trial) in this case that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury was a guarantee that the states had to honor as well.  Illustrating how infrequently the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was used, however, the Court instead relied on the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.    
 Both the opinion for the Court and the dissenting opinion discussed the continued 
viability of Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion in a 1975 case, Baldwin v. Fish and 
Game Commission of Montana.683  The Court there considered a challenge to a Montana 
law charging markedly higher fees for out-of-state hunters of elk. The Court upheld the 
fees against an Article IV Privileges and Immunities Challenge, as well as one based on 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.   
 Suggesting that the development of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence provides 
one explanation for the Court’s failure to “precise(ly) shape” the contours of Article IV’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause,684 the Court held that “only with respect to those 
‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the nation as a single entity, must 
the state treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.”685 
 Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court cited Corfield favorably for the point that, 
in regulating the use of common property, a state is not required to extend to citizens of 
                                               
682 Ibid., 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968).   
683 Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).   
684 Ibid., 436 U.S., 371, 379-380 (1978). 
685 Ibid., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). 
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other states the same advantages that it extends to its own citizens.686 Recalling Justice 
Washington’s opinion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was restricted to 
“fundamental” rights687 and rejecting the claim that Justice Washington’s analysis in 
Corfield was now a dead letter, the Court framed the issue as whether Montana’s distinction 
between residents and nonresidents “threatens a basic right in a way that offends the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.”688  In answering “no” to that question, the Court noted 
that the state law deprived no one of the right to travel or the means of livelihood, and was 
thus not “basic to the maintenance or wellbeing of the Union.”689 
 The Court’s opinion in Baldwin clarified that Justice Washington had used the term 
“fundamental” in Corfield in two different senses.  One was a “natural rights” sense, as 
when Washington wrote, for example, of the right to “life and liberty.”690  When he also 
wrote, however, of the right of the citizen to pass through or to reside in other states, or to 
maintain actions in other states, he does not seem to have had classical natural rights in 
mind; he seemed, instead, to be focusing on those interests that Hamilton had earlier 
identified in Federalist 80, those rights that bound together American citizens as 
Americans.  It was in this latter sense that the Baldwin Court thought Washington’s 
language still had force and relevance.  
Justice Brennan, speaking for himself and two other dissenters, would have 
                                               
686 Ibid., 436 U.S. 371, 384 (1978). 
687 The Court added that Washington used the term “fundamental” in “the modern as well as the 
‘natural right’ sense.” 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978).  Evidently Justice Blackmun had in in mind the 
formation and maintenance of the Union as the “modern” meaning of “fundamental.” See Bogan, 
Privileges and Immunities:  A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution (2003), 78.   
688 Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978). 
689 Ibid., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).   
690 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (1823). 
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discarded Washington’s “fundamental” rights scheme altogether.  He thought that 
Washington’s language and subsequent interpretations had hopelessly muddled the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.  That language had used a “natural rights” methodology 
which was the subject of a “controversy raging in his time,”691 which was now obsolete, in 
the dissenters’ view. Worse still, even though Washington’s understanding of the Clause 
was “seemingly discarded” in Paul v. Virginia,692 in favor of holding that the Clause merely 
prohibits a state from discriminating in favor of its own citizens, subsequent Court opinions 
had created a hybrid of the two concepts.  Thus, the Clause had come to mean that a state 
could not discriminate against citizens of other states only with respect to those 
fundamental rights it guaranteed to its own citizens.693   
The dissenters would have discarded this scheme altogether and replaced it with 
the following two-part test:  1) Is the presence or activity of nonresidents the source or 
cause of the problem or effect with which the state seeks to deal?; and 2) Does the 
discrimination practiced against nonresidents bear a substantial relation to the problem they 
present?  Only if the answer to both questions was “yes,” (and irrespective of whether the 
discrimination involved a “fundamental” right), could a discriminatory action be sustained 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.694 
 
                                               
691 Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(1978). 
692 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (holding that, for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a 
corporation is not a “person.”) (1869). 
693 Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371, 398 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1978).   
694 Ibid., 436 U.S. 371, 402 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1978). 
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Justice Thomas:  Reviving Privileges and Immunities? 
For only the second time ever the Court relied on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause in striking down a state law in Saenz v. Roe.695  In 1992, 
California passed a statute limiting welfare (specifically Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families or “TANF”) benefits to newly arrived residents, those who had lived in the state 
for less than twelve months.  In overturning the law, the Court held that it violated the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and particularly the “right 
to travel.”  That right encompassed, the Court said, three different components:  First, the 
right of a citizen to leave one state and travel to another, second, the right to be treated as 
a welcome visitor while present in the second state, and finally, for those who decide to 
reside there permanently, the right to be treated like other citizens of the state.696  It was 
this last component that was implicated in this case. Although the opinion acknowledged 
that there have been widely divergent views of what the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects (especially in Slaughterhouse), it was “common 
ground” that the right to travel at least was included.697  The Court cited Corfield in noting 
that a visitor to one state enjoys the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several 
states.698 
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in Saenz, arguing that the state was entitled to 
                                               
695 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).   The other case was Colgate. Although it will be recalled that 
the lead opinion in Hague relied on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, that approach did not 
command a majority of the Court.   
696 Ibid., 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).   
697 Ibid., 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999).   
698 Ibid., 526 U.S. 489. 499, n. 16 (1999). 
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establish a bona fide residence requirement, and disputing the argument that this claim had 
anything to do with the “right to travel.” as opposed to an equal protection claim.699  It is 
Justice Thomas’s dissent in the case though, that concerns us most here.   
Thomas argued for looking to the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.700  Tracing the “privileges and immunities” phraseology to the 1606 Charter 
of Virginia, and arguing that the term signified certain “fundamental rights and liberties 
specifically enjoyed by English citizens,”701 he cited approvingly Justice Washington’s 
language from Corfield.  In citing Corfield, he argued, persuasively, that the Congress 
which enacted the Fourteenth Amendment were heavily influenced by Washington’s 
explanation of Article IV privileges and immunities.   
Finally, Thomas (joined by Rehnquist) indicated that he would be “open to 
reevaluating” the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in “an appropriate 
case.”702  That Clause, he wrote, might displace rather than augment, some of the Court’s 
equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence.   
 Thomas’s suggestion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause might displace 
substantive due process as a vehicle for securing certain fundamental liberties has been 
taken up by at least one commentator, who has argued that it does make a difference 
                                               
699 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (1999).   
700 It is an argument that Justice Thomas perhaps makes more frequently than any other justice; in 
other cases Thomas has argued for re-examining well-settled Commerce Clause jurisprudence in favor 
of the drafters’ intent.  Although Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Thomas’s opinion in this case, 
notably, Justice Scalia, who usually shares Thomas’s “originalist” philosophy, did not, casting his lot 
with the majority instead.   
701 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 523 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (1999).   
702 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (1999).  He would accept his own 
invitation in McDonald, supra.   
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whether the Court protects fundamental rights under the rubric of Privileges or Immunities 
or under substantive due process.  Under this reasoning, using the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause would be the intellectually honest approach, and the task of discerning substantive 
rights would be “more disciplined and restrained” than it otherwise is.703 
 This reasoning is dubious.  Irrespective of whether, as an historical matter, Thomas 
is correct that the Clause was intended to secure certain fundamental liberties against state 
encroachment, the fact remains that over a century and a half of judicial pronouncements 
have passed since its enactment.  While the drafters’ intent is undoubtedly a relevant 
consideration in considering the meaning of a constitutional enactment, it cannot be the 
only one.  Such a methodology ignores the fact that not only Congress, but at least three-
quarters of states also passed the amendment, and that perhaps those supporting it had a 
variety of intentions, or even understandings of the Clause’s meaning.  Attempting to 
replace a century and a half of extensive jurisprudence with respect to substantive due 
process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities in favor of discerning the intent 
of the provisions’ drafters, is not a sensible or even a workable trade-off.  Whatever benefits 
might be gained by a fidelity to the historical context and intentions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification would be more than offset by the substantial upheaval to existing 
law that such a process would entail.  Add to that the fact that only two justices, one of 
them now deceased, have argued for such a process, and it is readily apparent that the 
suggestion is an academic one only.    
                                               
703 Shaffer, “Answering Justice Thomas in Saenz:  Granting the Privileges or Immunities Clause Full 
Citizenship within the Fourteenth Amendment,” Stanford Law Review, 52:3 (2000), 709, 733.   
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The most recent case in which justices discussed Corfield at length - and engaged 
in an extended analysis of the appropriateness of using the Due Process Clause as a means 
of incorporation, as opposed to the Privileges or Immunities Clause - was a Second 
Amendment case, McDonald v. City of Chicago. 704  The McDonald Court faced a Chicago 
City ordinance that essentially banned private gun ownership within the City.  The Second 
Amendment to the Constitution provides that “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 
infringed.”705 
The Petitioners in Chicago alleged that the city ordinance violated their Second and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Specifically, they contended that, like most of the other 
provisions in the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was 
incorporated as protection against any government action, including state and local.  In 
McDonald, the Court was squarely presented with the issue of whether they should reject 
the narrow Slaughterhouse interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, discussed at some 
length above. In other words, should they base incorporation of the Bill of Rights on the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause instead of the Due Process Clause?  The Court rejected 
the invitation, noting that (as championed by Justice Black and others), the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had become the judicially-accepted vehicle by which 
fundamental rights listed in the Bill of Rights were incorporated as against the states.706  
Turning to the Due Process Clause, the Court then held that the Second Amendment 
                                               
704 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 462 (2010). 
705 U.S. Constitution, Amendment II.   
706 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 462, -- (2010).   
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right to bear arms was “fundamental,” and that the Chicago ordinance at issue thus violated 
the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The Court rejected the 
supposed notion that the right to keep and bear arms was a “second-class right.”707  It also 
dismissed the City’s claim that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was merely an 
anti-discrimination provision - similar to the argument that eventually won the day with 
respect to Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.   
Justice Thomas did not join that part of the Court’s opinion which rejected reliance 
on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and rejected the petitioner’s invitation to repudiate 
the narrow construction of that Clause given by the Court in Slaughterhouse.  Instead, he 
filed a separate opinion, concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment.708  Instead of 
relying on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, he would have based the 
holding on the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Tracing the history of the Clause through 
Slaughterhouse and such cases as United States vs Cruikshank,709 (holding that the right to 
peaceably assemble was not one of the privileges of United States citizenship because it 
long predated the adoption of the Constitution), Thomas criticized the Court’s previous 
holdings for “marginali(zing)” the Clause.710  This marginalization, according to Thomas, 
has led to an unfortunate “substantive due process” jurisprudence that is reflected in this 
case.  Note that the late Justice Scalia was also, like Thomas, a critic of the Court’s 
                                               
707 Ibid., 561 U.S. 462, -- (2010).  
708 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, -- (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (2010).   
709 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
710 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, -- (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (2010).   
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substantive due process jurisprudence, but he explicitly accepted it in this case.711 
Justice Thomas, it will be recalled, was one justice (along with Scalia) whom critics 
suggested was willing to rely on precepts of natural law or natural rights in his 
jurisprudence.  And indeed, in McDonald, he rejected the now-widely accepted view that 
the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause was a nondiscrimination clause, in favor 
of Justice Washington’s older view.712  Article IV, Justice Thomas suggested, provides a 
certain federal guarantee of “baseline” rights that no state could abridge.713 
Justice Thomas’s view might once have carried the day.  It no longer will, and he 
could not even persuade his fellow originalist, Justice Scalia, to join him. Thomas is an 
outlier on the current court, willing to turn back decades of precedent with respect to, 
among other issues, the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.  His arguments might have received a receptive audience from past courts 
and past justices, including Washington and the first Harlan, but not at the present time.    
The drafters of Article IV of the Constitution, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
may have had natural rights in mind when they drafted it.  They may have meant that there 
were certain limits beyond which no government body could go, but one cannot conclude 
that definitively from evidence existing at the time of the Constitutional Convention.  There 
is, however, ample evidence that early jurists thought in terms of natural rights, and Justice 
Field made that explicit in his dissent in Slaughterhouse.  Quite a few of the interpretations 
                                               
711 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, -- (Scalia, J., concurring) (2010).   
712 Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371, 398 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1978). 
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of the Privileges or Immunities Clause have suggested a natural rights basis for the Clause.  
The Court's opinion in Mugler seemed to suggest as much.  Several of these opinions have 
been dissents or concurring opinions criticizing the Court for not adopting a Privileges or 
Immunities rationale.  The former category includes Justice Field's dissent in 
Slaughterhouse, Justice Harlan's dissent in Maxwell, and Justice Thomas's dissent in Saenz.   
This latter category would include Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in McDonald, and 
Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Edwards.   Of the fifteen cases citing Corfield and 
discussed in this paper (there were a total of thirty-six cases citing Corfield; as explained 
previously those opinions whose only interest in citing Corfield was for the non-
discriminatory reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause have not been discussed), 
the Corfield cite is found in eight majority opinions, five concurring opinions and six 
dissents.   However, the Court has cited the Privileges and Immunities Clause as the basis 
for its holdings only very rarely. The Privileges or Immunities Clause is now the least 
relied-upon (even though the first mentioned) part of Section I, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, taking a back seat to Due Process and Equal Protection claims.714  Still, there 
are enough suggestions in Supreme Court jurisprudence that the Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and Amendment Fourteen's Privileges or Immunities Clause are meant 
to be interpreted in light of natural rights principles.  That is largely a matter of historical 
interest now.  Although there has been a recent revival of interest in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, largely because of Justice Thomas's writings, it seems unlikely that this 
                                               
714 See Shaffer, "Answering Justice Thomas in Saenz:  Grating the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
Full Citizenship within the Fourteenth Amendment," Stanford Law Review, 52: 3 (2000), 709, 711 –
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renewed interest presages a new era of natural law jurisprudence.  But the complete story 
of natural law and natural rights in Supreme Court jurisprudence must encompass the story 
of privileges and immunities – as well as the Chase-Iredell debate in Calder. Those are two 
integral parts of any complete analysis of where the Court has been and where it might be 
going. 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
A survey of cases in which the Supreme Court speaking as the Court, or an 
individual justice writing a concuring or dissenting opinion have cited Calder for its natural 
law implications or Corfield for Justice Washington's construction of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause yields several related conclusions.   
Natural law and natural rights philosophy have had a significant impact on Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, especially in the aftermath of the Constitution's Fourteenth 
Amendment.  While one will not often (if ever) find a Court opinion that explicitly argues 
that natural law as such is controlling, there are several cases where the holding can most 
plausibly be explained as relying on natural law principles.  Moreover, there have been 
several Supreme Court justices who themselves have written in terms of "eternal justice" 
and the "law of nature" in a manner suggesting that those principles have served at least as 
substantial influences on their thinking.   
Court opinions that may be said to have relied, at least in part, on natural law 
reasoning include (but are not limited to) the following:  The Court’s opinion in McVeigh, 
the Salmon Chase and Field dissents in Knox and the other Legal Tender cases, the Field 
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dissent in Slaughterhouse,  the Salmon Chase dissent in Osborn, the Court’s opinion in 
Loan Association¸ the Harlan dissent in Atchison, the Harlan dissent in the Civil Rights 
Cases, the majority opinion (by Harlan) in Mugler (which arguably provided the bridge 
between past cases and “substantive due process”) Douglas’s dissent in Poe, the Court 
opinion (by Douglas) in Griswold, and, if one is to accept Justice Black’s argument, The 
Court’s opinions in Adamson and in re Winship, the Thomas dissent in Saenz, and the 
Thomas concurrence in McDonald.   
This is not necessarily to argue that natural law was controlling in any of these 
opinions for the Court, or dispositive for any of the single justices.  Justice Black, as has 
become apparent, was certain that several of his brethren did rely on natural law precepts.  
He was to write repeatedly – in Adamson, in Griswold and in Winship, among other cases 
– that the Court or individual justices felt that they had a roving commission, especially 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, to infuse abstract constitutional provisions with their 
own sense of universal principles or eternal law or natural justice.  He took liberties 
associated with writing dissents to be more rhetorically inclined, and even caustic, for 
Black, a jurist who believed in "strict construction," was an unapologetic positivist.  My 
own conclusions will be less dogmatic, I hope.  
Still, Court opinions such as in the McVeigh and Loan Association, and cases are 
best explained by reliance on natural law principles.  In neither of these cases did the Court 
rely on an explicit constitutional provision, while striking down a federal law in McVeigh 
and state laws in Loan Association.  Although the argument is not as straightforward in a 
case like Griswold, (as by the time of that case, the Court had developed an extensive 
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substantive due process jurisprudence), the author of the Court's opinion, Justice Douglas 
freely borrowed from the language of natural law, especially in his Poe dissent, but also in 
his memoirs.   
There are several instances of concurring or dissenting justices using the language 
of natural law.  One finds this often in dissents by Justice Field, in both the Legal Tender 
Cases and Slaughterhouse, and by Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases and Atchison.   
Then, too, there are Justice Thomas's more recent suggestions (in Saenz and McDonald) 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause ought to be revived and infused with natural 
justice principles.  
It is well to keep in mind these opinions often find a mix of natural law rhetoric and 
language regarding Americans' historic rights or the privileges that are inherent in free, 
republican governments.  It frequently is unclear whether the language is invoking natural 
law as such or natural law as mediated by historical practice and America's particular brand 
of constitutional government.  That ambiguity begins with Chase's opinion in Calder.  For 
one might argue that natural law controls in all cases and that any legislative decree 
contrary to natural justice is void (Justice Field comes close to this position).  One might 
argue that the Constitution’s drafters deliberately incorporated certain fundamental 
principles, as reflected in the Bill of Rights, and especially in the Ninth Amendment, and 
that judicial interpretation ought to be guided by this fact (an approach Justice Goldberg 
advocated in Griswold).  Or one might argue that there is no fiddling with the text of the 
Constitution, and that a jurist’s job is to interpret the text in light of history and the drafters’ 
intentions irrespective of any other “fundamental” principles (the approach taken both by 
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Justices Black and Scalia).  But it would be wrong to suggest that natural law considerations 
were merely rhetorical, either or at the time of the founding or since.   
            There are at least three trends that can be discerned by tracing the Calder history.  
First are those justices who unequivocally side with Iredell’s opinion in that case, and who 
hold that constitutional interpretation (at least by judges) is limited to what controlling 
positive law provides.  That line can be traced from Iredell, who argued that natural justice 
admits of no fixed principles, and that judges ought not to consider any extra-constitutional 
sources.  Clifford subsequently picked up that theme, as did Black and this tradition was 
most recently continued by Justice Scalia, until his passing in 2016.  The Iredell-Clifford–
Black-Scalia school is reasonably uncomplicated; judges must look to text and intention 
and interpret constitutional provisions and legislative enactments accordingly.   
            Chase’s Calder opinion has resulted in two jurisprudential lineages. First are those 
justices whose language may be fairly construed as considering natural law principles as 
such.  Field is the clearest example of this and the first Harlan also seemed to be in this 
tradition in his Civil Rights Cases and Atchison dissents and his opinion for the Court in 
Mugler. More recently Douglas and Justice Stevens may also have written in this tradition.  
Douglas’s opinions in Poe and Griswold (the latter an opinion for the Court) have already 
been reviewed above; Justice Stevens wrote a noteworthy opinion in dissenting from the 
Court’s holding in Meachum v. Fano.  There, the Court upheld a state’s refusal to grant a 
hearing to a prisoner who was transferred from one prison to another, the second prison 
imposing substantially more burdensome restrictions on the prisoner.  In dissenting, 
Stevens wrote that the majority viewed liberties as coming from the Constitution or from 
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state law.  This was incorrect, Stevens said, as the Due Process Clause protects certain 
inalienable rights.  “All men were endowed by their Creator with liberty,” Stevens wrote, 
echoing the Declaration of Independence.   There thus is a Field – Harlan I – Douglas – 
Stevens line which traces its lineage back to Chase’s Calder opinion.   
            On the other hand, are those justices who read Chase in the narrower sense that he 
was referring to principles that animate government in free, republican societies.  These 
justices have argued for a gradualist approach, avoiding sweeping rhetoric about timeless 
principles, but arguing that there are fundamental precepts inherent in American republican 
government that courts should protect irrespective of specific textual commands.  The two 
most prominent jurists in this line of thought have been Harlan II and Souter.  So finally, 
there is a Chase – Harlan II – Souter jurisprudence that seeks to avoid the apparent extremes 
of “text only” (as in the Iredell-Clifford-Black-Scalia line) and what has been criticized as 
a free-roaming jurisprudence based in natural law principles (the Chase-Field-Douglas 
line).   
            As is now apparent, there were no citations to either the Calder opinion (for its 
natural law debate) or Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion until after the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification in 1868, No Supreme Court opinion cited Calder until McVeigh 
in 1870, and none cited Corfield until Slaughterhouse in 1873.   Natural law considerations 
took on a heightened importance and interest after the American government and system 
of federalism underwent a fundamental transformation as a result of the Civil War and the 
post-Civil War amendments.  The federal Constitution instituted a government of very 
limited authority, one that did not have any of the “police powers” that were associated 
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with the state governments.   
            But after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal government, 
and thus federal courts, became guarantors of due process, privileges and immunities and 
equal protection as against the actions of individual states.   Federal courts were thus called 
on to give substantive content to these abstract constitutional guarantees and given that 
state constitutions often explicitly provided for natural law considerations, it was not 
surprising that courts would consider similar principles in interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment.   
            Beginning in 1870, then, the Supreme Court and individual justices began engaging 
the Chase-Iredell exchange in Calder, but always, for the remainder of the Nineteenth 
Century, in the economic and property sphere.   All seven of the cases in which the Chase 
and Iredell opinions were discussed for the remainder of the Century involved questions of 
judicial protections of property.  These opinions reflected the general philosophical 
atmosphere of the time, where natural law principles were often thought to serve property 
interests first.   
            That trend did not continue into the Twentieth Century.  Although property and 
contractual concerns remained paramount in cases such as Lochner, no justice was to cite 
Calder again until 1947, and only once since that time – in Kelo – have property interests 
been at stake.  Instead the cases have involved criminal law or juvenile adjudication 
(Adamson and Winship), issues of privacy and personal autonomy (Poe, Griswold, 
Glucksberg) and sovereign immunity (Seminole Tribe).   
            The Court’s substantive Due Process jurisprudence has developed along similar 
  
190 
lines.  Although the exact date of the Court’s recognition of a substantive component to the 
Due Process Clause is disputed, by 1887 – the date of the Mugler decision – the Court was 
certainly considering and applying substantive due process concerns.  Here, too, the early 
concerns were with property and economic issues.  And the Twentieth and Twenty-First 
Century focus on individual liberties and personal autonomy has also been reflected in 
Supreme Court substantive due process jurisprudence.  One scholar has referred to this 
focus as the "new morality," and that new morality is also reflected in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that has not cited Calder or Corfield.  Examples include Court holdings 
protecting the right of a woman to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy (Roe v. Wade) 
and the right of individuals to choose whom they will marry (Obergefell v. Hodges).   It is 
to be expected that while much of the Supreme Court's Nineteenth and early Twentieth 
Century cases involved considerations of natural law, broadly defined, more recent cases 
– and probably future cases, as well – will focus more narrowly on natural rights.  "There 
are limits beyond which government may not go," once meant, for example, that 
government could not interfere with the employer-employee relationship (Lochner).  It is 
now much more likely to mean that government may not interfere with personal and private 
decisions (Roe, Casey, Obergefell).   
            The Privileges and Immunities Clause (or, to use the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
verbiage, the Privileges or Immunities Clause), as reflected in Corfield citations, has taken 
a slightly different, though similar trajectory.  But here, too, it was after the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification.  The Nineteenth Century Corfield citations also came primarily 
in the economic sphere (Slaughterhouse, Mugler, Blake) although issues of Civil Rights 
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also presented themselves (The Civil Rights Cases, Hodges).  In the Twentieth Century, 
one finds the type of criminal law procedure cases that one does find much of in Calder’s 
progeny, including the cases of Maxwell, Twining and Duncan.  This is because the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause is more easily applied to criminal procedure cases, than 
is the sort of natural law analysis one finds in Calder and its progeny.  Whether a jury must 
be made up of twelve as opposed to eight members, for example, or whether a criminal 
defendant is entitled to a jury at all, are questions to which natural law provides no answer.  
One may, however (as the first Harlan did) trace the historical privileges to a jury trial that 
the English and early Americans enjoyed.   
As Justices Roberts and Brennan have both argued, the non-discriminatory reading 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause has appeared to win out.  Justice Thomas has 
attempted to revive the Privileges and Immunities Clause and infuse it with substantive 
content, but he has been an outlier on the Court, unable to persuade even his fellow 
originalist, Justice Scalia, to join with him in that venture.  Instead, the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause has been the vehicle the Court has most commonly used 
to protect individual rights and liberties.   
This study's goal has been to evaluate the use of natural law and natural rights 
concepts in Supreme Court jurisprudence by looking at the progeny of two cases, Calder 
v. Bull and Corfield v. Coryell.  Examining the history of those cases has been a fruitful 
way of conducting one part of an exhaustive history of natural law in American legal 
jurisprudence. The method is justified by the fact that these two cases are landmark pieces 
of jurisprudence, known to any student of American law and jurisprudence.  If the Chase-
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Iredell debate is engaged, it is likely to engaged with citations to those jurists.  Similarly, 
if the Privileges and Immunities Clause, one very plausible basis for natural rights 
protections in the Constitution, is to be construed, Washington's opinion in Corfield is 
likely to be cited.   
But avenues for future research have suggested themselves.  While the method 
employed here has the benefit of avoiding any subjectivity in case selection (if a case has 
the appropriate citation, it was considered; otherwise it was not), it will miss cases that 
arguably do involve debates around natural law or natural rights considerations.  Some of 
those are mentioned above.  There is also a strand of "morals" legislation that the Supreme 
Court has considered (for example, Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton) that form no part of this 
study.  But a complete history of natural law jurisprudence in the United States will pursue 
the methods used here, by for example, considering an exhaustive history of the Ninth 
Amendment.  For that provision, like the Privileges and Immunities Clause, arguably 
provides a textual basis for natural rights protection.  We have seen the Ninth Amendment 
cited in Griswold, as it was, too in Roe.  And while it was once a restraint on the federal 
government alone, perhaps that is no longer a tenable position.   
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APPENDIX – ALL CASES CITING CORFIELD V. CORYELL  
 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)  
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) 
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) 
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898)   
Canadian Northern Railway. Co.  v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920) 
Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 142 (1907) 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
C.J. Henry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943)  
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935),  
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) 
Edwards v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) 
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) 
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) 
Howlett By and Through Howlett, v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) 
Lynch v. Household Finance Corporation, 405 U.S. 538 (1972) 
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) 
Mason v. State of Missouri, 179 U.S. 328 (1900) 
Maxwell v. Dowd, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) 
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McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., 292 U.S. 230 (1934)  
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 628 (1887) 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) 
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) 
Slocum v. New York Life Insurance, 228 U.S. 364 (1913) 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985)  
Twining v. State, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) 
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) 
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) 
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